In explaining our determination that Plaintiffs had shown a likelihood of success on the merits, we stated as follows: Some idea of the history of the City's efforts may be gleaned from the cases of City of Chicago v. Prus, 99 Ill. App.3d 473, 54 Ill.Dec. 561, 425 N.E.2d 426 (1st Dist. 1981); City of Chicago v. Prus, 117 Ill. App.3d 455, 72 Ill.Dec. 901, 453 N.E.2d 776 (1st Dist. 1983); and City of Chicago v. Gordon, 146 Ill. App.3d 898, 100 Ill.Dec. 464, 497 N.E.2d 442 (1st Dist. 1986). As we shall discuss in text, this court has also ruled on the validity of a previous ordinance. The court agrees with plaintiff's expert witness, Robert Hamilton, who testified that a ban on all commercial outdoor advertising in residential areas would have no impact on traffic safety.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Downey v. Retirement Board, 22 Conn. App. 172, 178, 576 A.2d 582 (rejecting claim that city charter provision was repealed by implication), cert. denied, 216 Conn. 811, 580 A.2d 56 (1990); see also, e.g., Chicago v. Gordon, 146 Ill. App. 3d 898, 901, 497 N.E.2d 442 (1986) ("[w]here portions of an ordinance or statute are repeated and retained in the amendatory enactment, or where there is a simultaneous repeal and reenactment, such an amendatory ordinance or statute will not affect the rights, duties or liabilities accrued under former portions of ordinance which have been reenacted"); State v. Sundling, 248 Neb. 732, 736, 538 N.W.2d 749 (1995) ("the simultaneous repeal and reenactment of substantially the same statutory provisions is ordinarily construed to be an affirmation or continuation of the original provisions rather than a true repeal"); Raleigh v. Fisher, 232 N.C. 629, 633, 61 S.E.2d 897 (1950) (zoning ordinance enacted in 1923 remained in effect because 1944 repeal "simultaneously reenacted [it] in substantially the same terms"). My research has revealed two cases wherein courts have applied this rule to conclude that a pending action was not rendered moot by a regulatory or statutory change that did not change the substance of the provisi
The appellate court noted that after Hicks was decided in 1991, the legislature enacted Public Act 87-496 to amend section 4.1a of the Act. After factually distinguishing the contrary decisions in Village of Park Forest v. Wojciechowski, 29 Ill. 2d 435, 438 (1963), and City of Chicago v. Gordon, 146 Ill. App. 3d 898, 901 (1986), the court deemed Davis v. City of Chicago, 59 Ill. 2d 439 (1974), instructive, although it was not directly on point. 348 Ill. App. 3d at 865-66. The appellate court noted that DIDMCA specifically allowed states to adopt subsequent limitations on discount points and overcome the preemption provision.
Plaintiffs respond that the amendment to section 4.1a(f) of the Interest Act did not change the limitations on imposing fees in excess of 3% on loans with an interest rate in excess of 8%. Thus, plaintiffs argue that where an amendatory statute is enacted which reenacts some of the provisions of the former statute, such portions of the old statute as are repeated or retained, either literally or substantially, are to be regarded as a continuation of the old statute and not as the enactment of a new statute on the subject or as the repeal of the former statute. Village of Park Forest v. Wojciechowski, 29 Ill. 2d 435, 438, 194 N.E.2d 346, 348 (1963); City of Chicago v. Gordon, 146 Ill. App. 3d 898, 901, 497 N.E.2d 442, 445 (1986). The trial court agreed with plaintiffs on this point.
In determining whether the public-interest exception will be applied to retain such a moot issue for review three criteria are to be considered: (1) the public nature of the question; (2) the need for an authoritative determination to guide public officers; and (3) the likelihood the question will recur. ( City of Chicago v. Gordon (1986), 146 Ill. App.3d 898, 901.) A clear showing that all three criteria exist is needed before the case will be brought within the public-interest exception.
Furthermore, as such appeals by the State purport to be authorized by the legislature through the provisions of sections 110-2 and 110-6(f) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, we think it likely that this issue will recur in the future. (See In re N.R. (1988), 172 Ill. App.3d 14, 525 N.E.2d 1193; City of Chicago v. Gordon (1986), 146 Ill. App.3d 898, 901-02, 497 N.E.2d 442, 445; Hernandez v. Fahner (1985), 135 Ill. App.3d 372, 376, 481 N.E.2d 1004, 1007.) As our supreme court has recently stated: