Opinion
No. CV08 5004427 S
August 5, 2010
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE ROBERT OLSEN'S MOTION TO OPEN JUDGMENT
This foreclosure matter arises out of a series of cascading mistakes by the Court, Holzberg, J., the clerk's office, the committee for sale, plaintiff's counsel, and the successful bidder, Robert Olsen, and his counsel. These mistakes cumulatively resulted in Olsen purchasing at a foreclosure auction property which was subsequently foreclosed by the first mortgagee whose interest in the property was not recognized by the court, the committee, Mr. Olsen or his attorney, or disclosed by plaintiff prior to Olsen's purchase of the property. As a result of these errors, Mr. Olsen paid $216,000 for a house he no longer owns; the plaintiff second mortgagee is the potential recipient of over $90,000 in sale proceeds to which it has no legal or equitable claim and the defendant estate is the potential recipient of an approximate $120,000 windfall despite its being in default of two mortgages. Olsen appeals to the equitable discretion of the court to open the judgment of foreclosure by sale and to order the return of the purchase price, even though the sale has been confirmed, title has vested and the motion to open was filed well past 120 days following the entry of the original judgment.
This dispute arises out of a lengthy procedural and factual history which is largely uncontested. On April 29, 2008, the plaintiff Citibank NA ("Citibank") initiated a foreclosure action against Debra Lindland, Executrix of the Estate of Madlyn Landin ("Estate") alleging that the Estate defaulted on a mortgage loan owed to Citibank secured by property located at 17 Ridge Road, Cromwell, Connecticut. On July 10, 2008, in support of its motion for strict foreclosure, Citibank filed with the court a foreclosure worksheet reflecting the absence of any equity in the property. Specifically, the worksheet disclosed: 1) a fair market value of $305,000; 2) the existence of a first mortgage in the amount of $295,000; and 3) a debt arising out of the plaintiff's second mortgage in the amount of $82,615.46. Although the worksheet showed a negative equity in the amount of $12,815.46, the parties agree that calculation is incorrect and the actual negative equity at the time was $72,815.46.
On August 4, 2008, Citibank's Motion for Judgment of Strict Foreclosure appeared on the short calendar. A series of mistakes then ensued that would infect the entire process beginning with the court, Holzberg, J., erroneously entering a judgment of foreclosure by sale, having failed to recognize that Citibank's mortgage was subsequent to the first mortgage of IndyMac Federal Bank, FSB ("IndyMac") in the amount of $295,200. As a result of the court's failure to take into account the IndyMac first mortgage, it improperly concluded that there was substantial equity in the property justifying a sale. This error was reflected in the Foreclosure Orders which failed to reference the prior first mortgage. The Orders noted a debt of $82,615.46 and a fair market value of $305,000, but failed to reference IndyMac's priority debt of $295,200.
The court's error was either not noticed, or ignored, by Citibank's counsel, who failed to object or otherwise bring to the court's attention, the absence of equity in the property and the need to proceed with a judgment of strict foreclosure.
Following the entry of judgment of foreclosure by sale, the court, through the clerk's office, issued standard orders governing the sale, scheduling the auction on October 8, 2008 and appointing Attorney John Carta as the Committee for Sale. Attorney Carta testified that in proceeding with the sale he relied on the court's Foreclosure Orders, its finding of debt and fair market value and the absence of any finding of a mortgage prior in right to the plaintiff's. He concluded that Citibank's was a first mortgage. Attorney Carta also testified that in multiple conversations with staff of plaintiff's law firm concerning the sale he was never informed by them that Citibank's mortgage was actually a second mortgage. In accordance with established procedures, Attorney Carta prepared a Notice to Bidders that was read aloud prior to the commencement of the sale on October, 8, 2008, and that set forth the liens that were prior in right to plaintiff's. This Notice only referenced taxes owed to the City of Cromwell. No reference was made to the prior IndyMac mortgage or that the sale was subject to the prior mortgage. Attorney Carta testified that had he known of the prior mortgage he would have included it in the Notice to Bidders.
Defendant Robert Olsen was the successful bidder at the sale with a high bid of $216,000. He retained Attorney Stephen Small prior to the sale. Based on his conversations with the Committee, Attorney Small advised Olsen that there was no prior mortgage on the property. Attorney Small did not review the court file, perform a title search or inspect the land or probate court records pertinent to the property in question. Following the sale, and in accordance with standard procedures, Attorney Carta prepared a bond for deed which was executed by Olsen who delivered a deposit in the amount of $30,500. The deed disclosed only that taxes owed to the City of Cromwell were prior in right to the Citibank mortgage. No reference was made in the deed to the IndyMac mortgage. The deed set forth the usual and customary language that "It is expressly understood and agreed by and between the parties hereto that the Seller has made no representations regarding the condition of the premises and that the premises are being sold `as is' with no warranties, either expressed or implied."
Prior to the closing on January 21, 2009, Attorney Small obtained a title search which disclosed the prior IndyMac mortgage and an IndyMac lis pendens. Despite his knowledge of the first mortgage Attorney Small did not take any steps to contact the Committee or plaintiff's counsel to discuss the IndyMac encumbrance or to attempt to postpone the closing or vacate the sale. In preparation for the closing, Attorney Small reviewed plaintiff's complaint which alleged the existence of the IndyMac mortgage prior in right. After reviewing the court website (CATER), which erroneously reported a satisfaction of judgment as to the first mortgage, Attorney Small was satisfied that there was no impediment to proceeding with the closing. Notwithstanding the CATER entry, Attorney Small did not review the official clerk's file to confirm that a satisfaction of judgment had been entered. Nor did he review the Probate Court file or the land records to determine if such satisfaction had been filed and the IndyMac mortgage released. Prior to the closing, Attorney Small issued a title insurance policy which failed to except the IndyMac mortgage.
At the closing Olsen tendered the balance of the $216,000 purchase price; Attorney Carta delivered to Olsen the Committee Deed. At the time of the closing, Olsen transferred the property to a limited liability company in which he is a 50 percent member, 17 Ridge Road, LLC. Following the closing, Olsen and his partner cleaned the property, plowed the snow, restored the electric and paid property taxes to the Town of Cromwell. On Easter Sunday, 2009, Olsen discovered a lock box on the property preventing his access to it. Subsequent investigation by Attorney Small revealed that the interests of Olsen and 17 Ridge Road, LLC in the property had been foreclosed out by virtue of IndyMac's foreclosure of its first mortgage. As a result, Olsen paid $216,000 for the property but is no longer the owner of it. Finally, of concern to this dispute, are the two supplemental judgments that were granted by the Court. On February 2, 2009, plaintiff filed a motion for supplemental judgment which was approved on February 26, 2009. On March 24, 2009, the court disbursed the $91,854.27 supplemental proceeds to the plaintiff. On March 27, 2009, the defendant estate filed its motion for supplemental judgment which was granted on April 14, 2009. The court continues to hold $119,064.17.
Plaintiff's expert witness identified significant errors by both the court, its Committee, Robert Olsen and his counsel. In his opinion, the court erred, as previously noted, by failing to recognize and identify the prior IndyMac mortgage and by ordering a judgment of foreclosure by sale instead of a strict foreclosure. The Committee, for its part, likewise erred, in the expert's opinion, by failing to independently review the file, to identify the IndyMac first mortgage, to notify potential bidders of the IndyMac first mortgage and to disclose the first mortgage in the bond for deed. Plaintiff's expert acknowledged that the cumulative impact of these omissions by the court and committee resulted in a sale that was misleading to potential buyers.
The errors and omissions by the court and committee were reinforced and compounded by those of Olsen's counsel, Attorney Stephen Small. Olsen's interest in purchasing the property arose out of his ownership of the adjacent property. Prior to attending the auction, Olsen spoke with Attorney Small who proceeded to speak with the Committee who advised Attorney Small that the mortgage that was being foreclosed was a first mortgage. Based on the information communicated to him by his attorney and the information disclosed in the Notice to Bidders on the date of the auction, Olsen believed he was bidding on a property subject to a first mortgage only with no other encumbrance, other than the Cromwell taxes, prior in right. Had he known of the IndyMac mortgage, Olsen would not have bid on the property or conveyed the required deposit to the Committee in return for the bond for deed.
Prior to the closing Attorney Small obtained a title search of the property. That search did reveal a prior first mortgage in favor of IndyMac, but the title policy issued by Attorney Small to Olsen erroneously failed to note the existence of, or except, the IndyMac mortgage. Attorney Small's confusion arose out of his reliance on incorrect information contained on the Judicial Website which, on December 16, 2008, showed that there had been a satisfaction of judgment in the IndyMac foreclosure action. In fact, that entry was incorrect; the data entry should have reflected that a judgment of strict foreclosure had entered with respect to the IndyMac mortgage.
Olsen relied on the title policy and assurances of Attorney Small in closing on the property. Had the policy or Attorney Small's investigation revealed the existence of the IndyMac mortgage, Olsen would not have closed. Both expert witnesses in this case concluded that Attorney Small's failure to identify the IndyMac mortgage and the resultant failure to issue a proper title insurance policy constitute a departure from the attorney's standard of care.
Finally, with respect to the facts that govern the resolution of this case, the conduct of plaintiff's counsel is highly relevant to the disposition of this matter. As previously noted, at the time of the entry of the judgment of foreclosure by sale, through and including the sale itself and subsequent closing, plaintiff's counsel or his firm was fully aware of the existence of the IndyMac mortgage prior in right to Citibank's. That knowledge is indisputable because the same counsel represented IndyMac in the foreclosure of its first mortgage and filed notice of lis pendens on the land records with respect to both foreclosures. Further, plaintiff's counsel filed a series of motions for determination of priorities and supplemental judgment in the Citibank action in which it continued to incorrectly assert that Citibank was the holder of the first mortgage on the property at 17 Ridge Road, Cromwell. Throughout the pendency of this action and as late as April 14, 2009, when the court granted the defendant estate's motion for supplemental judgment, counsel inexplicably failed to raise the issue, despite multiple opportunities to correct the mistaken conclusion of the court, its committee, the successful bidder and the bidder's attorney as to the priority of the Citibank mortgage. As a consequence, Citibank is the unexpected and unjustified recipient of $91,854.27 ordered disbursed by the court following the sale to Olsen. The court is presently holding the balance of $119,064.17. Plaintiff's own expert acknowledges that given the priority of the IndyMac mortgage, Citibank could not reasonably have expected to receive this windfall based on the absence of any Citibank equity in the property. Citibank, in fact, should have expected to have its interest foreclosed in the IndyMac action, as should have the estate.
The Estate has appeared in this action and is seeking to have awarded to it the balance of the proceeds now on deposit with the court following the granting of its motion for supplemental judgment.
I. Jurisdiction
Olsen now seeks to open the judgment of foreclosure by sale and to obtain an order of restitution directing that the $216,000 he paid for the purchase of the property, less the costs of sale, be returned to him. His motion is met with a series of objections, both procedural and substantive, from the plaintiff. Citibank urges that Olsen lacks standing to raise this claim due to his transfer of ownership in the property to the LLC; that the 120-day limit for filing a motion to open has long since lapsed; and that the court is without jurisdiction to consider this matter because the sale has been confirmed and title has passed. Each of these arguments will be addressed in turn.
A. Standing of Robert Olsen
The motion to open and set aside is brought in the name of Robert Olsen. It is undisputed that Mr. Olsen no longer owns the property in question, having transferred his ownership interest immediately upon closing to 17 Ridge Road, LLC. It is also undisputed that Olsen's $216,000 interest in the property has been foreclosed and the 17 Ridge Road, LLC's interest has likewise been foreclosed. "Standing is not a technical rule intended to keep aggrieved parties out of court; nor is it a test of substantive rights. Rather it is a practical concept to ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests and that judicial decisions which may affect the rights of others are forged in hot controversy with each view fairly and vigorously represented." Andross v. West Hartford, 285 Conn. 309 (2008). The essence of standing is whether the plaintiff's allegations establish a "colorable claim of injury" Wesley v. Schaller Subaru, 277 Conn. 526, 538 (2006). "Standing is conferred if the party can demonstrate a specific, personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the controversy." Andross v. West Hartford, 285 Conn. 309 (2008). Unquestionably, both Olsen and the LLC can make such a showing. As previously noted, Olsen's $216,000 interest in 17 Ridge Road has been foreclosed out, and the LLC was likewise divested of its ownership by virtue of the foreclosure of the IndyMac mortgage. Under these circumstances, it would be inappropriate to engage in a hypertechnical application of the standing doctrine to deprive a party, who has lost title to a house for which he has paid $216,000, the opportunity to contest that loss. Accordingly, both Robert Olsen and 17 Ridge Road, LLC have standing to pursue their motion to open judgment.
Motion #121, Olsen's and 17 Ridge Road, LLC's Motion to Be Joined as a Party, was granted by the court, Taylor, J. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a motion to reargue. It is unclear from the docketing history of the file whether that motion to reargue was heard or decided. If the order were vacated on reargument, the motion is hereby granted such that both Olsen and 17 Ridge Road, LLC are party defendants. If reargument were not heard, Judge Taylor's initial order granting the motion will not be disturbed. In either circumstance plaintiff's claim that Olsen and/or 17 Ridge Road, LLC lack standing because they are not parties to this proceeding is rendered moot by their party status.
B. Timeliness of Motion to Open
Plaintiff objects to Olsen's motion to open on the grounds that it is untimely. The sale was approved by the court on December 10, 2008. Plaintiff's supplemental judgment was granted on February 26, 2009. The estate's motion for supplemental judgment was granted on April 14, 2009. The motion to open judgment was filed on April 22, 2009. As such the motion was filed more than 120 days following the confirmation of the sale on December 10, 2008. However, the motion is well within the 120 days following the granting of plaintiff's and estate's motions for supplemental judgment. The parties agree on the basic principles that guide the resolution of this claim, but disagree as to their applicability to the facts of this case. On the one hand, "[t]here are two time restrictions for filing a motion to open or set aside a judgment ratifying a sale entered pursuant to General Statutes § 49-26. First, the motion must be filed within the four month period from the date the decision was entered . . . Second the motion must be filed within the applicable appeal period." Wells Fargo Bank of Minnesota, N.A., Trustee v. Morgan, 98 Conn.App. 72 (2006).
On the other, it is equally well established that the "decision to grant or deny a motion to open judgment is within the trial court's discretion." Altberg v. Paul Kovacs Tire Shop, Inc., 31 Conn.App. 634 (1993), and that equity may require granting a motion to open even if filed beyond the statutory time limit. "Our case law on that statute (C.G.S. § 52-212a) recognizes that, in some situations, the principles of protection of finality of judgments must give way to the principle of fairness and equity." Kim v. Magnotta, 249 Conn. 94, 109 (1999). Thus, for example, in Conn. Savings Bank v. Obenauf, 59 Conn.App. (2000) the Appellate Court approved reopening a judgment seven years after its entry because the judgment debtor was not a party to the note. Where "there is a judicial action of a trial court that requires a change in judgment because it affects justice, an appellate court should effect that change" (internal citations omitted). Significantly, the Court noted that "[i]t is an abiding principle of jurisprudence that common sense does not take flight when one enters a courtroom." Id. In this case, the series of errors that have led to this juncture certainly qualify, collectively and individually, as the type of mistake that our law has consistently recognized as an exception to the rigid application of the 120-day limit for reopening judgments set forth in C.G.S. § 52-212a and C.P.B. § 17-3a.
While the 120-day limit for opening a judgment has lapsed if measured from the date of the approval of the sale (December 10, 2008), that period has not expired if measured from the date of the entry of supplemental judgments which were granted respectively on February 26, 2009 and April 14, 2009. Therefore, even if the motion is untimely with respect to the December 10, 2008 approval of the sale, it is well within the 120-day period following the entry of the supplemental judgments ordering the distribution of funds to both Citibank and the estate. Plaintiff does not contest the timeliness of the motion to open with respect to the supplemental judgments.
In this case the court concludes that the principles of equity dictate that the 120-day limit for filing a motion to open or set aside the approval of the sale, as measured from December 10, 2008, not be rigidly enforced. The error in this case, as in the Obenauf matter arises, in large measure, out a judicial error that improperly ordered the entry of a judgment by sale instead of by strict foreclosure. As previously noted, that initial error was compounded by the errors of the Committee, Olsen's counsel, plaintiff's counsel, and the clerk's office. These errors have created an approximate $100,000 windfall each for the plaintiff and defendant estate. Under these circumstances justice would not be served by insisting on the strict application of the 120-day rule of § 52-212a.
C. Jurisdiction of the Court after Title Has Passed
Plaintiff relies on the well established principle that once the sale has been approved and title has passed the court is deprived of jurisdiction to open a judgment of foreclosure by sale.
"The [judicial] sale is not absolute until confirmed. The order of confirmation gives the judicial sanction of the court, and when made it relates back to the time of the sale. [U]nder Connecticut law, a judicial sale becomes complete and creates a legal right to obligations among parties when it is confirmed and ratified by the court. Generally, once a court has approved the foreclosure sale and the applicable appeal period has elapsed, the mortgagor's right of redemption is extinguished and court's jurisdiction to modify that judgment ends. [A]bsent the possibility of an appeal from [the court's] determination, the approval of the sale generally operates to divest the owner of his equity of redemption and consequently places the property beyond the power of the court." Wells Fargo Bank of Minnesota, N.A. v. Morgan, supra 98 Conn.App. at 79 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
The successful bidder Robert Olsen objects to the strict application of this doctrine, claiming there is no statutory basis preventing the court from opening the judgment of foreclosure by sale, and that principles of equity and fundamental fairness require that the status quo be restored in order to avoid a gross miscarriage of justice. Olsen correctly notes that General Statutes § 49-15(a), which prohibits the opening of a judgment of foreclosure after title vests, applies, by its terms, only to strict foreclosures. ("Any judgment foreclosing the title to real estate by strict foreclosure may . . . be opened and modified . . . but no such judgment shall be opened after the title has become absolute in any encumbrancer"). The absence of a statutory prohibition does not mean, however, that the court is affirmatively empowered to set aside a judgment of foreclosure by sale after its confirmation.
Olsen also argues that to the extent that the law prohibits the opening of judgments of foreclosure by sale following its confirmation, that directive is predicated on the mortgagor's opportunity to exercise his equity of redemption. As the Morgan court noted, "the approval of the sale generally operates to divest the owner of his equity of redemption and consequently places the property beyond the power of the court." Id. In this case, it is not the owner of the equity of redemption who seeks to open the judgment, but rather the successful bidder. Accordingly, Olsen contends that the compelling interest in maintaining the finality of judgments does not operate in this case and therefore should not act as a bar against the successful bidder's attempt to open the judgment.
Finally, and not surprisingly, Olsen appeals to the equitable power of the court to enter orders that are required to avoid a "miscarriage of justice." With regard to this claim, it is incontrovertible that the court possesses such equitable power to set aside a sale after its confirmation. Citicorp Mortgage, Inc. v. Burgos, 227 Conn. 116 (1993). What is less clear is whether the court's equitable powers ought to be exercised under the circumstances of this case. The plaintiff insists that the foreclosure process and the law of conveyancing will be irreparably compromised if the purchaser can successfully open a judgment after the sale has been confirmed, supplemental judgments approved and funds distributed in accordance with the supplemental judgment.
Specifically, plaintiff asserts that if the relief requested by Olsen is granted, lending institutions will be required to hold in escrow, in perpetuo, funds received from supplemental judgments because of the possibility that those funds may someday be subject to a claim such as Olsen has proffered in this case. Plaintiff's argument proves too much. Both the plaintiff and estate stand to receive a windfall of approximately $100,000 each if the judgment remains intact. That either should now complain about the uncertainty of having to return those funds is the equivalent of a bank depositor complaining that he is not sure whether he can utilize the $100,000 that was erroneously deposited into his savings account and to which he has no legal or equitable claim. This case does not involve a successful bidder who now seeks the return of his purchase money because the condition of the house is worse than expected, or who is unhappy about traffic and noise or who finds the neighbors unfriendly, or who, for a variety of other reasons, is seeking to undo his purchase because of buyer's remorse. Rather it involves an attempt to unwind a process that has unfairly burdened an innocent buyer and unfairly benefitted plaintiff and the estate. Under these circumstances the potential threat to the foreclosure process hypothesized by plaintiff seems speculative and remote at best. Lenders who receive (and are entitled to) distributions pursuant to supplemental judgments need not worry that such receipts will be disgorged years later unless, as in this case, the lender has no legal or equitable right to those funds and has actual knowledge, as in this case, of the reasons giving rise to the claim of restitution.
Plaintiff, however, does raise a significant concern with respect to threats to the conveyancing system if Olsen's motion is granted. Specifically, plaintiff's expert points out that the success of Connecticut's conveyancing system is predicated on the accepted principle that notice to buyers and potential purchasers is provided via the land records through the recording of deeds, mortgages, lis pendens, and other encumbrances. Plaintiff's expert worries, legitimately, that the primacy of this system would be undermined if Mr. Olsen is relieved of the obligation of due care imposed on him by virtue of notice imputed to him of the IndyMac mortgage. This concern highlights again the collision in this case between strict application of legal doctrine and the obligation to inform that application with equitable principles.
As previously noted in connection with other objections raised by the plaintiff, this case is, in many respects, sui generis. While it is impossible to predict that this peculiar set of errors will not occur again, it is hard to imagine this calamity repeating itself. As such, the understandable apprehension that opening this judgment will fundamentally undermine the law of conveyancing is significantly dissipated. Balanced against that concern is the equally weighty concern that failure to address the errors in this case and the resulting unjustifiable windfall to the plaintiff and estate, would undermine respect for and trust in the judicial process. On balance, recognizing that there is no easy or clear answer, the court concludes that correcting a concrete, identifiable and specific miscarriage of justice weighs more heavily than protecting against the unquantifiable concern that in subsequent cases parties may seek to utilize this decision as a basis for relieving themselves of self-induced errors or failures of judgment. Accordingly, the court concludes that it retains jurisdiction over this matter despite the sale having been approved prior to the filing of the motion to open and supplemental judgments having been granted.
II. Motion To Open
As previously noted, the standards for granting a motion to open judgment are well established. "The decision to grant or deny a motion to open a judgment is within the trial court's discretion and this decision will not be disturbed on appeal unless it was unreasonable and a clear abuse of discretion." Altberg v. Paul Kovacs Tires Shop, Inc., 31 Conn.App. 634, 640 (1993).
"Such discretion, however, imports something more than leeway in decision making and should be exercised in conformity with the spirit of the law and should not impede or defeat the ends of substantial justice." Ducci Electrical Contractors, Inc. v. Department of Transportation, 28 Conn.App. 175, 182 (1992). Where "there is a judicial action of a trial court that requires a change in a judgment because it affects justice;" Altberg v. Paul Kovacs Tire Shop, Inc., supra; that change should be effected. This is especially true in the context of a foreclosure action. "It is well established that a foreclosure action constitutes an equitable proceeding. In an equitable proceeding, the trial court may examine all relevant factors to ensure that complete justice is done. . . . The determination of what equity requires in a particular case, the balancing of the equities is a matter for the discretion of the trial court." Citicorp Mortgage, Inc. v. Burgos, supra, 227 Conn. at 120.
A review of applicable case law indicates that trial courts have both the authority and obligation to correct errors and mistakes that "defeat the ends of substantial justice." Id. Thus, courts have opened judgments in order to correct judicial errors. See, e.g., Conn. Savings Bank v. Obenauf, supra. (Trial court's entering judgment against defendant who was not party to the promissory note was "contrary to law" and "shocks the judicial conscience.") See also, Red Rooster Construction Co. v. River Associates, supra at 576 (refusal to reopen judgment to consider documents directly contradicting plaintiff's claims constituted failure by trial court to "exercise its discretion in conformity with the spirit of the law or the notion of substantial justice"). Likewise, errors by the court appointed committee for sale have resulted in the appellate court setting aside a judicial sale after its confirmation. Citicorp Mortgage, Inc. v. Burgos, supra, 227 Conn. at 123. ("A committee of sale functions as an arm of the court . . . As an agent of the court, the committee was obligated to fulfill the specific conditions of the sale to the best of its ability.")
In this case none of the participants, including the parties, their counsel, the court and its committee and purchaser's counsel, are without fault for the substantial injustice that has befallen Mr. Olsen. Mindful that its obligation is to exercise its discretion "in conformity with the spirit of the law;" id.; and that "it is an abiding principle of jurisprudence that common sense does not take flight when enters a courtroom"; Conn. Savings Bank v. Obenauf, supra, at 357; I conclude that the combination of Olsen's $216,000 loss and the undeserved windfall of approximately $100,000 each to the plaintiff and defendant estate require equity to intervene. Accordingly, Olsen's motion to open judgment is granted. He is instructed to file with the court within ten days of this decision a draft order specifying with particularity the relief he seeks by way of a final order. All other parties can also submit proposed orders.
SO ORDERED.