46 C.J. 1067, note 92; District of Columbia v. Petty, 229 U.S. 593, 33 S.Ct. 881, 57 L.Ed. 1343. Where an officer holds two distinct offices, although one is held ex officio, a bond given as to one does not cover liability as to the other. 46 C.J. 1067; U.S. v. White, 28 Fed.Cas. page 588, No. 16,686; People v. Gardner, 55 Cal. 304; People v. Edwards, 9 Cal. 286; Cooper v. People, to Use of Madison County, 85 Ill. 417; City of Chicago v. Southern Surety Co., 239 Ill. App. 628; Houser v. State, 184 Ind. 88, 110 N.E. 665; State v. Medary, 17 Ohio, 554; State v. Thomas, 88 Tenn. 491, 12 S.W. 1034; Com. v. Moody, 150 Ky. 571, 150 S.W. 680; Cook v. Clark, 16 S.W. 269, 13 Ky.Law Rep. 100; 22 R.C.L. 503; City of San Bruno v. Nat. Sur. Co., 119 Cal.App. 27, 5 P.(2d) 951; Mechen, Pub. Off. § 285; County Trustee v. Matlock, 12 N.C. 214; Alcorn v. State, 57 Miss. 273; Stearns Suretyship (3d Ed.) 257; Morrow v. Wood, 56 Ala. 1; Board of Supervision v. Ehlers, 45 Wis. 281; County Board of Education v. Bateman, 102 N.C. 52, 8 S.E. 882, 11 Am.St.Rep. 708; Columbia County v. Massie, 31 Or. 292, 48 P. 694; House v. Dallas, 96 Tex. 594, 74 S.W. 901; Coker v. Wilkinson, 142 Miss. 1, 106 So. 886. Especially so where an additional and totally distinct bond is required for such duties, even though such other bond is not in fact given. 46 C.J. 1069; Satterfield v. People, to Use of Jefferson County, 104 Ill. 448; City of Milwaukee v. United States F. G. Co., 144 Wis. 603, 129 N

But liability mayexist by reason of the language of the statute and the suretybond. (See Grays Harbor Const. Co. v. Paulk, 179 Wn. 300 [ 37 P.2d 584]; Chicago v. Southern Surety Co., 239 Ill. App. 628, 640.) And upon an examination of the statute and the bond, it becomes clear that defendants are liable under their terms.

The bond given by Chapman in this case was given by him as night marshal and covered acts done in that capacity. 11 Brandt on Suretyship and Guaranty (3 Ed.), sec. 664, page 1204; City of Chicago v. Southern Surety Co., 239 Ill. App. 628; Sec. 2888, Code of 1930; Sims v. Hundley, 125 Miss. 355, 87 So. 89. Argued orally by Mrs. Elizabeth Hulen and Tom Watkins, for appellant, and by Ralph and Sam E. Lackey, for appellee.

But liability may exist by reason of the language of the statute and the surety bond. (See GraysHarbor Const. Co. v. Paulk, 179 Wn. 300 [ 37 P.2d 584]; Chicago v. Southern Surety Co., 239 Ill. App. 628, 640.) And upon an examination of the statute and the bond, it becomes clear that defendants are liable under their terms.

The liability of the county collector of Cook county is to these public bodies and his liability in that respect is that of a surety. People v. McGrath, 279 Ill. 550; City of Chicago v. Southern Surety Co., 239 Ill. App. 628. Even if the taxes which were paid to defendant Harding as county collector had been illegally collected by him, payment being voluntary and to a public officer, it could not be recovered by plaintiffs.

While this judgment was offered in evidence in the present suit, the suit was based upon the attachment bond, not the judgment, and evidence was offered tending to prove damages to the amount for which judgment was rendered and the reasonableness of the finding as to the damages is not questioned. The defendant contends that the obligations of a surety are to be strictly construed and cannot be extended or enlarged beyond the strict condition of his bond, citing to this proposition the recent case of City of Chicago v. Southern Surety Co., 239 Ill. App. 628, where this court, in opinion by the writer, so stated. We have examined the briefs submitted in that case and find that the appellant Surety Company urged that proposition of law, citing in support of it People v. Toomey, 122 Ill. 308; Orton v. City of Lincoln, 156 Ill. 499; People for use of Fleishman v. Sowell, 186 Ill. App. 617, and People v. Wilson, 169 Ill. App. 452.