In the ratemaking scheme, the Commission and not the court is the fact-finding body ( People ex rel. Hartigan v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n (1987), 117 Ill.2d 120, 142) ( Hartigan I). Its findings of fact are to be accepted as prima facie true and cannot be set aside on appeal unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. ( City of Chicago v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n (1985), 133 Ill. App.3d 435, 439.) Accordingly, our review of the Commission's orders is limited to determining whether the Commission: acted within the scope of its statutory authority; set out findings of fact adequate to support its decisions; issued findings which were supported by the manifest weight of the evidence; and rendered decisions which do not infringe upon a constitutional right.
In proceedings before the Commission, once a utility makes a showing of the costs necessary to provide service under its proposed charges, it has established a prima facie case. City of Chicago v. People of Cook County, 133 Ill. App. 435 [ 133 Ill. App.3d 435], 478 N.E.2d 1369 (1985). The burden then shifts to others to show that the costs incurred by the utility are unreasonable because of inefficiency or bad faith.
In the rate-making scheme, the Commission and not the court is the fact-finding body ( People ex rel. Hartigan v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n (1987), 117 Ill.2d 120, 142[, 510 N.E.2d 865]) ( Hartigan I). Its findings of fact are to be accepted as prima facie true and cannot be set aside on appeal unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. ( City of Chicago v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n (1985), 133 Ill. App.3d 435 [, 439, 478 N.E.2d 1369].) Accordingly, our review of the Commission's orders is limited to determining whether the Commission: acted within the scope of its statutory authority; set out findings of fact adequate to support its decisions; issued findings which were supported by the manifest weight of the evidence; and rendered decisions which do not infringe upon a constitutional right.
In reviewing the Commission's construction and application of technical rules and regulations, the court must accord great weight to the Commission's decision because it is essential that the determination of issues requiring professional competence capable of evaluating technical data and expert opinion be made by the tribunal appointed by law and informed by experience. ( Village of Apple River v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n (1960), 18 Ill.2d 518, 523, 165 N.E.2d 329, 332; accord City of Chicago v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n (1985), 133 Ill. App.3d 435, 478 N.E.2d 1369.) Moreover, deference is accorded the interpretation of the authoring agency in the construction of its rules and regulations.
. Staff argued, citing City of Chicago v. People of Cook County, 133 Ill.App.3d 435, 442-43 (1985), that for a disallowance to be approved, the party should address the proposed projects identified by AIC and explain why the investments for those specific projects were imprudent. It further asserted, citing Business &Professional People for the Public Interest v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 279 Ill.App.3d 824, 829 (1996), that the Commission could only disallow costs if the evidence established unreasonableness or imprudence in AIC's business decisions.
The AG initially asserts the Commission's findings on annual DCF methodology and retention ratio are insufficient because those findings, which are based on past agency decisions, require this court to make a de novo review of the evidence. Edison counters that the Commission can rely on principles adopted in prior decisions and the Commission errs if it departs arbitrarily or capriciously from its past practices and principles, relying upon City of Chicago v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 133 Ill. App.3d 435, 440, 478 N.E.2d 1369 (1985). As stated in City of Chicago, the decisions of the Commission are not res judicata, but the Commission has the power to deal with each situation before it regardless of how it may have dealt previously with a similar or the same situation. 133 Ill. App.3d at 440.
McCann's testimony concerning a 12% "net" rate did not mandate that the trial court disregard this other evidence of the appropriate rate of return. (See City of Chicago v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n (1985), 133 Ill. App.3d 435, 478 N.E.2d 1369 (Illinois Commerce Commission's conclusion that a 6% rate of inflation was proper in computing oil prices was supported by the evidence even where there was testimony presented that those prices would not increase at all).) The trial court's determination of a 12% rate of return which did not include a shift in the payment of the property taxes was within the range of evidence established by McCann's testimony and the prior rate of return received by defendant on the same property for the period immediately preceding that at issue.
The court distinguished utility rates set by public utilities without prior review by a regulatory agency and Commission-ordered rates, concluding that the latter type of rates could not be termed excessive for the purpose of awarding reparations because the utility was required to charge the Commission-ordered rates. 2 Ill.2d 205, 212. See also Independent Voters v. Illinois Commerce Com. (1985), 139 Ill. App.3d 957, 962, 487 N.E.2d 963, appeal allowed (1986), 111 Ill.2d 582; City of Chicago v. Illinois Commerce Com. (1985), 133 Ill. App.3d 435, 449, 478 N.E.2d 1369. Although both parties agree that the distinction set down in Mandel would permit plaintiff to bring a cause of action for reparations in the present case, defendant contends that the reasonableness of its utility rates must be determined as of the time the rates were set. Defendant argues that a plaintiff seeking reparations for excessive rates may not rely upon intervening circumstances or subsequently discovered information, such as the fact here that Commonwealth Edison had charged Batavia an excessive wholesale rate, to establish a cause of action.
Although the burden of proof of the reasonableness of all costs incurred which enter into a rate increase request rests with the utility, the utility's expenses are presumed to be reasonable and incurred in good faith. Missouriex rel. Southwestern Bell Co. v. Public Service Comm'nof Missouri, 262 U.S. 276, 43 S.Ct. 544, 67 L.Ed. 981 (1923) (Brandis, Jr., J., concurring); West Ohio Co. v. Pub. Util.Comm'n, 294 U.S. 63, 55 S.Ct. 316, 79 L.Ed. 761 (1935); BoiseWater Corp. v. Idaho Pub Util. Comm'n, 97 Idaho 832, 555 P.2d 163 (1976); City of Chicago v. Illinois CommerceComm'n, 133 Ill. App.3d 435, 88 Ill. Dec. 643, 478 N.E.2d 1369 (1985) (modified by statute as noted in People ex rel.Hartigan v. Illinois, 117 Ill.2d 120, 109 Ill. Dec. 797, 510 N.E.2d 865 (1987); Long Island Lighting Co. v. Pub. Serv.Comm'n, 134 A.D.2d 135, 523 N.Y.S.2d 615 (1987); City ofNorfolk v. Chesapeake Potomac Tel. Co., 192 Va. 292, 64 S.E.2d 772 (1951). This presumption does not shift the burden of persuasion but shifts the burden of production on to the Commission or other contesting party to demonstrate a tenable basis for raising the specter of imprudence. Long Island,supra. This evidence may be provided by the Consumer Advocate as an intervenor through the liberal discovery provision provided for in S.C. Code Ann. ยง 37-6-605 (Supp.
The circuit court agreed with the Commission dissenters and ruled that the majority had improperly presumed the reasonableness of Edison's costs. Edison points out that before section 30.1 was enacted, costs incurred by a utility were presumed to be reasonable (see, e.g., City of Chicago v. Illinois Commerce Com. (1985), 133 Ill. App.3d 435, 442-43), and Edison argues that the enactment of section 30.1 did not eliminate that presumption. The Commission majority agreed with Edison that the historic presumption of reasonableness had survived the enactment of section 30.1. The majority believed that once a utility demonstrated the amounts that it had actually invested in the construction of a power plant, the investment was presumed to have been reasonable and the Commission was powerless to deny recovery of those costs unless there was some showing that they were unreasonably incurred.