Opinion
A-22-CV-1259-DII-ML
08-02-2023
JAIME CISNEROS, Petitioner, v. WARDEN ROSALEZ, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
MARK LANE, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
TO THE HONORABLE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
Before the court are Petitioner's Motion for Relief Under § 2241 U.S.C. Article 28 (Dkt. #1) and Respondent's Response (Dkt. #8). Having considered the pleadings in the case and the applicable law, the undersigned recommends that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be dismissed as moot.
The Magistrate Court submits this Report and Recommendation to the United States District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 1 of Appendix C of the Local Court Rules of the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, Local Rules for the Assignment of Duties to United States Magistrate Judges.
I. Factual Background
When he filed his § 2241 petition, Jaime Cisneros was incarcerated at FCI Bastrop. Cisneros complains that his credits under the First Step Act (“FSA”) were improperly calculated. He asks the court to order the BOP to apply all earned credits he be released to home confinement, to apply his earned credits, to apply any credits earned since he filed his petition, to correct its records to properly reflect the law's language, and to remove incorrect designations from his FSA calculations. He also asks the court to sanction the BOP to compensate him.
Warden Rosalez responded to Cisneros's petition. Dkt. #8. The Warden explains that in October 2022, the BOP adopted an automated system to calculate each prisoner's FSA time credits. Each prisoner was issued an FSA Time Credit Assessment through October 7, 2022 using the automated calculation system. Those Assessments reported the total programming days each prisoner had accrued to date and the number of FSA time credits that applied to pre-release custody or supervised release. Prisoners, such as Cisneros, who failed to complete FSA needs assessments were disallowed programming days. The BOP allowed until December 31, 2022 for all prisoners to correct issues with the automated calculation by notifying their unit teams. In January 2023, the BOP modified its automated calculation tool to correct any issues with the October calculation. These modifications ensured that prisoners would not be denied FSA time credits due to incomplete needs assessments before December 31, 2022.
On January 8, 2023, the BOP's modified automatic calculation tool updated Cisneros's accrued programming days and earned FSA time credits. As of February 11, 2023, Cisneros accrued 1,509 programming days with four days disallowed, resulting in 570 total earned FSA time credits: 205 towards placement in a Residential Re-entry Center (“RRC”) or Home Confinement (“HC”) and 365 towards supervised release.
The Warden argues Cisneros's petition is moot because it does not allege any FSA violation that has not already been remedied. Additionally, the Warden argues Cisneros is not yet entitled to have his FSA time credits applied. Cisneros did not file a reply to the Warden's response. Moreover, it does not appear from Cisneros's petition that he exhausted his remedies with the BOP before filing his petition with the court.
II. Applicable Law
A § 2241 petition on behalf of a sentenced prisoner attacks the manner in which a sentence is carried out or the prison authorities' determination of its duration, and must be filed in the same district where the prisoner is incarcerated. Pack v. Yusuff, 218 F.3d 448, 451 (5th Cir. 2000). To prevail, a § 2241 petitioner must show that he is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c). And he must show that he has already exhausted his administrative remedies. Fuller v. Rich, 11 F.3d 61, 62 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). Exhaustion in this context means “proper exhaustion,” including compliance with all administrative deadlines and procedures. Cf. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S 81, 90 (2006) (discussing exhaustion under the Prison Litigation Reform Act).
Additionally, Article III of the Constitution limits federal court jurisdiction to “only actual, ongoing cases or controversies.” Lewis v. Cont'l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990). “If a dispute has been resolved or if it has evanesced because of changed circumstances, including the passage of time, it is considered moot.” Am. Med. Ass'n v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 267, 270 (5th Cir. 1988). “A moot case presents no Article III case or controversy, and a court has no constitutional jurisdiction to resolve the issues it presents.” Goldin v. Bartholow, 166 F.3d 710, 717 (5th Cir. 1999). Although an action “is not moot simply because a § 2241 petitioner is no longer in custody . . . an action is moot when the court cannot grant the relief requested by the moving party.” Salgado v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 220 Fed.Appx. 256, 257 (5th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).
III. Analysis
Cisneros has already received a correction to his FSA time credits. Accordingly, his request to order that the BOP update its FSA calculation is moot. Moreover, Cisneros failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to his October 7, 2022 calculation.
Had Cisneros exhausted his administrative remedies, he may have received this relief even sooner.
For the reasons stated in the Warden's brief, Cisneros' has not shown he is yet entitled to the application of the FSA credits to his sentence. See Dkt. #8 at 9-10. The BOP is permitted to apply FSA time credits only once a prisoner has earned FSA time credits equal to the remainder of his sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(1)(A). This approach prevents premature application of FSA time credits, as FSA time credits, though earned, may be lost. 28 C.F.R. § 523.43. Accordingly, a petitioner asking that FSA time credits be applied must show that those credits equal the remainder of his sentence. Here, Cisneros's 570 earned FSA time credits will not exceed the remainder of his sentence until approximately December 19, 2023.
Finally, to the extent Cisneros seeks damages, “damages are not available in federal habeas corpus proceedings.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 493 (1973); see also Williams v. Texas, No. A-22-CV-345-RP, 2022 WL 1121426, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 13, 2022) (“A request for damages is an improper request in a habeas corpus petition”).
Accordingly, the undersigned will recommend Cisneros's petition be dismissed as moot.
IV. Recommendations
The Magistrate Court hereby RECOMMENDS the District Court DISMISS AS MOOT Petitioner's Motion for Relief Under § 2241 U.S.C. Article 28 (Dkt. #1).
V. Warning
The parties may file objections to this Report and Recommendation. A party filing objections must specifically identify those findings or recommendations to which objections are being made. The District Court need not consider frivolous, conclusive, or general objections. See Battles v. United States Parole Comm'n, 834 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 1987).
A party's failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations contained in this Report within fourteen (14) days after the party is served with a copy of the Report shall bar that party from de novo review by the District Court of the proposed findings and recommendations in the Report and, except upon grounds of plain error, shall bar the party from appellate review of unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the District Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150-53 (1985); Douglass v. United Services Automobile Ass 'n, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996)(en banc).