Put more simply, licensing "regulates establishments based on the type of business they conduct," and zoning regulates them "based on their location." City of Batavia v. Allen, 218 Ill. App.3d 545, 161 Ill.Dec. 239, 578 N.E.2d 597, 599 (1991). As we turn our attention to the Ordinance in question, it becomes clear that the portion that provides that adult entertainment businesses can only be located in a B-5 district, excluding such businesses in a B-3 district, constitutes an exercise of the City's zoning power because it defines where adult entertainment businesses can be located.

Thus, although the ordinances may advance the health and general welfare of the community, they do not do so by regulating the usage of land by district. See City of Batavia v. Allen, 218 Ill. App.3d 545, 547, 161 Ill.Dec. 239, 241, 578 N.E.2d 597, 599 (1991) (holding ordinance requiring taverns to close doors and windows during business hours was a licensing restriction and not a zoning provision because "it regulates establishments based on the type of business they conduct, not based on their location"); Square Lake Hills Condominium Ass'n v. Bloomfield Township, 437 Mich. 310, 471 N.W.2d 321, 326 (1991) (holding ordinance regulating boat docking and launching was not a zoning ordinance because it regulated an activity, and not the use of land and buildings according to districts); Town of Islip v. Zalak, 165 A.D.2d 83, 566 N.Y.S.2d 306, 311 (1991) (holding ordinance regulating recycling stations was not a zoning ordinance because it regulated an activity wherever it was carried out). We note a contrary conclusion would lead to an absurd result.

To the contrary, where the purpose of an ordinance is primarily to regulate for health concerns rather than to provide for uniform development of real estate, then the ordinance will not be held to be a zoning ordinance, but rather an ordinance related to health and welfare.See also Goodell v. Humboldt County, 575 N.W.2d 486 (Iowa 1998) (because ordinances regulating livestock did not regulate land use by district, court found they were not an exercise of zoning power); Town of Islip v. Zalak, 566 N.Y.S.2d 306 (A.D.2d Dept. 1991) (ordinance not a zoning law merely because it touches the use of land, especially if ordinance merely applies to activities wherever they are carried out in the town, without suspending or limiting in any way the application of zoning laws); Square Lake Hills v. Bloomfield Tp., 471 N.W.2d 321 (Mich. 1991) (ordinance is not a zoning ordinance if it only regulates "activities" on land, rather than use of land according to districts); City of Batavia v. Allen, 578 N.E.2d 597 (Ill. App. 2 Dist. 1991) (restriction which regulates establishments based on the type of business they conduct, without affecting the location of the business, are not zoning provisions). Furthermore, the very purposes of the building and structure restrictions in Ordinance 477 are related to the purpose of preserving the general health of the public rather than for a uniform development of real estate.

Where neither a "fundamental right" nor a suspect class is involved, a legislative enactment is presumptively valid and will survive constitutional scrutiny if it is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. ( Nevitt v. Langfelder (1993), 157 Ill.2d 116, 623 N.E.2d 281; City of Batavia v. Allen (1991), 218 Ill. App.3d 545, 578 N.E.2d 597.) Under the rational relationship test, the means chosen to achieve a governmental objective need not be the best possible means; they need only be measures that rational people believe might help to achieve the objective.

The party challenging a municipal resolution bears the burden of establishing its invalidity. ( City of Batavia v. Allen (1991), 218 Ill. App.3d 545, 547.) With both the underlying principles and the heavy burden placed on a party challenging a municipal enactment clearly in mind, we turn to an examination of Algonquin's contentions regarding the validity of Barrington Hills' resolution.