Opinion
01-30-2024
Rafael M. Pantoja, appellant pro se. Davidson Fink LLP, Rochester (Todd Z. Marks of counsel), for respondent.
Rafael M. Pantoja, appellant pro se.
Davidson Fink LLP, Rochester (Todd Z. Marks of counsel), for respondent.
Singh, J.P., Kapnick, Kennedy, Higgitt, Michael, JJ.
Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Doris M. Gonzalez, J.), entered April 27, 2023, which denied defendant Rafael Pantoja’s motion for entry of a proposed judgment and other relief, unanimously affirmed, without costs.
[1, 2] Supreme Court properly denied defendant’s motion seeking entry of a judgment, since the action had been finally terminated by an order discontinuing the action, which divested the court of jurisdiction to consider the motion (see Cropper v. Stewart, 190 A.D.3d 407, 408, 135 N.Y.S.3d 634 [1st Dept. 2021]; CPLR 3217[b]). The discontinuance had the effect of nullifying Pantoja’s pending motion to vacate his default, and his proposed answer and counterclaims were never filed (see Newman v. Newman, 245 A.D.2d 353, 354, 665 N.Y.S.2d 423 [2d Dept. 1997]; see also Pearson v. New York City Health & Hosps. Carp. [Harlem Hosp. Ctr.], 43 A.D.3d 92, 95, 840 N.Y.S.2d 25 [1st Dept. 2007], affd 10 N.Y.3d 852, 859 N.Y.S.2d 614, 889 N.E.2d 493 [2008]). Even if we were to consider the merits, the proposed judgment offered by Pantoja is inconsis- tent with this Court’s determination in prior appeals that the deed purporting to convey the subject property to him was void ab initio (see CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Pantoja, 176 A.D.3d 655, 655–656, 111 N.Y.S.3d 584 [1st Dept. 2019]; Salazar v. Pantoja, 137 A.D.3d 511, 511, 29 N.Y.S.3d 249 [1st Dept. 2016]).
We have considered Pantoja’s remaining arguments and find them unavailing.