City of Chicago v. Adams

13 Citing cases

  1. People v. Vera

    393 Ill. App. 3d 94 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009)   Cited 2 times
    Relying on Illinois statutory exception similar to Leon

    The court then signed the warrant, which indicated that the complainant had "subscribed and sworn to a complaint," and also signed both pages of the complaint, following the notation that it was "subscribed and sworn to before" the court. In City of Chicago v. Adams, 67 Ill. 2d 429, 433-34 (1977), a warrant was held to be valid even though the informant, who appeared before the issuing judge, failed to reduce his sworn testimony to a signed writing. The court noted that although good practice would suggest that the informant's statement be reduced to writing and verified, the record was, notwithstanding, sufficient to support the credibility of the informant and determination of probable cause.

  2. People v. Ward

    326 Ill. App. 3d 897 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002)   Cited 13 times
    In People v. Ward, 326 Ill. App. 3d 897, 762 N.E.2d 685 (2002), an SAAP attorney took over the prosecution of a criminal prosecution in which the charges originated under the Cannabis Control Act (720 ILCS 550/1 et seq. (West 1996)) and not the Illinois Controlled Substances Act (720 ILCS 570/100 et seq. (West 1996)).

    This issue presents a question of law appropriate for de novo review. In the instant case, the trial court relied on City of Chicago v. Adams, 67 Ill.2d 429, 367 N.E.2d 1299 (1977), in determining that it could go outside the four corners of the document to obtain sufficient indicia of the reliability of the cooperating witness. In that case, the Illinois Supreme Court upheld a search warrant based upon an informant's tip, but the informant was present in court and had been sworn when the complaint was presented.

  3. People v. Daehler

    373 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978)   Cited 2 times

    The State contends on appeal that the trial court erred in limiting the State's proof in support of the search warrant to the facts contained within "the four corners" of the affiant officer's complaint. We agree, finding the recent case of City of Chicago v. Adams (1977), 67 Ill.2d 429, 367 N.E.2d 1299, to be determinative of this issue, and we reverse. In Adams, a trial court during a motion to quash a search warrant permitted the police officer who had presented the complaint for a search warrant to the issuing judge to testify that the informant had appeared before the issuing judge, had been sworn and had given information upon which the search warrant was based.

  4. United States v. Patton

    962 F.3d 972 (7th Cir. 2020)   Cited 3 times   1 Legal Analyses

    Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(d)(2)(C). Illinois lacks such a requirement, see Chicago v. Adams , 67 Ill. 2d 429, 10 Ill.Dec. 533, 367 N.E.2d 1299 (1977), and the informant's statements were not recorded or transcribed. After hearing evidence on Patton's motion to suppress, the federal judge concluded that the informant had testified under oath but that almost nothing else could be pinned down: the informant did not appear in federal court, and Mings had a sketchy memory of what had been said before the state judge.

  5. State v. Lopez

    676 P.2d 393 (Utah 1984)   Cited 3 times

    Similarly, it is well settled that unless a statute or rule of criminal procedure requires otherwise a finding of probable cause for a search warrant can be based wholly or partially on sworn oral testimony heard by the magistrate and not embodied in a written affidavit. E.g., City of Chicago v. Adams, 67 Ill.2d 429, 10 Ill.Dec. 533, 367 N.E.2d 1299 (1977); People v. Schnitzler, 18 N.Y.2d 457, 276 N.Y.S.2d 616, 223 N.E.2d 28 (1966); State v. Walcott, 72 Wn.2d 959, 435 P.2d 994 (1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 890, 89 S.Ct. 211, 21 L.Ed.2d 169 (1968); United States v. Hill, 500 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 931, 95 S.Ct. 1135, 43 L.Ed.2d 404 (1975); Boyer v. Arizona, 455 F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1972); Leeper v. United States, 446 F.2d 281 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1021, 92 S.Ct. 695, 30 L.Ed.2d 671 (1972). Because statements "given on oath" stand on the same footing under § 77-23-4(1) whether reduced to writing or recorded verbatim, the only question to be resolved under § 77-23-4(2) is what "circumstances make it reasonable" to authorize sworn oral testimony given by telephone.

  6. People v. Kleinik

    233 Ill. App. 3d 458 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)   Cited 1 times

    ( Lippman v. People (1898), 175 Ill. 101, 113, 51 N.E.2d 872, 875.) More recently, the court in City of Chicago v. Adams (1977), 67 Ill.2d 429, 367 N.E.2d 1299, upheld a search warrant based on an informant's tip where the informant was present in court and sworn when the complaint was presented. Such a holding clearly implies that an applicant for a search warrant must be sworn for the warrant to be valid.

  7. People v. Freeman

    121 Ill. App. 3d 1023 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984)   Cited 16 times
    Holding police officer's observation of garage's interior through window unconstitutional because "[t]he evidence does not show the officer had to pass by the garage in order to lawfully execute the search warrant for the house, or for any other reason"

    This was sufficient for the judge to assess the informant's credibility. City of Chicago v. Adams (1977), 67 Ill.2d 429, 433-34. We do not believe the decision on the motion to suppress is controlled by the decision in People v. Garcia (1982), 109 Ill. App.3d 142.

  8. People v. Fredrics

    395 N.E.2d 723 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)   Cited 3 times

    • 5 Defendant suggests that in a case such as this, the child-informant should have been produced in court so the court being asked to issue the eavesdropping order could personally determine credibility. In support of this suggestion defendant cites the case of City of Chicago v. Adams (1977), 67 Ill.2d 429, 367 N.E.2d 1299. The issue in Adams, however, was not whether the in-court presence of the informant was the required or preferred practice, but, instead, whether such an in-court examination could be used to supplement an incomplete affidavit of the officer requesting the warrant. We conclude the application in the instant case established probable cause on its face, and thus we find no need to require the in-court presence of the informant.

  9. People v. Barker

    72 Ill. App. 3d 466 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)   Cited 8 times

    The State contends that the issuing court, when considering a complaint for a search warrant, may consider facts beyond the four corners of the complaint. (See People v. Daehler (1978), 57 Ill. App.3d 944, 373 N.E.2d 776; cf. City of Chicago v. Adams (1977), 67 Ill.2d 429, 367 N.E.2d 1299 (although affidavit itself sufficient to establish probable cause, determination of informant's reliability based upon evidence outside four corners of affidavit).) However, there is nothing in the record which indicates the issuing court actually considered anything other than the information contained in the complaint at the time the warrant was issued.

  10. People v. Moran

    58 Ill. App. 3d 258 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978)   Cited 3 times

    However, Hartfield also recognized that the requirement of an oath or affidavit should not be interpreted in a hypertechnical manner. Such avoidance of a hypertechnical approach was utilized by our supreme court recently in City of Chicago v. Adams (1977), 67 Ill.2d 429, 367 N.E.2d 1299. In that case an informant appeared before an issuing judge, but the informant's sworn testimony was not reduced to writing and signed. It was argued that because this was not done the informant could not be charged with perjury if his statements were untrue. The supreme court noted that good practice would have the issuing judge reduce the informant's statement to writing and have it verified, but concluded that the facts of the case supported the determination of probable cause, observing that the record showed that the informant was sworn before the issuing judge.