In order to avoid the anomalous and unjust result of depriving a condemnee of compensation for the loss of use of "additional deposits" of estimated just compensation made subsequent to an order of possession, we hold that such money "paid by the plaintiff to the clerk of the court" must be unconditionally for the use of the persons entitled thereto, cf. HRS § 101-30, in order to escape interest charges under HRS § 101-33. Compare City County v. Bishop Trust Co., 48 Haw. 444, 479-84, 404 P.2d 373, 393-96 (1965) (interest as blight of summons damages runs on amount of just compensation fully stipulated to between the parties, but not yet paid to condemnee). Since we reverse the judgment and remand for a new trial on the issue of just compensation, however, we do not necessarily hold that MPL is entitled to the entire amount of interest awarded by the trial court on the second deposit. It may be that a new trial will result in a figure for just compensation at or less than the amount of the first deposited estimate, $961,500.00.

State v. Kunimoto, 62 Haw. 502, 507-08, 617 P.2d 93, 98 (1980); State v. Dillingham Corp., 60 Haw. 393, 411, 591 P.2d 1049, 1060 (1979). See also State v. Martin, 54 Haw. 167, 170, 504 P.2d 1223, 1225 (1973); Honolulu Redevelopment Agency v. Pun Gun, 49 Haw. 640, 647, 426 P.2d 324, 328 (1967); City County v. Bishop Trust Co., 48 Haw. 444, 463, 404 P.2d 373, 385 (1965). On more than one occasion we also have said "any evidence which will aid the jury in fixing the fair market value of the property should be considered by them."

Note, 9 Hastings L.J. 101 (1957). City and County of Honolulu v. Bishop Trust Co., 48 Haw. 444, 404 P.2d 373, presented the question of whether there was error in excluding evidence of new rent set by a lease evidently providing for periodic renegotiation of the rent. It was noted that in the lease situation, if the parties failed to agree on the new rent then the matter would be determined by arbitration or some means other than agreement by the parties. For this reason, it was said that the agreement reached may be in the nature of a compromise, similar to a sale under threat of condemnation.

State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Bloomfield Tractor Sales, Inc., Mo.App., 381 S.W.2d 20, 24 [1, 2]. Accordingly, " hearsay andbest evidence rules (are not to be) applied to prevent an expert witness from giving the basis of his opinion" of value. (Emphasis supplied) State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Barron, Mo., 400 S.W.2d 33, 38 [16]; State v. Oakley, 163 Tex. 463, 356 S.W.2d 909, 95 A.L.R.2d 1207, 1212-1213; City and County of Honolulu v. Bishop Trust Co., 48 Haw. 444, 404 P.2d 373, 384 [5, 6]; 5 Nicholas, Eminent Domain, Sec. 18.42[1], pp. 188-193. This is because "(o)rdinarily evidence as to facts * * * given by an expert as the basis of his opinion as to value comes with a sufficient guaranty of trustworthiness to justify the relaxation of the hearsay and best evidence rules".

A parallel analysis of this divergence of authority is to be found at 27 Am.Jur.2d Eminent Domain § 429, p. 331, at 334. One recent decision appears to favor the "Texas rule" of limited use, City and County of Honolulu v. Bishop Trust Co., 404 P.2d 373, 385 (Hawaii 1965), and another to favor the admissible-for-all-purposes doctrine, State Highway Commission v. Greenfield, 145 Mont. 164, 399 P.2d 989 (1965). It is to be noted that in Town of Williams v. Perrin, 70 Ariz. 157, 217 P.2d 918 (1950), in passing upon the related but separate problem of whether comparable sales are admissible at all as direct proof, our Supreme Court expressly adopted the "Massachusetts rule," ( 70 Ariz. at 163, 217 P.2d 918) which permits the introduction of evidence of comparable sales on direct examination, as opposed to the "Pennsylvania rule," holding evidence of comparable sales to be irrelevant except to test the expert witness on cross-examination. If in Perrin, our court intended to adopt the Massachusetts view in its entirety, in this area of law, then it is clear that while evidence of comparable sales may be introduced on direct examination as evidence of the value of the condemned property, such evidence of comparable sales must be developed by witnesses who h

Pun Gun, 49 Haw. at 643 n. 4, 426 P.2d at 326 n. 4. Although the new lease terms were admitted into evidence, we believe that the tax appeal court's failure to give any weight to the new lease prevented its consideration of potentially probative evidence of the property's fair market value because it was the only recent open market transaction involving the property at issue. See, e.g., City and County of Honolulu v. Bishop Trust Co., 48 Haw. 444, 459, 404 P.2d 373, 383 (1965) (noting, in an eminent domain proceeding, that the nature of the error was clear and, thus, no offer of proof was necessary where "[t]he City's expert witness was limited in his explanation of his use of the comparative method. He was permitted to paint in the background, but was precluded from putting in the picture.").

We agree that the evidence should have been admitted and considered by the court below. It has long been our rule that any evidence of value, not merely speculative, which might aid the trier of fact, should properly be admitted. Cf. City and County v. Bishop Trust Co., 48 Haw. 444, 404 P.2d 373 (1965); Territory v. Adelmeyer, 45 Haw. 144, 363 P.2d 979 (1961); State v. Pioneer Mill, 64 Haw. 168, 637 P.2d 1131 (1981). That rule, we hold, is applicable, not only to evidence as to market value as of the date fixed by statute, but to evidence as to what rate of interest should be allowed as blight of summons damages for the purposes of just compensation.

To place this question in its proper context, we recognize that the trial judge did not address the issue of whether evidence offered by defendants' expert as foundational data to support his opinion, adjusted from the DROA date, was admissible. If he had done so, the obvious issue before this court would have been whether the trial court abused his discretion for we have repeatedly stated that the trial judge has broad discretionary authority to admit or exclude evidence of comparable sales and the exercise of discretion will not be upset unless there is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Martin, 54 Haw. 167, 170, 504 P.2d 1223, 1225 (1973); Honolulu Redevelopment Agency v. Pun Gun, 49 Haw. 640, 645, 426 P.2d 324, 327 (1967); City and County v. Bishop Trust Co., 48 Haw. 444, 464, 404 P.2d 373, 386 (1965); State v. Heirs of Kapahi, 48 Haw. 101, 112-13, 395 P.2d 932, 939 (1964). In the absence of a failure of the trial judge to exercise discretion, we need only to determine whether the foundational data offered by the defendants' expert was admissible and whether the trial court erred in declaring a mistrial.

We have held in this jurisdiction that the trial judge has broad discretionary authority to admit or exclude evidence of comparable sales or leases and the exercise of discretion will not be upset on appeal unless there is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Martin, 54 Haw. 167, 170, 504 P.2d 1223, 1225 (1973); Honolulu Redevelopment Agency v. Pun Gun, 49 Haw. 640, 645, 426 P.2d 324, 327 (1967); City and County v. Bishop Trust Co., 48 Haw. 444, 464, 404 P.2d 373, 386 (1965); State v. Heirs of Kapahi, supra, 48 Haw. at 112-13, 395 P.2d at 939. We have also stated the following:

Other jurisdictions, however, do admit evidence of gross sales as a determinant of reasonable rental value. Ableman v. State ex rel. Secretary of the Department of Highways Transportation, 297 A.2d 380 (Del. 1972); City and County of Honolulu v. Bishop Trust Co., 48 Haw. 444, 404 P.2d 373 (1965). [4] We believe that gross sales like profits are more inextricably tied to the management and administration of a business than to the value of the property upon which the business is situated.