City and County of San Francisco v. Superior Court

5 Citing cases

  1. Gadbois v. Superior Court

    126 Cal.App.3d 653 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981)   Cited 4 times

    Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in refusing to make a preliminary determination of paternity and refusing to award temporary visitation rights. He cites Civil Code section 4601 and the decision of this court in City and County of San Francisco v. Superior Court (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 87 [ 150 Cal.Rptr. 45] as authority for a pendente lite visitation order in a paternity action. Real party does not contest the applicability of Civil Code section 4601 or the authority of the trial court to act.

  2. Thompson v. Thames

    57 Cal.App.4th 1296 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 37 times

    The legislative history demonstrates the "conscious whittling away" of the legal distinctions between children born of a marriage and those born otherwise. ( Estate of Woodward (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 113, 117-119 [ 40 Cal.Rptr. 781] [illegitimate minor, not publicly acknowledged by father, entitled to receive family allowance from father's estate, referencing Civ. Code, ยง 196a]; see also Carbone v. Superior Court (1941) 18 Cal.2d 768 [ 117 P.2d 872, 136 A.L.R. 1260]; City and County of San Francisco v. Superior Court (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 87 [ 150 Cal.Rptr. 45]; Stargell v. Stargell (1968) 263 Cal.App.2d 504, 507 [ 69 Cal.Rptr. 715]; Guay v. Superior Court (1957) 147 Cal.App.2d 764, 767 [ 305 P.2d 990]; DeSylva v. Ballentine (1950) 96 Cal.App.2d 503, 513 [ 215 P.2d 780]; Sharpe v. Wesley (1947) 78 Cal.App.2d 441, 444 [ 177 P.2d 802], all of which acknowledge the application of Code Civ. Proc., ยง 396b as amended in 1939 to Civ. Code, ยง 196a) As stated in Miller v. Laird (D.C. Cir. 1972) 349 F. Supp. 1034, 1047, a class action challenging the constitutionality of a law excluding dependent illegitimate children of military personnel from medical benefits, "`[T]here are no illegitimate children, only illegitimate parents', and statutes, such as the one here, which visit upon innocent children the consequences of their parents' misbehavior are constitutionally unbearable."

  3. Jaycee B. v. Superior Court

    42 Cal.App.4th 718 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)   Cited 7 times
    Defining gestational surrogacy

    In the wake of the Carbone decision, it has even been held that a local government entity seeking recovery of welfare payments can obtain pendente lite child support orders pending final determination of paternity. ( City and County of San Francisco v. Superior Court (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 87, 90-91 [ 150 Cal.Rptr. 45] [allowing pendente lite child support order against putative fathers because it makes no difference that provider of support is county government].) The precise quantum of proof necessary to show the probable existence of the legal relationship of paternity and marriage upon which a temporary support order could be predicated has been a somewhat troublesome matter, at least as revealed in the late 19th century marriage case of Hite v. Hite.

  4. Smith v. Superior Court

    118 Cal.App.3d 512 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981)   Cited 1 times

    The final argument in County of Los Angeles was that the award was authorized under either Civil Code section 196a (parental obligation for attorneys' fees in an action to require support and education of a child) or Civil Code section 4370 The court concluded that the action was neither on behalf of a child seeking support and education nor by a spouse seeking to dissolve a marriage. While acknowledging that a putative parent might be required to pay attorneys' fees to a county acting on behalf of a child ( City and County of San Francisco v. Superior Court (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 87 [ 150 Cal.Rptr. 45]), the court concluded that to reverse the situation would convert a child-support action into a parent-support action. Finding no statutory authority for using public funds to pay counsel to defend indigents in actions brought under Welfare and Institutions Code section 11350, the County of Los Angeles court concluded that the award was improper: "Until the Legislature provides statutory authorization to pay such expenses from public funds, the trial court is not empowered to order the county to pay [defendant's] attorneys' fees. [Citations.] Until the Legislature fixes liability on some particular governmental entity to pay such attorneys' fees, appointed counsel in such causes act pro bono publico in the manner appointed counsel formerly acted for indigent defendants in state and federal criminal causes.

  5. County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court

    102 Cal.App.3d 926 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980)   Cited 16 times

    But the cause at bench is not an action on behalf of a child against a parent seeking support and education, nor is it an action by a spouse seeking to dissolve a marriage. Holley argues that because Civil Code sections 196a and 4370 may require a putative parent to pay attorneys' fees to a child, or to a county acting on behalf of the child ( City and County of San Francisco v. Superior Court (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 87 [ 150 Cal.Rptr. 45]), therefore a child, or a county acting on its behalf, can be required to pay attorneys' fees to a putative parent. His argument seeks to convert a child-support action into a parent-support action (Civ. Code, ยง 248), a metamorphosis we do not find persuasive.