The board has broad discretion under the standards set forth in OCGA § 34-9-200 (a) to determine what medical treatment the employer and insurer will be required to furnish to an injured employee. Holcombe v. Brown Transport Corp., 253 Ga. 719, 721 ( 324 S.E.2d 446) (1985); City of Atlanta v. Walker, 169 Ga. App. 34, 35 ( 311 S.E.2d 479) (1983); see City of Atlanta v. Padgett, 68 Ga. App. 96, 109 ( 22 S.E.2d 197) (1942); U.S. Fidelity c. Co. v. O'Byrne, 61 Ga. App. 806, 808 ( 7 S.E.2d 689) (1940). WCGB and its insurer contend that, because the surgical procedure at issue was at an investigational stage under FDA guidelines, had not been approved by the FDA, and was not widely employed in the medical profession, it cannot be considered "reasonably required" or "likely to effect a cure," and the board had no discretion under § 34-9-200 (a) to order them to furnish the procedure.

In fact, the board is vested with a broad discretion in determining whether proffered employment is refused justifiably. See City of Atlanta v. Padgett, 68 Ga. App. 96, 109 ( 22 S.E.2d 197). In this regard, we note that the State Board of Workers' Compensation is an administrative agency, Cardin v. Riegel Textile Corp., 219 Ga. 695, 697 (2) ( 135 S.E.2d 284), Plummer v. State, 90 Ga. App. 773, 777 ( 84 S.E.2d 202), and that the courts must give due deference to the wisdom of the board in deciding discretionary issues within its area of expertise.

The Board has broad discretion as to what medical treatment may be required by a particular claimant. City of Atlanta v. Padgett, 68 Ga. App. 96, 109 ( 22 S.E.2d 197) (1942). When there is any evidence to support the Board of Workers' Compensation's findings of fact, neither the Superior Court nor the Court of Appeals has authority to substitute itself for the Board as a fact-finding body, and to set aside an award based on the Board's findings. Horton v. Ga. Power Co., 164 Ga. App. 252 ( 296 S.E.2d 798) (1982); Howard Sheppard, Inc. v. McGowan, 137 Ga. App. 408 ( 224 S.E.2d 65) (1976).

Section 501 is designed to bring about, hopefully for the better, a change in claimant's medical condition, while § 709 is designed to determine whether an economic change in condition has occurred, for better or for worse, so that a change in income benefits is appropriate. We held as much in City of Atlanta v. Padgett, 68 Ga. App. 96 ( 22 S.E.2d 197) (1942) where the board, having directed claimant pursuant to authority in § 501 either to submit to an operation found to be needed or be barred from compensation, later reversed itself and reached the opposite conclusion based upon different medical evidence. The employer insisted that the prior decision, like a § 709 change-of-condition determination, was res judicata as to claimant's condition so that his subsequent refusal of the operation was unjustifiable and barred him from compensation by § 501 so providing.

This issue was properly raised by the application for a hearing under the provisions of Code Ann. § 114-501, by which claimant sought to show liability on the basis of seeking medical expenses to produce an improvement of her condition, rather than showing a change of condition. See City of Atlanta v. Padgett, 68 Ga. App. 96, 108 ( 22 S.E.2d 197). The awards of the deputy director and the full board were based on the theory that the claimant was estopped to recover the claimed expenses by her failure to produce the available evidence thereof at the change of condition hearing instigated by the employer and insurer.

" Refusal to submit to surgery will not bar the claimant from benefits under the act unless the surgery has been ordered by the board. City of Atlanta v. Padgett, 68 Ga. App. 96 (1) ( 22 S.E.2d 197). The board has jurisdiction to determine whether a refusal of medical services is justified. Zant v. United States Fidelity c. Co., 40 Ga. App. 38 (1) ( 148 S.E. 764); Bituminous Casualty Co. v. Dyer, 62 Ga. App. 279 (2) ( 7 S.E.2d 415). Surgery, as defined by Webster's International Dictionary, is that branch of medical science concerned with the correction of deformities, repair of injuries, diagnosis and cure of disease, relief of suffering, and prolongation of life by manual and instrumental operations. See 70 C. J. S., Physicians and Surgeons, § 1, p. 804 et seq. An examination of the type here sought, which involves the penetration of living tissue, is much closer to a surgical operation than a simple physical examination, many of which the claimant had submitted to in the past.

In United States Fidelity Guaranty Co. v. O'Byrne, 61 Ga. App. 806 ( 7 S.E.2d 689), this court construed the first paragraph of Code, § 114-501, to mean that the Department of Industrial Relations has the power to order the payment of medical expenses after they have been incurred for a period exceeding ten weeks. The court pointed out that the department may order such treatment as may in the discretion of the department be necessary. City of Atlanta v. Padgett, 68 Ga. App. 96 ( 22 S.E.2d 197). It seems to us that the act of 1937 (Code Ann. Supp., § 114-501), which makes it the duty of the employer to furnish medical, surgical, and hospital treatment, has two purposes: (1) to effect a cure and give relief to the injured employee so as to reduce the time or extent of his incapacity which would of course inure to the benefit of the employer by reducing the time or amount for which the employer would have to pay compensation; and (2) a humanitarian and just purpose which inures to the benefit of the employee by effecting the cure of the injury and giving such relief to the injured employee as is possible.