Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
San Mateo County Super, Ct. No. CIV464542
RIVERA, J.
In this declaratory relief action, William and Clive Yang (collectively, the Yangs) appeal from a judgment finding that Citibank, N.A.’s deed of trust was valid and enforceable. The Yangs contend that a lis pendens they filed had priority over the Citibank lien. We affirm.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The facts are undisputed. In 1999, the marriage of Clive and Lucy Yang was dissolved. A marital settlement agreement (MSA) was incorporated into the judgment of dissolution. Pursuant to that agreement, Clive and Lucy agreed that the residence at 20 Miranda Court in Hillsborough (the property) would be transferred to a living trust in which Lucy was the trustee and the couple’s son, Humphrey, was the primary beneficiary. Under the trust, Humphrey was to receive the corpus of the trust at age 30 (in 2017), with Lucy having the right to reside at the property rent free until that time. The MSA further provided that Clive was to pay any outstanding mortgages on the property before October 31, 2005, and to transfer his interest in the property to Lucy within two weeks following approval of the MSA.
For ease of reference, we refer to Clive, Lucy, William, and Humphrey W. A. Yang by their first names.
In accordance with the MSA, Lucy established the Lucy Yuan Yang 2000 Trust (the Lucy Trust) on May 19, 2000, and the property was transferred to the trust.
On December 7, 2005, Clive filed an order to show cause to enforce the trust provisions of the dissolution judgment. He alleged that the MSA provided any changes in the mortgage of the property prior to October 31, 2005, required the consent of both parties; and that Lucy had violated the provision by recording two mortgages against the property.
On December 8, 2005, Clive recorded a lis pendens against the property, giving notice that a dissolution action affecting the property was pending, and that the object of the action was to enforce a restriction regarding the ownership of the property and to “charge” the trustee. At trial, counsel for Clive testified that the notice should have read “ ‘change’ ” the trustee.
On May 22, 2006, Citibank recorded a deed of trust executed by Lucy against the property. The deed of trust secured a line of credit up to a limit of $500,000. Citibank extended the credit without requiring Lucy to verify her income or to provide an appraisal, a preliminary title report, or a copy of the Lucy Trust.
On August 11, 2006, the court continued the hearing on Clive’s order to show cause and ordered that “[p]ending hearing there shall be no further loans or use of any line of credit against the real property located at 20 Miranda Court....” On November 30, 2006, Citibank advanced the $500,000 available under its credit line.
The continued hearing on the order to show cause was held on December 8, 2006. The court ordered that Clive and Lucy choose an independent trustee to replace Lucy and continued its order precluding borrowing against the property absent a written agreement. The court reserved jurisdiction concerning repayment of a $60,000 loan taken out by Lucy against the property.
Lucy’s whereabouts were unknown at the time of trial. On January 16, 2007, the court appointed William, Clive’s son, as trustee of the Lucy Trust and authorized him to litigate the release of the Citibank lien.
On March 21, 2007, William entered into a contract to sell the property for $2,100,000. Escrow on the sale closed on April 24, 2007. Citibank was paid $510,739.90 in satisfaction of its line of credit to Lucy out of the proceeds of the sale.
Citibank filed this declaratory relief action against Clive and William on July 18, 2007, seeking a declaration that its deed of trust was a valid and enforceable lien on the property and that it was entitled to the payoff funds. The court found in favor of Citibank.
II. DISCUSSION
The Yangs contend the court erred in finding that the lis pendens was ineffective to foreclose Citibank from asserting a lien against the property. They argue, first, that the trial court was wrong in suggesting that Clive did not appear to be a proper “claimant” as defined by the statute—and therefore was not authorized to file a lis pendens—because he did not have or assert any right, title or interest in the property in connection with his order to show cause. The Yangs contend that nothing in the statute requires that the claimant in the action underlying the lis pendens be the person claiming an interest in the property. They argue that Clive’s request in the order to show cause that Lucy be replaced as trustee was a claim “which would, if meritorious, affect... title to... specific real property” (Code Civ. Proc., § 405.4) and this is all the law requires to support a lis pendens. Citibank contends the trial court was correct, citing Moseley v. Superior Court (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 672, 677.
After oral argument and after the case was submitted, counsel for the Yangs lodged with the court a letter brief and an application to reopen briefing citing to authority in support of their position. We will not vacate our submission to permit this tardy brief to be filed. As we explain, we need not reconcile the apparently conflicting authorities on this issue because we affirm on other grounds.
We need not decide whether Clive was a proper claimant, however, because there was nothing in his court filing that called into question the validity of Lucy’s title to, or right to possession of, the property. As the trial court correctly noted, a lis pendens in effect “ ‘republishes the pleadings.’ ” (Gale v. Superior Court (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1388, 1396.) Upon discovering a lis pendens recorded against a piece of property, a potential purchaser or lender can go to the courthouse and review the pleadings to determine how the action could affect title or possession of that property. (Ibid.)
Here, at most, Clive’s moving papers put the reader on notice that Lucy, at some time in the future, might be removed as trustee of the trust that owned the property, due to matters unrelated to any title dispute. Although there were boxes Clive could have checked on the Judicial Council form to ask for restraints on Lucy’s ability to transfer, encumber, or hypothecate the property, he did not check any of those boxes. Accordingly, as of the date that Citibank recorded its deed of trust, there was nothing in the public record that would put a lender on notice of any dispute as to the validity of Lucy’s title to, or right to possession of, the property.
Clive’s declaration also claimed that the mortgages Lucy had recorded against the property were in “violation of [a] court order,” but this contention is not a “ ‘[r]eal property claim’ ” as it did not “affect... title to, or the right to possession of, [the] real property.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 405.4.)
Clive’s moving papers also sought an order to enforce the “trust provisions of [the] dissolution judgment.” This claim, as well, did not provide any warning that a lender’s security interest in the property might be at risk, because nothing in the MSA prevented Lucy from obtaining a line of credit secured by the property. The MSA simply required that all liens against the property be paid by Clive on or before October 31, 2005, and that prior to October 31, 2005, any “changes in the mortgage” of the property had to be approved by both Clive and Lucy. It did not restrict Lucy from encumbering the property after that date. Citibank recorded its deed of trust on May 22, 2006. It was a valid lien. The trial court properly so found.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: RUVOLO, P.J., REARDON, J.