City County of San Francisco v. Superior Court

3 Citing cases

  1. Ensworth v. Mullvain

    224 Cal.App.3d 1105 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990)   Cited 110 times
    Finding "[t]he Schraer court did not hold that the requisite clear and convincing proof of a petitioners substantial emotional distress had to be in the form of the petitioners direct testimony that he or she suffered such distress"

    Where the language of a statute is clear, "`there can be no room for interpretation, and effect must be given to its plain meaning.'" ( City and County of San Francisco v. Superior Court (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 481, 485 [ 181 Cal.Rptr. 775], quoting Outboard Marine Corp. v. Superior Court (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 30, 40 [ 124 Cal.Rptr. 852].) Mullvain does not argue that the statutory language is ambiguous or unclear.

  2. City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court

    170 Cal.App.3d 744 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985)   Cited 7 times

    This violates one of the long-established rules of statutory construction: that the testimony of an individual legislator as to his intention, motive or opinion with regard to a particular piece of legislation is inadmissible. ( City and County of San Francisco v. Superior Court (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 481, 485-486 [ 181 Cal.Rptr. 775].) Legislative intent must be ascertained from the language of the statute itself; "`if the language is clear there can be no room for interpretation and effect must be given to its plain meaning.'"

  3. Rumac, Inc. v. Bottomley

    143 Cal.App.3d 810 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983)   Cited 13 times

    The following decisions discuss the absolute privilege: Williamson v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 829, 833-834 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 39, 582 P.2d 126]; Shepherd v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 107, 121-122 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 257, 550 P.2d 161]; Watt Industries, Inc. v. Superior Court (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 802 [ 171 Cal.Rptr. 503]; Schlumberger Limited v. Superior Court (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 386, 393-394 [ 171 Cal.Rptr. 413]; Fellows v. Superior Court, supra, 108 Cal.App.3d at pages 61-70; Popelka, Allard, McCowan Jones v. Superior Court (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 496, 500-503 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 748]; Rodriguez v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 626, 647-648 [ 151 Cal.Rptr. 399]; Lohman v. Superior Court (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 90, 100-102 [ 146 Cal.Rptr. 171]; City of Long Beach v. Superior Court (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 65, 80-81 [ 134 Cal.Rptr. 468]; American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 579, 593-595 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 561]. See also City and County of San Francisco v. Superior Court (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 481, 486 [ 181 Cal.Rptr. 775]; Insurance Co. of North America v. Superior Court (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 758, 771 [ 166 Cal.Rptr. 880, 14 A.L.R.4th 581]; Merritt v. Superior Court (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 721, 731 [ 88 Cal.Rptr. 337] . Recognizing that the expense of pretrial procedures had driven up the cost of civil litigation, in 1976 the Legislature enacted the Economic Litigation Project (ELP), a pilot program authorizing the Judicial Council to experiment with innovative procedures in certain civil actions. (See ยงยง 1823-1833; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rules 1701-1859.)