MoPac argues that Goldmine cannot obtain by "circumvention" what Bean cannot recover in a direct action against MoPac. We note that railroads sued under the FELA have routinely maintained actions for contribution against third parties where those parties were in part responsible for injuries to a railroad employee (see Canton R.R. Co. v. American Smelting Refining Co. (4th Cir. 1974), 504 F.2d 1377; Reynolds v. Southern Ry. Co. (N.D. Georgia 1969), 320 F. Supp. 1141; Gaulden v. Burlington Northern, Inc. (1982), 232 Kan. 205, 654 P.2d 383; Ciosek v. Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. Co. (1979), 75 Ill. App.3d 410, 394 N.E.2d 590) and MoPac has filed a counterclaim for contribution here. In our view, it is only just that Goldmine should be entitled to file a counterclaim for contribution from MoPac if MoPac is in part responsible for causing Bean's injuries and death for which Goldmine is being sued.

One line of cases, relying on the pre- Muhlbauer cases of Reynolds v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co. (1964), 51 Ill. App.2d 334, 201 N.E.2d 322, and Sargent v. Interstate Bakeries, Inc. (1967), 86 Ill. App.2d 187, 229 N.E.2d 769, held that a pretort relationship was unnecessary. ( Ciosek v. Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. Co. (1979), 75 Ill. App.3d 410, 394 N.E.2d 590; Burgdorff v. International Business Machines (1975), 35 Ill. App.3d 192, 341 N.E.2d 122.) In other cases, however, the court held that a party was not entitled to indemnification unless there was a pretort relationship.

• 2 A motion to dismiss a complaint is properly allowed where no set of facts can be proved which would entitle a plaintiff to recover. ( Ciosek v. Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. Co. (1979), 75 Ill. App.3d 410, 412, 394 N.E.2d 590, 592.) We hold that in the instant case no set of facts can be proved which would entitle plaintiffs to recover against defendant.