Opinion
A146887
11-08-2017
CITIZEN'S VOICE ST. HELENA et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF ST. HELENA et al., Defendants and Respondents; HUGH DAVIES et al., Real Parties in Interest.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Napa County Super. Ct. No. 26-65618)
In 2012, respondents City of St. Helena and its city council (hereafter collectively St. Helena) approved the application of real parties in interest Hugh Davies, Davies Vineyard Winery, and Schramsberg Vineyards (hereafter collectively Davies) for a conditional use permit for operation of a wine production facility (also called the "Event Center") within the municipal limits of St. Helena. Over the opposition of Citizen's Voice St. Helena, Susan Kenward, and Geoff Ellsworth (hereafter collectively Citizen's Voice, or appellants), St. Helena approved an amended use permit that would allow for a considerable expansion of the project. Citizen's Voice challenged that decision, without success, from which it appeals. We affirm.
This entity characterizes itself as follows: "Citizen's Voice St. Helena is an unincorporated association of citizens and taxpayers living in St. Helena, who are dedicated to preserving the local character and quality of life in St. Helena," as well as "the natural environment, agriculture, and the local character of St. Helena." "Citizen's Voice St. Helena was formed after the City approved the Event Center" in 2012. The record does not establish the relationship, if any, between this entity and the two individuals, Susan Kenward and Geoff Ellsworth, who are also appellants here.
BACKGROUND
Final approval culminated a process that commenced with a number of studies and reports addressing various features and possible consequences, followed by a mitigated negative declaration, a public hearing before the planning commission, and initial approval by that body. Citizen's Voice filed a written appeal, which was heard and denied by the city council. The planning commission then gave ministerial final approval.
At this point we quote (with insertion of minor nonsubstantive modifications) from the admirable and comprehensive statement of decision prepared by the Honorable Rodney Stone:
"On May 6, 2014, the City issued a Mitigated Negative Declaration ('MND') on the basis of the findings in the Initial Study. The MND and contemporaneous Notice of Availability provided public opportunity to submit written comments regarding the appropriateness or adequacy of the MND. No challenge was made during the 30 day comment period.
" 'Negative declaration' means a written statement briefly describing the reasons that a proposed project will not have a significant effect on the environment and does not require the preparation of an environmental impact report." (Pub. Resources Code, § 21064.) " 'Mitigated negative declaration' means a negative declaration prepared for a project when the initial study has identified potentially significant effects on the environment, but (1) revisions in the project plans or proposals made by, or agreed to by, the applicant before the proposed negative declaration and initial study are released for public review would avoid the effects or mitigate the effects to a point where clearly no significant effect on the environment would occur, and (2) there is no substantial evidence in light of the whole record before the public agency that the project, as revised, may have a significant effect on the environment." (Id., § 21064.5.)
"Hearing on the MND was initially set for July 15, 2014 before the City's Planning Commission, but was continued to address one of the commissioner's questions regarding traffic, water and cumulative impacts.
"On September 16, 2014, the City held continued hearing on the application. At that hearing, discussion was held regarding the traffic and water analyses, parking capacity issues, landscaping, and public correspondence. The City's Staff Report included draft conditions, plans for the Project, the MND, an updated traffic analysis that had been completed by Omni-Means, Ltd, Engineers & Planners on August 19, 2014, the theoretical water use report by Delta Consulting & Engineering, the septic feasibility report by Delta Consulting & Engineering, and letters and emails in support of and in opposition to the Project.
"The Omni-Means traffic report identified existing and future based conditions, and determined that buildout of the Project would result in 9 morning peak hour trips, 26 evening peak hour trips, and 20 Saturday peak hour trips during harvest. These additional trips would result in an additional 1.3 seconds of increased delay at the Grayson Avenue/Main Street intersection and the Main Street/Pope Street/Mitchell Drive intersection, which was a less-than-significant addition of proposed traffic. The only potentially significant impact was related to 'incompatible uses' from special events with visitors in excess of on-site parking capacity of 100 vehicles. To mitigate potential impacts, [Davies] was required to prepare a Parking Management Plan identifying specific methods (valet, shuttle buses, off-site parking, etc.) for providing off-street parking for special events. Planning Department approval was required prior to issuance of a Certificate of Occupancy.
"The groundwater analysis, completed by Richard C. Slade & Associates, Consulting Groundwater Geologists, on July 2, 2014, determined that the entire demand for the Project would be met by pumping groundwater from the onsite well.
"Eight members of the public spoke in support of the Project, and one member spoke in opposition, stating her concerns regarding whether the traffic studies were cumulative (they were) and regarding water use and wastewater disposal, which were general in nature. One member of the City's Planning Commission expressed concern over the Project regarding the baseline used for the water analysis and traffic safety as the Project is located across the street from St. Helena High School. Other Planning Commission members and representatives of Real Parties addressed her concerns. The City approved the Project on a 4-1 vote.
"A written appeal was filed on September 29, 2014. The written appeal argued that an excessive amount of visitors and vehicles would frequent the Project, wine tasting near the high school was dangerous, special events parking was insufficient, the proposed water use could not be accurate, and that the Project was inconsistent with the City's General Plan and zoning ordinances. The written appeal did not challenge the size of the proposed buildings, did not assert an EIR was necessary, did not challenge the proposed winery kitchen, and did not particularize any alleged inadequacies in the water, traffic, noise, public safety, or any other analysis and mitigation measures.
"On October 28, 2014, the City heard the appeal. At the hearing, [Citizen's Voice] reiterated the assertions made in their written appeal. Petitioner Susan Kenward commented at the hearing, stating in pertinent part:
"Why was there no EIR? There most definitely needs to be one. This is a service commercial area with a limit of one building of 10,000 square feet. This project expands the use three-fold . . .
"My question is, if this does not conform to our current land-use policies—and it does not—why should we make an exception? What is the benefit to the city and the citizens? How do we benefit from increased traffic at an already congested intersection, increased water uses, increased noise, generate more parking demand than on-site can supply . . .
"Petitioner Kenward's comments did not state a supporting basis for an EIR and did not point to any particular inaccuracy with the findings of the various traffic and water studies. Petitioner Ellsworth also commented at the hearing, focusing his comments on the safety of the Project given the proximity of the high school and the City's interpretation of the purpose of the service commercial zoning district. After the close of the public hearing, the City Council deliberated and ultimately denied the appeal, but did discuss adding conditions and findings to the final resolution to address comments made regarding the possible use of amplified outdoor music and pedestrian traffic that would benefit from a crosswalk on Grayson Avenue.
"On November 25, 2014, the City's Planning Commission considered the final resolution to approve the project. Petitioners attended the hearing and made comments after the Mayor allowed public comment limited to the draft resolution. The Planning Commission then discussed the resolution and directed staff to revise the draft resolution to include a prohibition on weddings, a requirement that the special events be scheduled so as not to conflict with events at the high school, a requirement that Real Parties fund a crosswalk with specifics to be determined by the City Engineer, and to include a noise attenuation plan to address the potential use of amplified music. With those directed revisions, the Planning Commission approved the resolution.
"On December 31, 2014, [Citizen's Voice] filed their initial Verified Petition For Writ of Mandate. On January 7, 2015, they filed the instant Petition, which includes two causes of action. Their first cause of action alleges the City violated [the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA)] by failing to prepare an EIR because substantial evidence in the record supports a fair argument that the Project may have significant impacts to: (1) safety due to increased traffic and its location immediately across the street from a public high school, (2) noise from outdoor events held at the Project, (3) water usage, and (4) traffic. [Citizen's Voice] also allege that the City conducted an inadequate analysis of traffic, safety, noise and water supply, and the MND relied on an improper baseline for assessing impacts to water supply at the Project. Their second cause of action alleges the City violated planning and zoning laws by being: (1) primarily tourist-serving and not local-serving, (2) exceeding the 10,000 square foot limitation on the footprint of buildings as set forth in [St. Helena Municipal Code (SHMC)] section 17.52.070, and (3) the City failed to demonstrate that the Project is compatible in that district. [Citizen's Voice] further allege that SHMC section 17.168.050 was also violated because the City's findings were not supported by substantial evidence."
After setting out "The Applicable Legal Standards," Judge Stone then analyzed
"Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
"The City and Real Parties argue that Petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies (except with respect to the land issue regarding the Project's consistency with the General Plan and zoning ordinances). [Citizen's Voice] claim they have exhausted administrative remedies with comments made during any of the hearings, including the appeal hearing. As an initial matter, the court finds that the public hearing was closed on October 28, 2014. The November 25, 2014 meeting was for the City's Planning Commission to consider the final resolution to approve the project. The transcript from that meeting indicates that the Mayor allowed public comment limited to the draft resolution, and was not re-opening the public comment period, as [Citizen's Voice] allege. As to the issues raised prior to the close of the public comment period, 'a failure to raise an issue in an administrative appeal after raising the issue in the first public or administrative hearing constitutes a failure to exhaust administrative remedies and prevents the issue from being raised in a subsequent judicial action.' (Tahoe Vista [Concerned Citizens v. County of Placer (2000)] 81 Cal.App.4th [577,] 592.)
"[Citizen's Voice] also claim that because SHMC section 17.08.180(H) provides that appeals from the Planning Commission are heard de novo, any issue mentioned in the appeals hearing was sufficient to exhaust administrative remedies as to that issue. However, SHMC section 17.08.180, subsection B and C requires appeals to be in writing and include specific information. 'B. Unless otherwise indicated, all appeals shall be made in writing and accompanied by the appropriate fee.' 'C. The letter for appeal must state: (1) the specific action objected to; (2) the action appellant requests the city council to take; (3) the reason for the appeal; and (4) the name, address, and telephone number of the appellant or contact person if there are multiple appellants.' (SHMC § 17.08.180(B), (C).) The only issues included in the written appeal were regarding general traffic and parking concerns, questions about the proposed water use, claims that the Project was not local-serving, and references to the inapplicable winery ordinances.
"[Citizen's Voice] argue that the Court of Appeal has confirmed that where a local government offers de novo review of administrative appeals, a court may hear any claim raised at any time during the administrative proceeding. (California Clean Energy Committee v. City of San Jose (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1325.) A review of California Clean Energy does not reveal such a broad holding. Rather, the Court of Appeal ruled in California Clean Energy that because 'the planning commission's certification of the final EIR was not proper, no administrative appeal had to be taken in order to exhaust administrative remedies.' (Id. at p. 1346.) It was specifically because the certification was 'faulty' that no administrative appeal was available. (Id. at p. 1349.) The Court of Appeal therefore found the petitioner in that case had adequately exhausted administrative remedies by submitting a comment letter during the public comment period. (Id. at p. 332, 1349.) The facts of California Clean Energy are dissimilar to the instant case.
"Thus, the only issues for which Petitioners could have exhausted administrative remedies are those issues that were included in the written appeal. Prior to the instant Petition, there had been no claim that the zoning ordinances prohibited the expansion of the wine production facility building beyond 10,000 square feet. General comments and questions were made regarding the size of the proposed building, but Petitioners cannot rely on 'isolated and unelaborated' comments. (North Coast [Rivers Alliance v. Marin Municipal Water Dist. Bd. of Directors (2013)] 216 Cal.App.4th [614,] 623.) In regards to the need for an EIR, there was no mention of it in the written appeal. While Petitioner Kenward did state during the October 28, 2014 appeal hearing, 'Why was there no EIR? There most definitely needs to be one,' she provided no further basis for why there needed to be an EIR, or why the MND was insufficient. Generalized environmental comments do not satisfy the exhaustion requirement. (Tahoe Vista [Concerned Citizens v. County of Placer (2000)] 81 Cal.App.4th [577,] 594.)
"[Citizen's Voice's] claims regarding the domestic water use baseline, projected domestic and winery water usages, traffic and noise analysis, mitigation measures, and the proposed winery kitchen were also insufficiently raised during the administrative proceedings. The domestic water baseline issue was not raised in the appeal. The projected water use concerns consisted of vague statements of disbelief regarding water analysis results and general claims that the winery would use a lot of water. The comments regarding traffic were similarly conclusory and vague. As to noise, the Project never sought permission to play amplified music. A member of the public raised the concern regarding potential amplified music at the Project in the future, which was discussed by the City and addressed to alleviate any concerns. There was never any assertion that CEQA required the study of potential impacts from potential outdoor amplified music.
"CEQA Compliance
"Even assuming [Citizen's Voice] had exhausted administrative remedies as to their claims regarding water, traffic and parking issues, [those] claims were raised via comments that were generally speculative and not predicated upon relevant facts. The Initial Study determined that revisions in the Project plans 'would avoid the effects or mitigate the effects to a point where clearly no significant effect on the environment would occur' and that there was 'no substantial evidence that the project as revised may have a significant effect on the environment,' which allowed an MND to be used. (Architectural Heritage Assn. v. County of Monterey (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1095, 1101.) The studies analyzed by the City supported this determination. The water use report showed the Project would have a lower daily use than the auto dealership, which would be achieved by installing high-efficiency toilets, low-flow faucets and a high-efficiency dishwasher. The Crane Transportation Group's Traffic Impact Report showed that the Project would result in less traffic during peak traffic hours than the car dealership. Even the updated traffic study by Omni-Means found only a 1.3 second delay at the intersections around the Project during harvest season at peak traffic hours. Thus, the day-to-day operations of the Project would not have a significant effect on traffic or parking.
"The only potential significant impact was related to the larger special events, which would be mitigated with a Parking Management Plan. The Parking Management Plan would identify specific methods of providing parking (i.e. valet, shuttle buses, etc.), and would need to be approved before any special events took place. Furthermore, impacts to parking may only be considered a significant environmental impact under CEQA where parking effects directly or secondarily impact the physical environment. (San Franciscans [Upholding the Downtown Plan v. City and County of San Francisco (2002)] 102 Cal.App.4th [656,] 697.)
"[Citizen's Voice] argue that the City should have prepared an EIR because 'substantial evidence supports a fair argument that a proposed project "may have a significant effect on the environment." ' (Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of University of California (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1112, 1123.) ' "[T]he sufficiency of the evidence to support a fair argument" ' is a question of law. (Sierra Club v. County of Sonoma (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1307, 1318.) When determining whether sufficient evidence exists to support a fair argument, 'deference to the agency's determination is not appropriate and its decision not to require an EIR can be upheld only when there is no credible evidence to the contrary.' (Ibid.)
"The issue is therefore whether [Citizen's Voice] presented any credible evidence contrary to the City's decision not to require an EIR. '[F]acts, reasonable assumptions predicated upon facts, and expert opinion supported by facts' all constitute '[s]ubstantial evidence' of a significant effect on the environment, and '[a]rgument, speculation, unsubstantiated opinion or narrative, or evidence that is clearly inaccurate or erroneous, or evidence that is not credible' do not. ([Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14,] § 15064, subd. (f)(5).) The court does not find the evidence relied on by [Citizen's Voice] to be credible. General concerns regarding the quantity of traffic and water use were conclusory and unsubstantiated. Comments regarding the safety of the Project's location near a high school relied on speculation that patrons would be engaging in illegal behavior (driving under the influence of alcohol) and that high school students would continue to jaywalk.
"Comments from one individual that saw a school bus doing an improper turn in the area also assumes that this type of improper turn is routinely made by school buses. While there have been cases where public comments regarding traffic, based on relevant personal knowledge, were considered substantial evidence, the public comments and the appeal in this case do not fit that description. In addition, [Citizen's Voice] never pointed to any particular inaccuracies in the studies relied on by the City; unsubstantiated personal opinions on the studies do not constitute evidence of a significant adverse impact.
"[Citizen's Voice] have the burden of proof 'to demonstrate by citation to the record the existence of substantial evidence supporting a fair argument of significant environmental impact.' (League for Protection of Oakland's etc. Historic Resources v. City of Oakland (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 896, 904.) 'Unless the administrative record contains this evidence, and [plaintiffs] cite[] to it, no "fair argument" that an EIR is necessary can be made.' (South Orange County Wastewater Authority v. City of Dana Point (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1604, 1612-1613.) [Citizen's Voice] have not met their burden.
"Zoning Compliance
"As to issues regarding the location of the Project winery in the service commercial district, the City argues that because there was no objection to locating the winery there in 2012, which was approved, that approval is res judicata on the issue. Res judicata principles apply to administrative decisions, and if the decision is not timely challenged, the decision is res judicata of the matter determined, and beyond collateral attack. (Hollywood Circle, Inc. v. Dept. of Alcoholic Beverage Control (1961) 55 Cal.2d 728, 729-732.) To the extent that [Citizen's Voice] are arguing that a winery in the service commercial district is inconsistent with the City's General Plan and zoning ordinances, those arguments are barred. However, [Citizen's Voice's] claims are focused on the winery's inclusion of wine tastings, retail sales and special events, which were not sought in the 2012 use permit, and are therefore not barred.
"[Citizen's Voice] argue[s] that the Project is inconsistent with the General Plan. The General Plan provides the service commercial district is designed 'to be primarily local resident-serving in character.' 'Local-serving businesses are considered to be those that derive a significant portion of their revenues from St. Helena residents, and which provide services and products which satisfy local residents' day-to-day needs.' (St. Helena General Plan at 2-21 and 2-22.) 'Tourist-serving uses are those which would generally not be in St. Helena if it were not for the presence of visitors.' (Id. at 2-24.) [Citizen's Voice] argue[s] that the City cannot explain how the Project could derive a significant portion of its revenue from St. Helena residents or satisfy locals' day-to-day needs.
"The City responds with arguments that reflect the position originally taken in Resolution No. 2014-96 upholding the Planning Commission's approval of the use permit amendment. The City 'finds that wineries and wine tasting rooms are not primarily tourist serving. The wine industry is a critical part of the economy and quality of life in St. Helena. Both local residents and tourists patronize the wineries and tasting facilities throughout the Napa Valley and derive substantial benefits from the continued existence of these uses.' The City notes the General Plan states the service commercial designation 'provides for service and retail uses, restaurants, service stations, motels, public and quasi-public uses, and similar and compatible uses.' Clearly motels are not primarily local resident-serving in character and do not derive a significant portion of their revenues from St. Helena residents. Restaurants and service and retail uses in the service commercial district also may not be primarily local resident-serving in character and may not derive a significant portion of their revenues from St. Helena residents. The General Plan only expressly prohibits '[s]trictly tourist-serving retail uses' in the service commercial district. [Citation.]
"The City also argues the SHMC has an extensive list of the conditionally permitted uses in the service commercial district, which includes 'breweries, including tasting,' 'eating and drinking establishments,' 'hotels and motels,' 'light manufacturing uses,' 'wineries,' and 'winery tasting rooms.' (SHMC § 17.52.030.) These uses are not limited to strictly local-serving businesses. SHMC section 17.52.060 lists the prohibited uses in the service commercial district (formula restaurants, outlet/discount stores, souvenir shops, t-shirt shops, and time-share projects), which do not include wineries like the Project.
"The court's standard of review with respect to the City's consistency with its General Plan is whether the City has acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or without evidentiary basis. (San Franciscans [Upholding the Downtown Plan v. City and County of San Francisco,] supra, 102 Cal.App.4th [656,] 677.) The City's findings that the Project is consistent with the General Plan can be reversed only if they are based on evidence from which no reasonable person could have reached the same conclusion. [Citation.] [Citizen's Voice] have not shown that the City acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or without evidentiary basis. As the court finds a reasonable person could have reached the same consistency determination as the City, the City's findings will not be reversed." (Fn. omitted.)
This order was the basis for the judgment from which Citizen's Voice perfected this timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
Citizen's Voice advances three contentions, framed as follows: (1) "Petitioners Exhausted All of Their Claims During the Administrative Process"; (2) "The City's Approval Violated the General Plan and Zoning Ordinance"; and (3) "The City's Failure to Prepare an EIR Violated CEQA."
Judge Stone correctly quoted the standard of review that applies to all courts: "An appellate court's review of the administrative record for legal error and substantial evidence in a CEQA case, as in other mandamus cases, is the same as the trial court's: The appellate court reviews the agency's action, not the trial court's decision; in that sense appellate judicial review under CEQA is de novo." (Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cordova (2007) 40 Cal.4th 412, 427.) An administrative agency, which in this case means the city council and the planning commission, "may abuse its discretion under CEQA either by failing to proceed in the manner CEQA provides or by reaching factual conclusions unsupported by substantial evidence. [Citation.] Judicial review of these two types of error differs significantly: While we determine de novo whether the agency has employed the correct procedures, 'scrupulously enforc[ing] all legislatively mandated CEQA requirements' [citation], we accord greater deference to the agency's substantive factual conclusions. In reviewing for substantial evidence, the reviewing court 'may not set aside an agency's approval of an EIR on the ground that an opposite conclusion would have been equally or more reasonable,' for, on factual questions, our task 'is not to weigh conflicting evidence and determine who has the better argument.' " (Id. at p. 435.)
The first and third of Citizen's Voice's contentions involve whether the correct statutory procedures were followed. Its second contention does not, strictly speaking, challenge a factual determination. However, as will be shown, the challenged action does merit our deference. Because the first of Citizen's Voice's contentions also involves a jurisdiction question, it must be addressed first.
Although our de novo review owes no deference to Judge Stone's analysis, that does not mean we have ignored it. Quite the contrary, it has been of considerable assistance to our review, if for no other reason than it forms the pole around which the parties have organized their briefing.
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
This is how the planning department described the amended use: "Expansion of an existing winery from 20,000 gallons of wine per year to 75,000 gallons per year, remodeling and expansion of the existing on-site building to accommodate increased production, construction of a hospitality building on the site, reconfiguring the crush pad area and adding on-site parking, landscaping and similar features. The winery would also include a range of wine tasting, wine club release parties and similar events on a regular basis." Although the clear majority of community opinion was in favor of the expansion, there was a minority expressing reservation or outright opposition. Judge Stone excluded the appeal to the city council in determining what issues were forfeited and which were preserved for review. This was error.
This language is similar to the project description on the mitigated negative declaration: "Expansion of an existing winery from 20,000 gallons of wine per year to 75,000 gallons per year, expansion of the existing on-site building to accommodate increased production, construction of a hospitality building on the site, reconfiguring the crush pad area and adding on-site parking, landscaping and similar features. The winery would also include a range of wine tasting, wine club release parties and similar events on a regular basis." The project's architect told the planning commission that also included was a "demonstration vineyard" a "fermentation hall," some administrative offices, and "on the rooftop we have a garden."
The CEQA requirement that administrative remedies must be exhausted is statutory. "(a) An action or proceeding shall not be brought . . . unless the alleged grounds for noncompliance with this division were presented to the public agency orally or in writing by any person during the public comment period provided by this division or prior to the close of the public hearing on the project before the issuance of the notice of determination. [¶] (b) A person shall not maintain an action or proceeding unless that person objected to the approval of the project orally or in writing during the public comment period . . . or prior to the close of the public hearing on the project . . . ." (Pub. Resources Code § 21177.)
"Considering these provisions in order, subdivision (a) requires a showing that someone presented the CEQA objection to the agency before its decision was made. . . . [¶] Subdivision (b) requires that the petitioner must have objected to the project on some ground before the agency made its decision." (Defend Our Waterfront v. State Lands Com. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 570, 582.) Thus, the complaint on appeal must have been raised before the administrative agency by someone, and the person or entity seeking judicial relief cannot have been silent before the administrative agency. (See Galante Vineyards v. Monterey Peninsula Water Management Dist. (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 1109, 1119 ["a petitioner who has taken part in the administrative process may assert any issues raised by other parties during the administrative proceedings"].)
This statute is held to order the forfeiture of claims or alleged defects that were not aired during the administrative process. In other words, if there is an administrative remedy—in this case making an objection "orally or in writing"—it must be used and exhausted before seeking judicial redress. Our colleagues in Division Four of this District have explained the concept as follows: " ' "The essence of the exhaustion doctrine is the public agency's opportunity to receive and respond to articulated factual issues and legal theories before its actions are subjected to judicial review." ' [Citations.] Comments must express concerns so the lead agency has ' " ' "its opportunity to act and to render litigation unnecessary." ' " ' [Citation.] 'The purposes of the doctrine are not satisfied if the objections are not sufficiently specific so as to allow the Agency the opportunity to evaluate and respond to them.' [Citation.] ' " '[R]elatively . . . bland and general references to environmental matters' . . . , or 'isolated and unelaborated comment[s]' " ' do not satisfy the exhaustion requirement. [Citation.] Rather, ' "[t]he 'exact issue' must have been presented to the administrative agency . . . ." ' [Citation.] Requiring anything less 'would enable litigants to narrow, obscure, or even omit their arguments before the final administrative authority because they could possibly obtain a more favorable decision from a trial court.' [Citation.]
"Exhaustion of administrative remedies is a 'jurisdictional prerequisite.' [Citation.]. . . . Inasmuch as the issue of exhaustion is a question of law, '[a]n appellate court employs a de novo standard of review when determining whether the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine applies.' " (North Coast Rivers Alliance v. Marin Municipal Water Dist. Bd. of Directors (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 614, 623-624, italics added.)
There are three plaintiffs here: one entity, Citizen's Voice, and two individuals, Susan Kenward and Geoff Ellsworth. Only the individuals figured in the administrative history. Ellsworth was associated with the written appeal of the planning commission's initial approval to the city council, and both he and Kenward spoke at the city council.
In their joint brief, the three state that at the September 16, 2014 meeting of the planning commission "Members of the public, including members of Citizen's Voice, raised concerns that the Event Center was not an appropriate use in the City, and that the Project would have safety impacts on the nearby high school. AR 925-26, 1365-66." In one respect, the citations are puzzling. The first is from a woman who identified herself to the commission as "the superintendent of St. Helena Unified." She did not oppose the project. Indeed, she left the distinct impression that, although she expressed "a few considerations that parents asked me to share with you," "overall generally speaking . . . there have been no objections to this project." The second is an e-mail dated September 16, 2014, from Ellsworth to "Cindy Black," (who is the city clerk) reproducing "this letter to the SH Planning Commission, hoping that it is read tonight." The puzzlement continues with other statements in the opening brief. One is "Prior to the City's approval, Citizen's Voice claimed that the Project would violate the size limits in the City's Zoning Ordinance." Yet none of the four citations to the administrative record mention Citizen's Voice. Indeed, in the transcripts of the hearings conducted by the planning commission and the city council, there is no mention of Citizen's Voice. There are other such statements. We are directed to nothing in the administrative record which substantiates the statement in the brief that "Citizen's Voice repeatedly expressed its concerns to both the Planning Commission and the City Council."
Thanks to the marvels of modern IT, appellants submitted the 2,000 plus page administrative record on a flash drive, which permits electronic searching. Our search of the administrative record, which include transcripts of all the hearings, as well as all written and e-mail submissions to both the planning commission and the city council, showed that the words "Citizen's Voice" never appear. In short nothing cited in the opening brief or discoverable in the administrative record establishes that the entity calling itself Citizens Voice St. Helena ever communicated with either the planning commission or the city council, or made any appearance until this appeal was commenced.
Accordingly, we initially look to what the two individuals, Susan Kenward and Geoff Ellsworth, communicated "orally or in writing" during the administrative process, and then to such communications made by others. (Galante Vineyards v. Monterey Peninsula Water Management Dist., supra, 60 Cal.App.4th 1109, 1119.) Judge Stone erred in restricting the relevant scope of that process to the hearing conducted by the planning commission on September 16, 2014, because it includes the appeal to the city council. (Cadiz Land Co. v. Rail Cycle (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 74, 107; cf. Benton v. Board of Supervisors (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1467, 1474-1475 [appellant did not fail to exhaust administrative remedies by not seeking reconsideration because existing procedures did not allow for petition for reconsideration].) The ensuing analysis looks to what Kenward and Ellsworth may assert in light of the foregoing, subject to the fundamental principle of appellate practice that "it is counsel's duty to point out portions of the record that support the position taken on appeal. The appellate court is not required to search the record on its own seeking error." (Del Real v. City of Riverside (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 761, 768; accord, Lewis v. County of Sacramento (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 107, 113 ["We . . . 'cannot be expected to search through a voluminous record to discover evidence on a point raised by [a party] when his brief makes no reference to the pages where the evidence on the point can be found in the record.' "].)
It should be noted that the array of claims considered by Judge Stone was greater than Citizen's Voice contest here. In their brief, real parties identify the "claims . . . abandoned in this appeal: domestic water use baseline; . . . projected water use analysis results . . . ; . . . traffic; . . . potential future playing of amplified music; and the proposed winery kitchen."
Necessity of an EIR
"Under CEQA and its implementing guidelines, an agency generally conducts an initial study to determine 'if the project may have a significant effect on the environment.' (CEQA Guidelines, § 15063, subd. (a).) If there is substantial evidence that the project may have a significant effect on the environment, then the agency must prepare and certify an EIR before approving the project. (No Oil, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 85; see also Pub. Resources Code, §§ 21100 [state agencies], 21151 [local agencies].) On the other hand, no EIR is required if the initial study reveals that 'there is no substantial evidence that the project or any of its aspects may cause a significant effect on the environment.' (CEQA Guidelines, § 15063, subd. (b)(2).) The agency instead prepares a negative declaration 'briefly describing the reasons that a proposed project . . . will not have a significant effect on the environment and therefore does not require the preparation of an EIR.' (Id., § 15371; see id., § 15070.) Even when an initial study shows a project may have significant environmental effects, an EIR is not always required. The public agency may instead prepare a mitigated negative declaration (MND) if '(1) revisions in the project plans . . . before the proposed negative declaration and initial study are released for public review would avoid the effects or mitigate the effects to a point where clearly no significant effect on the environment would occur, and (2) there is no substantial evidence in light of the whole record before the public agency that the project, as revised, may have a significant effect on the environment.' (Pub. Resources Code, § 21064.5.)" (Friends of College of San Mateo Gardens v. San Mateo County Community College Dist. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 937, 945.)
Citizen's Voice contends the city flouted its obligation to order preparation of an EIR. According to Citizen's Voice, "[i]nstead of investigating . . . and disclosing the impacts to the public, the City pushed CEQA's requirements aside in order to push the Project forward." By contrast, it (Citizen's Voice) "submitted extensive comments—based on credible, non-speculative facts—illustrating a fair argument that the Event Center could have significant impacts on public safety in St. Helena." Quoting some of those comments, Citizen's Voice identifies as the safety of students at the nearby high school from traffic and the increased risk of inebriated drivers. "The City nonetheless ignored these comments. Nowhere in the Initial Study or MND is there a written analysis of impaired driving or other safety impacts related to the nearby school." "[N]owhere in the City's analysis is there a discussion of the potential for increased instances of impaired driving associated with the winery events and tasting rooms." "Finally, the City's decision to promise a crosswalk—if the City Engineer later approves one—at the last minute is proof that the issue of pedestrian safety was inadequately analyzed and also constitutes improperly deferred mitigation."
However, before proceeding to the merits, some observations are in order. As shown by the description of the project quoted at footnote 3, what Davies proposed was not just a stand-alone facility for the production of wine, but included also a number of features and functions associated with wine. We are not concerned with a situation where commercial wine production was being introduced into the area. According to the administrative record, such a facility has no novelty in St. Helena. In point of fact, the only feature of apparent novelty was the scope of the proposed expansion of the project. We are not talking about bringing a steel mill into a residential area. If we can characterize a common point of the minority not favoring the project, it was not a per se objection to the idea of this kind of facility, but a clear unease that so many other similar projects had already been approved that the distinctive nature of St. Helena was in danger of being lost. In short, the real objection was only one of degree, not of kind.
We agree with Judge Stone that simply reciting "There most definitely needs to be [an EIR]" will not suffice. The totality of the written appeal and the comments of appellants Kenward and Ellsworth might be read as identifying the specified omissions and inadequacies of the project as initially approved by the planning commission as including increased vehicular traffic; inadequate parking; increased demands on the water supply for grounds; the needs of special events; the disruption caused to the high school; and elevated noise. On the other hand, the city council treated the issue of "Compliance with CEQA" as not having been put at issue by the appeal, and thus "waived" by appellants.
Included in the council's "Resolution . . . Denying the Appeal and Thereby Upholding the Planning Commission Approval of the Use Permit Amendment" was the following:
" Compliance with CEQA/Mitigated Negative Declaration. The Appellant did not include in the Appeal any challenge or argument with respect to the Planning Commission's decision to approve the Mitigated Negative Declaration or the decision to adopt the Mitigation Monitoring and Reporting Program. Under the City's appeal ordinance (St. Helena Municipal Code section 17.08.180 C), Appellant was required to state all grounds for the Appeal in the written Appeal. Having failed to do so, the Council deems Appellant to have waived any such challenge or argument."
Yet the operative question here is not whether an EIR was appropriate in the first instance, but whether there is substantial evidence to support the determinations of the planning commission and the city council that the potentially significant environmental effects could be mitigated. (See Committee for Re-Evaluation of T-Line Loop v. San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1237, 1247; Latinos Unidos de Napa v. City of Napa (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 192, 200-201 and authorities cited.) A leading treatise puts it this way: "Without substantial evidence in the [administrative] record showing that significant adverse impacts will remain after mitigation, a court will presume that the conditions adopted by the agency in a mitigated negative declaration will be effective and will ensure that impacts are mitigated to an acceptable level. [Citations.] In other words, the burden is on the petitioner to demonstrate that there is substantial evidence in the record supporting a fair argument that the proposed project may have a significant [adverse environmental] effect even after mitigation measures are considered." (1 Kostka & Zischke, Practice Under the Cal. Environmental Quality Act (Cont.Ed.Bar. 2d ed. 2017) § 6.78, p. 6-78, italics added.)
The city council went to record that it "reaffirms the Planning Commission's approval of the Mitigated Negative Declaration and Mitigation Monitoring and Reporting Program, and in so doing agrees with the Planning Commission that the Mitigated Negative Declaration was and is adequate under the California Environmental Quality Act ('CEQA'). In so determining, the Council finds that while the initial study for the Project identifies potentially significant effects] including Aesthetics, Air Quality, Cultural Resources, Geology, Hydrology, Noise, Transportation, and Utilities/Service Systems but: [¶] Revisions in the project plans or proposals made by, or agreed to by the applicant before a proposed mitigated negative declaration and initial study are released for public review would avoid the effects or mitigate the effects to a point where clearly no significant effects would occur, and [¶] There is no substantial evidence, in light of the whole record before the agency, that the project as revised may have a significant effect on the environment. [¶] This finding is supported by the record before the Planning Commission and the City Council, including without limitation the staff reports, the application materials, and materials and testimony submitted at the public hearings before the Planning Commission and City Council."
The city made 12 "Use Permit Findings," to wit:
"1. That the proposed use would not generate odors, fumes, dust, light, glare, radiation or refuse that would be injurious to surrounding uses or to the community."
"2. That the proposed use would not generate levels of noise that adversely affect the health, safety, or welfare of neighboring properties or uses."
"3. That the proposed use would not generate traffic noise in excess of the 'normally acceptable' range identified in the General Plan."
"4. That the proposed use would not make excessive demands on the provision of public services including water supply, sewer capacity, energy supply, communication facilities, police protection, and fire protection."
"5. That the proposed use would provide adequate ingress and egress to and from the proposed location."
"6. That allowing the proposed use would not conflict with the City's goal of maintaining the economic viability of a local serving economy."
"7. That the proposed use would be compatible with surrounding land uses and would not conflict with the purpose established for the [service commercial] district within which it would be located."
"8. That the proposed use would not be in conflict with the City's General Plan."
"9. That the proposed use would not be injurious to public health, safety, or welfare."
"10. That granting the use permit would not set a precedent for the approval of similar uses whose incremental effect would be detrimental to the City or would be in conflict with the General Plan."
"11. That, as demonstrated on a detailed plan submitted by the applicant, adequate off-street parking to accommodate the long term parking needs of employees and business owners and customers is available."
"12. That the capacity of surrounding streets is adequate to serve the automobile and delivery truck traffic generated by the proposed use."
Each of the findings was followed by supporting reasoning.
For example, under finding No. 3 is the following: "The anticipated traffic generation for the proposed project will be generally consistent with trip generation associated with a winery and tasting room of this size. The traffic associated with the project is also consistent with traffic generated by surrounding uses and will not generate excessive traffic-related noise. In addition, the amount of traffic generated by the expansion of the winery, which is calculated to be 33 peak hour trips over and above the current winery trip generation, is negligible when compared to the much higher traffic volumes on Hwy 29 and surrounding streets."
And under finding No. 5 is the following: "The applicant provided a traffic analysis which was attached to the Planning Commission and City Council staff reports. Staff and the Planning Commission determined that this report was adequate and credible, and the City Council agrees. Adequate ingress and egress to this area is provided for both patrons and emergency vehicles. The Police and Fire Departments both found that the proposed access provides adequate ingress and egress to the project site under both normal and emergency conditions. The planned Grayson/Hwy 29 traffic signal, which is funded, will mitigate current and projected traffic volumes at the key Grayson Avenue/Hwy 29 intersection adjacent to the project site. It is anticipated this traffic signal will be constructed by May 2015."
The council also made a number of "additional findings in response to comments and correspondence submitted after the close of the public hearing." Among those findings were the following:
"The Findings Concerning Whether The Project Is 'Primarily Tourist' Are Adequate."
"Not Only Did Appellants Fail To Timely Raise An Issue Of The Project's Compliance With SHMC Section 17.52.070, The Project Complies With That Section."
"The Additional Noise And Crosswalk Conditions Imposed After The Close Of The Public Hearing Do Not Require The City To Reopen The CEQA Process Or The Public Hearing."
Each of these findings was also followed by supporting reasoning.
Attached to the resolution was an exhibit memorializing Davies's election to cap the number of visitors to 160 per day, and to reduce the number of specified "marketing events" ("Food & Wine Pairing Events," "Wine Club/Release Events," "Larger Auction-related Events") to 32.
This meant that Davies agreed to have no weddings or wedding receptions.
The majority of the argument advanced by Citizen's Voice is under the heading "Petitioners Presented Substantial Evidence of a Fair Argument that the Project Poses Significant Public Safety Impacts," specifically, pedestrian safety. But such is no longer the dispositive consideration. As indicated, the decisive question is whether, after taking account of the totality of the mitigation measures adopted, there remains an unaddressed prospect of a significant environmental impact. Yet Citizen's Voice ignores the extensive mitigation findings quoted above. Citizen's Voice makes no genuine attempt to demonstrate how the mitigation measures are inadequate in addressing concerns generated by the proposed project. It makes no attempt to demonstrate why the city council's findings Nos. 5, 9, 11, and 12 show that the issue of pedestrian safety is still unaddressed, particularly the language attending finding No. 9 that "conditions of approval have been added by Council to address . . . concerns over pedestrian safety." It does not mention the "Mitigation Monitoring and Reporting Program" adopted by the city council (see fn. 6, ante), or try to demonstrate why it will not be effective. Citizen's Voice makes no effort to disprove the city council's finding that "Revisions in the project plans or proposals made by, or agreed to by the applicant . . . would avoid the effects or mitigate the effects to a point where clearly no significant effects would occur." (Italics added.) And it makes no attempt to undermine the city council's finding (quoted at fn. 8, ante) that the "traffic analysis which was attached to the Planning Commission and City Council staff reports" "was adequate and credible" in addressing and mitigating any adverse impacts on pedestrians.
Among the conditions of approval imposed by the city council was the following: "All mitigation measures contained in the adopted Mitigated Negative Declaration shall be conditions of this project, and shall be implemented as specified in the Mitigation Monitoring and Reporting program."
The only particularized discussion from Citizen's Voice is that "The City Improperly Deferred Analysis and Mitigation of Public Safety Impacts by Postponing the Decision to Install a Crosswalk." But Citizen's Voice omits to mention that the crosswalk is mated with a stop light, which, because it involves a state highway, is dependent upon CalTrans approval. As for deferring the issue, the city council's approval stated: "The City Engineer will determine the precise location of the crosswalk, along with the design of the crosswalk including the type of signaling and other necessary improvements, including without limitation, connecting sidewalks, which would be needed by a pedestrian utilizing the crosswalk. The full cost of such a sidewalk, and any other related improvements as determined by the City Engineer, shall be the responsibility of the Project applicant. If the City Engineer, upon further review, has concerns over the appropriateness of installing such a crosswalk, the City Engineer shall bring the crosswalk issue back to City Council for a final decision by Council, upon consideration of the recommendation of the City Engineer."
We close our discussion of this point with two highly pertinent observations. "Responses to comments need not be exhaustive; they need only demonstrate a 'good faith, reasoned analysis.' " (Gilroy Citizens for Responsible Planning v. City of Gilroy (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 911, 937.) " 'An evaluation of the environmental effects of a proposed project need not be exhaustive, but the sufficiency of an [environmental document] is to be reviewed in the light of what is reasonably feasible. . . . [Citations.] Technical perfection is not required; the courts have looked not for an exhaustive analysis but for adequacy, completeness and a good-faith effort at full disclosure." (Rio Vista Farm Bureau Center v. County of Solano (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 351, 368, citing Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15151.)
Citizen's Voice has failed to establish the absence of good faith by St. Helena.
Consistency with General Plan and Zoning Ordinance
Contending that St. Helena "turned a blind eye" on its own planning policies, Citizen's Voice insists the approval "violated" the city's general plan and its "zoning ordinance."
The city council's findings have been quoted in the preceding discussion. The 12 "use permit" findings already quoted were made by the city council "[i]n accordance with Zoning Code Section 17.168.050." Many of those findings, and their supporting reasoning, made reference to the municipal general plan. The most extended is the following discussion after finding No. 7:
"For the reasons discussed more fully under Findings Nos. 1 through 6, above, the City Council finds that the proposed use will be compatible with surrounding land uses and will not conflict with the purpose established for the SC District or the City's General Plan. In addition, the Council expands upon those findings as set forth below.
"The 1993 General Plan states that: 'SC designation provides for service and retail uses, restaurants, service stations, motels, public and quasi-public uses, and similar and compatible uses. The designation is intended primarily for service and retail uses that are automobile-oriented or whose operational characteristics and space needs are not considered appropriate for the Central Business District. The intent is for the SC district to be primarily local resident serving in character. Strictly tourist-serving retail uses are prohibited within this designation. Maximum FAR in the SC district is 0.50. The SC designation includes areas fronting on Highway 29 south of Sulphur Springs Creek.'
"The Appellant has asserted that this language, read in isolation, prohibits the City Council from approving this or any winery/tasting facility. The City Council disagrees. The General Plan contains many different, sometimes competing policies that must be read together and harmonized. Other policies contained in the General Plan support the City Council's determination and findings here.
"For example, Policy 2.6.29 states the policy to 'Minimize the strip commercial appearance of the area south of the bridge by encouraging the redevelopment of underutilized parcels and poorly designed developments, and by maintaining open space corridors extending from the highway to the east and west as shown on the Land Use Map.' The Project here, which proposes to utilize and improve a long-vacant former automobile dealership, furthers this policy.
"In addition, while Policy 2.6.42, relied upon by Appellant, lists examples of uses deemed inconsistent with the 'local-serving' policy, that list of excluded uses does not include wineries or wine tasting facilities, and instead only includes only 'all fast food restaurants, outlet and discount type stores as well as large retail businesses whose consumer base requires a population larger than St. Helena and its vicinity.' Wineries and wine tasting facilities are not included in the list for good reason: they are not intended to be categorically prohibited by this policy.
"Further, Policy 2.6.63 explicitly anticipates and allows the winery and related uses proposed here: 'Permit wineries and other agriculture related industry to locate in the City if their location does not adversely impact surrounding uses or city services (water, traffic, etc.) or the quality and character of the community.'
"In addition to considering the policies of the 1993 General Plan, it is appropriate to also consider the City's draft General Plan Update. The Council and the community have spent substantial time reviewing, considering and revising that Update, which also has been recently reviewed by the Planning Commission, The Council anticipates the Update, which was recently considered anew by the Planning Commission, will be approved within the coming months. That Update does not include the language contained in the 1993 General Plan relied upon by Appellant here for the argument that wineries and tasting facilities are prohibited in the SC district, and in fact contains language] clarifying and confirming that such uses that are supportive of the wine industry are in fact encouraged under appropriate circumstances, such as through a conditional use permit in the Service Commercial zone.
"While Appellant also argues that the zoning for the SC district, as set forth in St. Helena Municipal Code chapter 17.52, similarly prohibits the Project and its proposed uses, the City Council finds otherwise, for reasons similar to those set forth above. As with the General Plan, the SC zoning (Section 17.52.030) explicitly allows for wineries and winery tasting rooms with a conditional use permit. As with the General Plan, the SC zoning ordinance (Section 17.52.060) contains a list of those uses deemed to be prohibited in the district. That list does not include wineries or winery tasting rooms/facilities. Those zoning provisions reflect the City Council's determination, made long ago, that wineries and winery tasting rooms/facilities may, on case-by-case determinations of the appropriateness of specific project applications, be approved by conditional use permit in the SC district, and may be found to be consistent with the General Plan.
"The City previously resolved the question of whether a winery at this specific location is consistent with the General Plan and allowed by the SC zoning, in granting a Use Permit and Design Review for a winery at the site in 2012. While the City Council properly may consider whether to allow the current proposal to expand upon the uses authorized by that 2012 Use Permit, the underlying question of whether any winery may be allowed at the site was already resolved. The Council reaffirms that determination here."
This discussion was effectively incorporated by reference to support finding No. 8—"That the proposed use would not be in conflict with the City's General Plan."
Mention has already been made of the city's council's "additional" finding that "Not Only Did Appellants Fail To Timely Raise An Issue Of The Project's Compliance With SHMC Section 17.52.070, The Project Complies With That Section." The reasoning supporting this findings was as follows:
"Appellants additionally asserted after the close of the public hearing that the City is required to adopt additional findings to allow buildings to exceed 10,000 square feet. This issue, and the rationale for the Use Permit allowing the exception, were discussed in the staff reports for the project hearings before both the Planning Commission and City Council. The law with respect to the form and sufficiency of findings does not require more.
"In addition, because appellants did not raise this issue in their appeal, as required by the Municipal Code (Section 17.08.180 C), they are barred from raising it now, or for asserting it in court as a basis for invalidating the City's decision.
"Notwithstanding these points, the City Council hereby makes the following relevant findings:
"Section 17.52.070 (C) (l)(a) and (2)(a) of the Municipal Code allow the expansion of existing and development of new facilities for winery use with Planning Commission approval. The City of St. Helena has imposed a maximum 10,000-sf. building footprint on any new or expansion of any existing commercial structures in the City's commercial districts. The purpose, which the project advances, is primarily to discourage the 'big box' commercial uses found in more urban areas, but is also for the purpose of scale and for minimizing visual impact from the roadway. The applicant here seeks an exception to this regulation, as authorized by Section 17.52.070, so as to avoid building two separate structures smaller than 10,000-sf. and incurring the operational inefficiencies associated with such separation. The exception would further, and be specific to the structure's use as a functioning winery. The City Council agrees with the Planning Commission that a Use Permit is appropriate to allow the structures proposed by the applicant. In so doing, the City Council finds that the exception proposed here is for a building that existed prior to 1993, and that in regard to the requested exception it has considered the criteria set forth in Section 17.52.070, namely:
"That expanded floor area shall only be allowed for office, winery, storage, or other nonretail uses determined by the planning commission;
"That the proposed increase in floor area shall not result in an expansion of the footprint or building coverage of the existing building; and
"That the floor area ratio shall not be exceeded.
"The City Council finds that these criteria are intended to be considered as a whole and harmonized, with all parts applied in a manner that does not negate or render impossible any other section. To this end, the Council finds that the second of the three criteria (the 'footprint' criterion) cannot be applied literally here without negating the first criterion which allows the exception for expansion of an existing building for a winery use. To that end, the Council finds that the applicant cannot operate its winery effectively without expanding the footprint."
" ' " 'An action, program, or project is consistent with the general plan if, considering all its aspects, it will further the objectives and policies of the general plan and not obstruct their attainment.' [Citation.]" [Citation.] State law does not require perfect conformity between a proposed project and the applicable general plan . . . . [Citation.]' [Citation.] In other words, 'it is nearly, if not absolutely, impossible for a project to be in perfect conformity with each and every policy set forth in the applicable plan. . . . It is enough that the proposed project will be compatible with the objectives, policies, general land uses and programs specified in the applicable plan. [Citations.]' [Citation.]
" . . . 'When we review an agency's decision for consistency with its own general plan, we accord great deference to the agency's determination. This is because the body which adopted the general plan policies in its legislative capacity has unique competence to interpret those policies when applying them in its adjudicatory capacity. [Citation.] Because policies in a general plan reflect a range of competing interests, the governmental agency must be allowed to weigh and balance the plan's policies when applying them, and it has broad discretion to construe its policies in light of the plan's purposes. [Citations.] A reviewing court's role "is simply to decide whether the city officials considered the applicable policies and the extent to which the proposed project conforms with those policies." [Citation.]' [Citation.]
" . . . 'A city's findings that the project is consistent with its general plan can be reversed only if it is based on evidence from which no reasonable person could have reached the same conclusion. [Citation.]' [Citation.] Thus, the party challenging a city's determination of general plan consistency has the burden to show why, based on all of the evidence in the record, the determination was unreasonable. [Citation.]" (Pfeiffer v. City of Sunnyvale City Council (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1552, 1563.)
The same standard governs our review of St. Helena's compliance with its zoning ordinances. (American Canyon Community United for Responsible Growth v. City of American Canyon (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1062, 1070.)
Was approval of Davies's amended use permit application unreasonable? Conceding that a winery is permitted by St. Helena's "Zoning Ordinance," Citizen's Voice maintains it nevertheless was, because "the City's municipal code" fosters "local-serving businesses," while prohibiting "[s]trictly tourist-serving retail uses" in the area where the Davies project is situated. According to Citizen's Voice, "The Davies Project represents a sharp break with these policies. Instead of focusing on local services, the Project depends upon and prioritizes tourist-serving uses."
On this point, we conclude Judge Stone's analysis was generally spot-on. The expanded winery production clearly would not be a "[s]trictly tourist-serving retail" use. (Italics added.) Some of the other features of the planned expansion might appear to be oriented to tourists, but not exclusively. There is nothing in the administrative record establishing that the "hospitality building" that would presumably host the "range of wine tasting, wine club release parties and similar events" (see fn. 3, ante) would attract only tourists.
Citizen's Voice notes that "[t]he City has never made any findings regarding what portion of the Project's revenue is likely to come from local residents as opposed to tourists." The speculative difficulty of trying to make such a finding is self-evident, and hardly in keeping with CEQA's emphasis on "what is reasonably feasible." (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15151.) Given the inherent imprecision of the relevant terms, it is appropriate to let the responsible local agency do the balancing of the general plan's competing policies.
The general plan itself recognizes that " 'local-serving' is difficult to precisely define." That the plan speaks on one hand about prohibiting "[s]trictly tourist-serving retail uses" and on another prohibiting commercial uses "that are primarily tourist-serving in nature" only compounds the matter. So does the plan's goal of "[e]ncourag[ing] primarily local serving businesses." Similarly, the plan notes "St. Helena's historic role as a commercial center providing supplies and services to the surrounding area" (italics added) makes it problematic to classify how many Napa residents might not qualify as "tourists."
With respect to the zoning issue—which Citizen's Voice treats as the city council waiving the 10,000 square foot limitation—the city's additional finding quoted above treated the site of the former automobile agency as an existing use ("the exception proposed here is for a building that existed prior to 1993"). One of the "[g]uiding [p]olicies" of the general plan is to "encourage . . . rehabilitation and re-use" of "resources in the commercial areas." Citizen's Voice identifies no authority that the square footage limitation is categorical and nonwaivable. The city council took pains to explain that it had the statutory power to "excuse" the limitation, and why it chose to exercise that power. There can be no doubt that the council " ' "considered the applicable policies." ' " (Pfeiffer v. City of Sunnyvale City Council, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th 1552, 1563.) The decision was not palpably unreasonable, and thus did not exceed the council's " 'broad discretion.' " (Ibid.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents and real parties shall recover their costs of appeal.
/s/_________
Richman, Acting P.J. We concur: /s/_________
Stewart, J. /s/_________
Miller, J.