City of Carbondale ex Rel. Ham v. Eckert

4 Citing cases

  1. Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove

    695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982)   Cited 71 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the Ninth Amendment is not violated by a gun control ordinance because the Supreme Court has never held that any specific right, including the right to bear arms, is protected by the Ninth Amendment

    See City of Evanston v. Create, Inc., 85 Ill.2d 101, 51 Ill.Dec. 688, 421 N.E.2d 196 (1981). The only limits on their autonomy are those imposed by the Illinois Constitution, City of Carbondale ex rel. Ham v. Eckert, 76 Ill.App.3d 881, 32 Ill.Dec. 377, 395 N.E.2d 607 (1979), or by the Illinois General Assembly exercising its authority to pre-empt home rule in specific instances. Because we have concluded that the Illinois Constitution permits a ban on certain categories of arms, home rule units such as Morton Grove may properly enact different, even inconsistent, arms restrictions.

  2. Station Place Townhouse Condo. Ass'n v. The Vill. of Glenview

    2022 Ill. App. 211131 (Ill. App. Ct. 2022)   Cited 1 times

    ¶ 35 This issue appears to have arisen only rarely before our courts. The only case cited by either party which concerns the sale of municipal real property is City of Carbondale ex rel. Ham v. Eckert, 76 Ill.App.3d 881 (1979). In that case, the City of Carbondale passed an ordinance authorizing the sale of certain parcels of real property pursuant to its home rule powers.

  3. Crain Enterprises v. City of Mound City

    189 Ill. App. 3d 130 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)   Cited 6 times

    Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 131 1/4, par. 3). Both of these statutory provisions were enacted prior to 1970, however, and it is well settled that to restrict the home rule power, a statute must have been enacted subsequent to the adoption of our Constitution, and a home rule unit's power supersedes any conflicting pre-1970 legislation. County of Cook v. John Sexton Contractors Co. (1979), 75 Ill.2d 494, 389 N.E.2d 553; City of Carbondale ex rel. Ham v. Eckert (1979), 76 Ill. App.3d 881, 395 N.E.2d 607. • 5 Plaintiffs argue most strenuously, however, that ordinance Nos. 612 and 625 are invalid because they were adopted for the private benefit of Consolidated and without any showing that the public interest was served by vacation of the streets and alleys.

  4. Clayton v. Village of Oak Park

    117 Ill. App. 3d 560 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983)   Cited 4 times

    The twin evils of blockbusting and white flight may well extend beyond Oak Park's boundaries; yet, the ordinance does not purport to regulate or combat those problems as they pertain to other units of local government — only those which affect the owners of homes who live inside the village. See City of Evanston v. Create, Inc. (1981), 85 Ill.2d 101, 116; City of Carbondale v. Eckert (1979), 76 Ill. App.3d 881, 395 N.E.2d 607. Plaintiffs' reliance on City of Des Plaines v. Chicago North Western Ry. Co. (1976), 65 Ill.2d 1, 357 N.E.2d 433, is of little aid.