City of Dallas v. Fifley

11 Citing cases

  1. Murmur v. Bd. of Adjustment of Dallas

    718 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. App. 1986)   Cited 27 times
    Holding subsequent purchaser of property had no standing to complain of lack of notice to former owner

    Without expressly addressing this question, both of these decisions give controlling weight to the term "investment" in the sense of actual cost. See White v. City of Dallas, 517 S.W.2d 344, 348-49 (Tex.Civ.App. โ€” Dallas 1974, no writ); City of Dallas v. Fifley, 359 S.W.2d 177, 183 (Tex.Civ.App. โ€” Dallas 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In the fourth place, the alternatives to actual investment as a measure of value are illogical and contradictory in the context of termination of a nonconforming use.

  2. Farahnak v. City of Southlake Bd. of Adjustment

    No. 02-21-00202-CV (Tex. App. Feb. 10, 2022)   Cited 1 times

    See Boehme Bakery, 190 S.W.2d at 70; Christopher Columbus St. Mkt. LLC v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustments of City of Galveston, 302 S.W.3d 408, 416 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist] 2009, no pet.). The reviewing court may refuse to hear any further evidence if the record of the board's proceedings supported its determination and, in fact, the reviewing court is authorized to determine that further evidence is not necessary for the proper disposition of the matter. See Tex. Loc. Gov't Code Ann. ยง 211.011(e); City of Dall. v. Fifley, 359 S.W.2d 177, 181 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1962, writ ref d n.r.e.).

  3. Bd. of Adjustment of San Antonio v. Wende

    92 S.W.3d 424 (Tex. 2002)   Cited 134 times
    Holding that when parties have settled dispute, there is no longer a live controversy between them, and case is moot

    quirement that a nonconforming use must legally exist when a rezoning takes place); City of Pharr v. Pena, 853 S.W.2d 56, 64 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied) (same); City of Jersey Village v. Texas No. 3 LTD., 809 S.W.2d 312, 313 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ) (same); City of Silsbee v. Herron, 484 S.W.2d 154, 156-57 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (same); F.T. Biddle v. Bd. of Adjustment, Village of Spring Valley, 316 S.W.2d 437, 442 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston 1958, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (same); Caruthers v. Bd. of Adjustment, 290 S.W.2d 340, 347 (Tex.Civ.App.-Galveston 1956, no writ) (same).Thomas v. City of San Marcos, 477 S.W.2d 322, 324 (Tex.Civ.App.-Austin 1972, no writ) (relying on local ordinance requiring nonconforming use to exist at the time of annexation); City of Carthage v. Allums, 398 S.W.2d 799, 802 (Tex.Civ.App.-Tyler 1966, no writ) (relying on ordinance requiring continuous nonconforming use during the one year preceding annexation); City of Dallas v. Fifley, 359 S.W.2d 177, 181-82 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (same as Thomas); Huguley v. Bd. of Adjustment, 341 S.W.2d 212, 218 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1960, no writ) (same). The court of appeals also erred in holding that the Board's construction of the Development Code rendered section 35-3067 superfluous.

  4. City of University Park v. Benners

    485 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. 1972)   Cited 90 times
    Holding "that property owners do not acquire a constitutionally-protected vested right in property uses once commenced or in zoning classifications once made"

    This Court has considered constitutional attacks upon ordinances requiring cessation of nonconforming uses of property. City of Corpus Christi v. Allen, 152 Tex. 137, 254 S.W.2d 759 (1953); Swain v. Board of Adjustment of the City of University Park, 433 S.W.2d 727 (Tex.Civ.App. 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.); City of Dallas v. Fifley, 359 S.W.2d 177 (Tex.Civ.App. 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Allen presented an ordinance adopted by the City of Corpus Christi in 1948 which required the cessation of certain nonconforming uses on January 1, 1950.

  5. Coyel v. City of Kennedale

    No. 02-04-391-CV (Tex. App. Jan. 5, 2006)

    Appellant directs us to another case, wherein the Dallas Court of Appeals, in determining the amount of the investment the owner recouped in the nonconforming use, considered the amount of money the owner received as lease payments, which included amounts attributable to the cost of the building as well as the cost of the land. City of Dallas v. Fifley, 359 S.W.2d 177, 183 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1962, writ. ref'd n.r.e.). In Fifley, the court construed a statute that required the discontinuance of the nonconforming use under any plan whereby "the full value of the structure" can be amortized within a definite period of time.

  6. Board of Adjustment v. Winkles

    832 S.W.2d 803 (Tex. App. 1992)   Cited 5 times

    Because the Board is a quasi-judicial body, the court should uphold its order on any possible legal theory regardless of the reasons the Board gave for its decision. Murmur Corp., 718 S.W.2d at 799; City of Dallas v. Fifley, 359 S.W.2d 177, 182 (Tex.Civ.App. โ€” Dallas 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.). B. Appellate Review

  7. Plemons-Eakle Neighborhood Ass'n v. City of Amarillo

    694 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. App. 1985)

    In their first point, appellants advance the theory that the actions of Dean in surrendering her licenses and ceasing her operations at a time when she was the "user" of the premises were sufficient to constitute an abandonment and loss of a nonconforming right within the purview of Sec. 26-24(F). They argue that the ordinance is sufficiently specific to allow the conduct of the user alone to be sufficient to effectuate the abandonment regardless of any intent of the owner. In support of that proposition, they cite City of Dallas v. Fifley, 359 S.W.2d 177 (Tex.Civ.App. โ€” Dallas 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.). While appellees point out certain factors distinguishing the facts in that case from those here existent, for purposes of our discussion, we will assume that appellants' proposition is correct. Implicit in appellants' statement of their first scenario is the recognition that the discontinuance of a nonconforming use results from the concurrence of the intent to abandon and some overt act or failure to act which carries the implication of abandonment.

  8. McDonald v. Board of Adjustment

    561 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978)   Cited 5 times

    We are governed by certain established legal principles in an appeal from a decision of the Board of Adjustment, as set out in the following cases, and it would serve no purpose to reiterate those principles here except to say that a party seeking relief from a decision of the Board of Adjustment, relative to nonconforming use, has the burden of proof to establish illegality and if the evidence before the court as a whole is such that reasonable minds could have reached the conclusion that the Board must have reached in order to justify its action, then the order must be sustained. City of San Angelo v. Boehme Bakery, 144 Tex. 281, 190 S.W.2d 67 (1945); Swain v. Board of Adjustment of City of University Park, 433 S.W.2d 727 (Tex.Civ.App. Dallas 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 277, 90 S.Ct. 563, 24 L.Ed.2d 465 (1970); City of Dallas v. Fifley, 359 S.W.2d 177 (Tex.Civ.App. Dallas 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Montgomery v. City of Dallas, 245 S.W.2d 753 (Tex.Civ.App. Waco 1952, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Prior to 1965 the Zoning Code of 1950, in ยง 64-6(a), provided as follows:

  9. Benners v. City of University Park

    477 S.W.2d 326 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972)   Cited 1 times

    The courts of Texas have indicated that provisions in zoning ordinances for amortization of nonconforming uses are valid if they are reasonable and fair in operation. See City of Corpus Christi v. Allen, 152 Tex. 137, 254 S.W.2d 759 (1953); City of Dallas v. Fifley (Tex.Civ.App., 1962, writ ref., n.r.e.), 359 S.W.2d 177; Swain v. Board of Adjustment of City of Univ. Park (Tex.Civ.App., 1968, writ ref., n.r.e.), 433 S.W.2d 727. A determination of the reasonableness of such provisions should involve the consideration of such factors as the character of the neighborhood in general, the amount an owner has invested in the property, the amount of his recoupment during the grace period, protection afforded to the public, the zoning classification and use of nearby property, availability and location of other sites, the extent to which property values are adversely affected by the nonconforming use, and the amount of loss that would be suffered by the owner upon termination of the use.

  10. Board of Adjustment v. Whitlock

    442 S.W.2d 437 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969)   Cited 4 times

    6. A finding by the trial court that the evidence was overwhelmingly against the decision of the Board is a finding of fact, and is not equivalent to a finding that the Board abused its discretion, and is not controlling of the disposition of the case. The order of the Board of Adjustment is accorded a presumption of validity, and the burden is on the one attacking such order to prove it invalid or illegal. City of Dallas v. Fifley, Tex.Civ.App., 359 S.W.2d 177, wr. ref. n. r. e.; Zoning Board of Adjustment of the City of San Antonio v. Marshall, Tex.Civ.App., 387 S.W.2d 714, wr. ref. n. r. e.; Montgomery v. City of Dallas, Tex.Civ.App., 245 S.W.2d 753, wr. ref. n. r. e. The Supreme Court in Boehme Bakery, supra, stated that the test to be applied in determining the validity of the Board's order is whether or not the Board abused its discretion in making the order.