Opinion
9821 Index 13637/06
07-09-2019
CITIMORTGAGE, INC., Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Rafael PANTOJA, et al., Defendants, Ana Iris Salazar, et al., Defendants-Appellants.
Balfe & Holland, P.C., Melville (Lee E. Riger of counsel), for appellants. Houser & Allison, APC, New York (Victoria R. Serigano of counsel), for respondent.
Balfe & Holland, P.C., Melville (Lee E. Riger of counsel), for appellants.
Houser & Allison, APC, New York (Victoria R. Serigano of counsel), for respondent.
Renwick, J.P., Gische, Kapnick, Singh, JJ.
It is undisputed that nonparty Rapsil Corporation conveyed the same property to two different recipients, first, defendant Rafael Pantoja (who obtained a mortgage from CitiMortgage), and, second, a bona fide entity that transferred it to the Salazar defendants. Although the deed that conveyed the property from Rapsil to Pantoja was unacknowledged, which ordinarily would render it only voidable, because Pantoja controlled Rapsil, the deed was made under false pretenses and was therefore void ab initio (see Marden v. Dorthy, 160 N.Y. 39, 53, 54 N.E. 726 [1899] ; International Union Bank v. National Sur. Co., 245 N.Y. 368, 372–373, 157 N.E. 269 [1927] ). Accordingly, the CitiMortgage mortgage was invalid as well ( Weiss v. Phillips, 157 A.D.3d 1, 10, 65 N.Y.S.3d 147 [1st Dept. 2017] ).
This determination is not inconsistent with our prior related decisions ( Salazar v. Pantoja, 137 A.D.3d 511, 29 N.Y.S.3d 249 [1st Dept. 2016] ; ABN Amro Mtge. Group, Inc. v. Pantoja, 91 A.D.3d 440, 936 N.Y.S.2d 163 [1st Dept. 2012] ). In any event, the law of the case doctrine does not limit our power to reconsider issues "where there are extraordinary circumstances, such as subsequent evidence affecting the prior determination" ( J.P. Morgan Sec., Inc. v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 166 A.D.3d 1, 8–9, 84 N.Y.S.3d 436 [1st Dept. 2018] [internal quotation marks omitted] ).