Accordingly, we look to that case as authority rather than Jean's case from a foreign jurisdiction that addresses the same issue but yields a contrary result. ¶ 13 Besides the New Jersey case, Jean cites an Illinois case— Citizen's National Bank of Decatur v. Farmer , 77 Ill. App. 3d 56, 32 Ill.Dec. 740, 395 N.E.2d 1121 (1979) —in an effort to support her argument that the four-year statute of limitations under the UCC applies here. Jean emphasizes that the court in Citizen's held that a buyer's obligation to pay for the goods purchased is a fundamental part of a contract for the sale of the goods.

Therefore, Harris Trust, which did not involve the sale of goods, is distinguishable from the case before us which involves a sale of goods. Fischer and the district court have relied on Citizen's National Bank v. Farmer, 77 Ill.App.3d 56, 32 Ill.Dec. 740, 395 N.E.2d 1121 (1979), which describes the distinction between a buyer/seller relationship and a debtor/creditor relationship. In Citizen's, the defendant promised to pay a car dealership for a car under the terms of a retail installment contract.

As Defendant argues (and Plaintiff does not dispute), Illinois follows the majority approach among states and applies Article 2's limitation period to installment contracts like the RIC here. See Citizen's Nat'l Bank of Decatur v. Farmer, 77 Ill.App.3d 56, 32 Ill.Dec. 740, 395 N.E.2d 1121 (1979) (holding Article 2's four-year limitation period governs an automobile retail installment sales contract); Fallimento C.Op.M.A. v. Fischer Crane Co., 995 F.2d 789 (7th Cir. 1993) (same regarding a promissory note for sale of hydraulic crane equipment governed by Illinois law); Scott v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 345 Md. 251, 691 A.2d 1320, 1325 (1997) (collecting cases across jurisdictions).

The question of which article applies to a suit for default on a motor vehicle retail installment sales contract has not previously been addressed in Vermont. Nearly every jurisdiction that has addressed the issue, however, has concluded that the four-year limitation period in Article 2 applies. See, e.g., Jack Heskett Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Metcalf, 204 Cal.Rptr. 355, 357 (Ct.App. 1984); Worrel v. Farmers Bank of Del., 430 A.2d 469, 471-72 (Del. 1981); First Hawaiian Bank v. Powers, 998 P.2d 55, 67 n. 8 (Haw.Ct.App. 2000); Citizen's Nat'l Bank of Decatur v. Farmer, 395 N.E.2d 1121, 1122-24 (Ill.App.Ct. 1979); Scott v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 691 A.2d 1320, 1322-26 (Md. 1997); First of Am. Bank v. Thompson, 552 N.W.2d 516, 520-22 (Mich.Ct.App. 1996); Assocs. Disc. Corp. v. Palmer, 219 A.2d 858, 860-61 (N.J. 1966); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Arce, 791 A.2d 1041, 1042-44 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div. 2002) (considering intervening law); First Nat'l Bank in Albuquerque v. Chase, 887 P.2d 1250, 1253 (N.M. 1994). But see N.C. Nat'l Bank v. Holshouser, 247 S.E.2d 645, 648 (N.C. 1978) (Article 9, not Article 2, governs deficiency actions); Chaney v. Fields Chevrolet Co., 503 P.2d 1239, 1241 (Or. 1972) (although a deficiency action is more closely related to a sale than to a security, an action by the party in default to recover a surplus is more closely related to a security and thus is governed by Article 9); see generally, Annotation, Causes of Action Governed by Limitations Period in UCC § 2-725, 49 A.L.R.5th 1, 144-49 (1997).

Scott also submitted at oral argument in this Court that the contract of sale terminated at the time the vehicle was delivered to him, so that all that remained was for the creditor to enforce its security interest. Citizen's Nat'l Bank v. Farmer, 77 Ill. App.3d 56, 32 Ill.Dec. 740, 395 N.E.2d 1121 (1979), rejected a similar argument. There the defendant purchased an automobile, making a cash down payment and signing an installment contract for the balance.

Subsequent to the Palmer decision, nearly every other jurisdiction that has considered which time limitation applies to deficiency actions has adopted the same approach.See, e.g., Worrel v. Farmers Bank of Del., 430 A.2d 469, 471-72 (Del. 1980) (following the Palmer reasoning in applying Section 2-725 to deficiency actions); Citizen's Nat'l Bank of Decatur v. Farmer, 77 Ill. App.3d 56, 32 Ill.Dec. 740, 742, 395 N.E.2d 1121, 1123 (1979) (holding that a deficiency action is an action for the price and governed by Section 2-725); Massey-Ferguson Credit Corp. v. Casaulong, 62 Cal.App.3d 1024, 133 Cal.Rptr. 497, 499 (1976) (noting that the reasoning in Palmer is equally applicable in California); Chemical Bank v. Rinden Professional Ass'n, 126 N.H. 688, 498 A.2d 706, 713 (1985) (holding Article 2 applicable to transactions in goods involving both a sale and a security agreement); Michael A. DiSabatino, Annotation, Application, to Security Aspects of Sales Contract, of UCC § 2-725 Limiting Time for Bringing Actions for Breach of Sales Contract, 16 A.L.R. 4th 1335 (1982) (listing jurisdictions that applied Section 2-725 to deficiency actions); cf. Chaney v. Fields Chevrolet Co., 264 Or. 21, 503 P.2d 1239, 1241 (1972) (holding that an action for a deficiency is more closely related to the sales portion of the contract, but that an action by the defaulter to recover a surplus from the resale after foreclosure is more closely

In deciding that the action was governed by the four-year statute of limitations in UCC 2-725, the Court's reasoning was as follows: 77 Ill. App.3d 56, 395 N.E.2d 1121 (1979). The bank's argument for application of the 10-year statute, although novel, is unacceptable. It argues that defendant's breach was of her obligations to make payment, not of a contract for the sale of goods.

Id. at 1028. In Citizen's Nat'l Bank of Decatur v Farmer, 77 Ill. App.3d 56; 32 Ill Dec 740; 395 N.E.2d 1121 (1979), a bank, as assignee, sued a defaulting buyer of an automobile for the balance due on a retail installment sales contract. The bank argued that a ten-year statute of limitations applied, rather than the four-year UCC period.

This rule has been applied when, like the transaction here, a third-party finance company is involved. See, e.g., Massey-Ferguson Credit Corp. v. Casaulong, 133 Cal.Rptr. 497, 62 Cal.App.3d 1024 (1976); Citizen's Natl. Bank of Decatur v. Farmer, 77 Ill.App.3d 56, 32 Ill.Dec. 740, 395 N.E.2d 1121 (1979). Because Article Two applies to the sales aspects of a mixed sale and security transaction, both Article Two and Article Nine govern.

On the other hand, an installment contract for the sale of particular goods and services, even if the contract is later assigned to a lending or financing institution, is not a loan. See Midland Funding, 127 N.E.3d at 1049-50 (citing Citizen's Nat. Bank of Decatur v. Farmer, 395 N.E.2d 1121, 1122 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) and Johnson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 303 N.E.2d 627, 637 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973)). That is, where there is fundamentally no "tripartite relationship," Midland Funding LLC, 127 N.E.3d at 1048, but instead the seller permits a consumer to buy goods and services on credit and pay in installments over time, then there is no loan, even if a bank or similar institution later steps into the shoes of the seller as the assignee of the installment contract. Id. at 1049-50.