In City of Chicago v. Morris (1970), 47 Ill.2d 226, 231, 264 N.E.2d 1, the same city ordinance was considered by our supreme court which held that "whether a violation has occurred is determined by the reasonableness of the conduct in relation to the surrounding circumstances." See also City of Chicago v. Otten (1st Dist. 1971), 133 Ill. App.2d 57, 60, 272 N.E.2d 844; and United States v. Woodard (7th Cir. 1967), 376 F.2d 136, 141. The police had been called to the Goodman on the basis of Tutterow's belief that defendant was carrying a gun.
In none, however, was the issue in this case either presented or decided. People v. Crockett, 41 Ill.2d 226, 242 N.E.2d 235; City of Chicago v. Fort, 46 Ill.2d 12, 262 N.E.2d 473; People v. Sullivan, 46 Ill.2d 399, 263 N.E.2d 38; City of Rockford v. Grayned, 46 Ill.2d 492, 263 N.E.2d 866; People v. Jackson, (Ill.App.3d), 266 N.E.2d 475; People v. Flannigan, (Ill.App.3d), 267 N.E.2d 739; People v. DeKosta, (Ill.App.3d), 270 N.E.2d 475; People v. Jackson, (Ill.App.3d), 271 N.E.2d 673; City of Chicago v. Otten, (Ill.App.3d), 272 N.E.2d 844; People v. Carroll, (Ill.App.3d), 272 N.E.2d 822. • 12 Guided by principles we deem controlling, it is our judgment that Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 38, par. 31-1 which proscribes the resisting or obstructing of a peace officer, does not particularize the offense nor does it describe the acts which constitute the crime.