See Tex. Const. art. XVI, § 59; City of Dallas v. Sabine River Auth. of Tex., No. 03-15-00371-CV, 2017 WL 2536882, at *1 (Tex. App.-Austin June 7, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.).

Because Doe is not challenging the validity of any statute or ordinance, we conclude that the trial court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over her UDJA claim. See id.; City of Dallas v. Sabine River Auth., No. 03-15-00371-CV, 2017 WL 2536882, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin June 7, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.). Has Doe alleged a viable ultra vires claim against Chief Manley?

Nevertheless, as jurisdiction is an issue we are obliged to consider "sua sponte," OAIC Commercial Assets, L.L.C. v. Stonegate Vill., L.P. , 234 S.W.3d 726, 735 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pet. denied), our review is not limited to the "precise jurisdictional challenges or arguments presented by the parties." City of Dallas v. Sabine River Auth. , No. 03-15-00371-CV, 2017 WL 2536882, at *7 (Tex. App.—Austin June 7, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.). I am aware of no Texas authority to the contrary and no authority from any other jurisdiction to suggest that our duty to independently examine jurisdiction is directed only toward one result, leaving us obliged and free to explore for ourselves only the law and the record to avoid jurisdiction.