Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, No. GIC868522 Kevin A. Enright, Judge.
AARON, J.
I.
INTRODUCTION
The Housing Authority of San Diego County (Authority) terminated Doris Cintron's eligibility for participation in the federally funded Section 8 Rental Assistance Program (Section 8 Program). Cintron requested an informal administrative hearing for the purpose of reviewing the Authority's decision. After a hearing officer upheld the Authority's decision, Cintron filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus in the trial court, seeking to have the decision of the Authority overturned. The trial court entered an order denying her petition.
On appeal, Cintron claims that the hearing officer and the trial court erred in relying on hearsay testimony and in admitting irrelevant and prejudicial information in affirming the Authority's decision. Cintron also claims that the trial court failed to exercise its independent judgment in denying her petition. We affirm the order.
II.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2001, Cintron began receiving housing assistance through the Section 8 Program. Cintron lived in a number of different residences between 2001 and 2005. In May 2005, Cintron signed a six-month lease for a residence on Fairway Drive in La Mesa. Also in May 2005, the Authority entered into a payment contract with the owner of the Fairway Drive residence for the purpose of making payments through the Section 8 Program from the Authority to the owner.
In June 2005, Jacquelyn Bishop, a manager at the Fairway Drive residence, sent Cintron a letter describing the ways in which Cintron was "causing a nuisance" at the property. Bishop instructed Cintron to refrain from cutting the plants on the grounds of the property. In addition, Bishop told Cintron that she was not to harass her neighbors, noting that Bishop had received "numerous complaints" about Cintron "grabbing people" while she tried to talk to them. In addition, Bishop told Cintron not to interact with the residents or guests in apartment M, in view of the "constant complaints" that Bishop had received from both Cintron and the residents of apartment M concerning each other.
In October 2005, the owner of the Fairway Drive residence sent Cintron a 30-day notice of termination of tenancy, which corresponded with the termination of Cintron's lease. Authority employee Liz Marohn advised Cintron to comply with the notice because an eviction would constitute a violation of the lease and would result in termination of Cintron's eligibility to receive rental assistance from the Section 8 Program.
In November 2005, Cintron filed a request for a temporary restraining order against Bonnie Scott, a property manager at the Fairway Drive residence. In a declaration accompanying her request, Cintron made numerous allegations regarding Scott, including that Scott was "involved in a crime syndicate" and that she was a prostitute. Cintron claimed that Scott was "running a covert operation through the property management to run her prostitution business, to sell drugs for the crime syndicate, to rob tenants of their property and mail, and to enter tenants['] apartments in order to destroy personal property if tenants do not support her in her wrongdoing." Cintron also claimed that Scott had induced another tenant to "throw large rocks on [Cintron's] ceiling," and that Scott "has her friend scream profanities at [Cintron's] door each week." Cintron also claimed that Scott had a "repairman puncture[] a gallon of grape juice inside [Cintron's] refrigerator with an inch wide knife and let it drip into ten pounds of chicken." There is no indication in the record that Cintron obtained the restraining order.
On January 12, 2006, the owner of the Fairway Drive residence obtained an unlawful detainer judgment against Cintron. A few days later, the Sheriff evicted Cintron from the residence. The following day, the Authority terminated Cintron's participation in the Section 8 program. Cintron requested an informal administrative hearing for the purpose of contesting the Authority's termination decision.
In March 2006, a hearing officer held the administrative hearing. At the hearing, Marohn described a number of documents that supported the Authority's decision to terminate Cintron from the Section 8 Program. Among these documents were letters corroborating Marohn's testimony that "a review of [Cintron's] case file indicates a pattern of similar behavior resulting in several terminations of her prior tenancies."
Bishop also testified at the hearing concerning Cintron's behavior at the Fairway Drive residence:
"Almost immediately, Ms. Cintron made it very clear that she was not happy at our community. Continuously complaining about her upstairs neighbor. Complaining about the condition of her property, her actual unit, but not allowing us to do anything to remedy the things she was complaining about. There became an ongoing problem between herself and her upstairs neighbor. Most of . . . the times that Ms. Cintron was complaining her upstairs neighbor, [her neighbor] wasn't even home.
[¶] . . . [¶]
"I don't have the police reports with me, but there are police reports where they would come out for [Cintron's] calls upon her request because she was complaining about her upstairs neighbor and there were several occasions that they documented [that the upstairs neighbor] was not in her apartment at that time.
[¶] . . . [¶]
"[Cintron] had a neighbor to the right of her, I believe in apartment O that was pregnant, and on several occasions, [Cintron] approached her, grabbed her, said things to her like don't have sex with your husband, you are going to damage your baby. Involving herself in their personal business unprovoked. And when she was asked by that tenant to leave them alone, she continued to talk them and pursued conversations that they were not comfortable having.
[¶] . . . [¶]
"There was the ongoing, you know, harassment between her and her upstairs neighbor. There had been several occasions that we found her outside cutting the grass with scissors and [we] reminded her that we had maintenance staff to take care of that for her. She would ask maintenance to come in and take care of something in her apartment, when maintenance staff would show up to do that[,] she would get upset and tell him he couldn't come in, he wasn't authorized to do the work, even though she had requested it. She started making wild and crazy allegations about myself and the manager . . . over there, Bonnie Scott, saying that we were part of a prostitution ring, that we had become part of a crime syndicate, she actually told the judge when we went to eviction court that I had orchestrated a shooting that had taken place on the property because the tenant . . . hadn't paid the rent. Um, and just ongoing allegations both to ourselves and to the tenants there, showing that she wasn't the best fit for the community, so we asked her to move on."
The Authority also introduced in evidence various documents, including Bishop's June 2005 letter to Cintron and Cintron's November 2005 request for a restraining order and accompanying declaration. In April 2006, the hearing officer upheld the Authority's termination of Cintron from the Section 8 Program.
In July 2006, Cintron filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus in the superior court. The Authority opposed the petition. After a hearing, the court denied the petition. In its order, the court stated in relevant part, "Relying on the testimony of Ms. Bishop . . . and Petitioner's request for a TRO against the manager of the Fairway Drive property, Ms. Bonnie Scott (the TRO was denied), and Petitioner's own declaration in support thereof dated 11/22/05, the weight of the evidence demonstrates [Cintron] was terminated from the Section 8 program for serious violations of her lease."
Cintron appeals.
III.
DISCUSSION
A. Cintron's evidentiary objections are without merit
Cintron claims that the hearing officer and the trial court erred in relying on "unexamined hearsay" and "irrelevant and prejudicial information," in affirming her termination from the Section 8 program. Specifically, Cintron claims that the hearing officer and the trial court erred in relying on the following evidence: Marohn's testimony regarding facts that were not within her personal knowledge; Bishop's testimony regarding the existence of police reports detailing Cintron's complaints concerning her neighbors; Bishop's testimony concerning letters that she had received from Cintron; and Bishop's testimony regarding a neighbor's complaints about Cintron. Cintron also claims that the hearing officer erred in admitting evidence pertaining to Cintron's behavior during prior tenancies.
1. Governing law
Title 24 of the Code of Federal Regulations section 982.1 outlines the purpose and structure of the Section 8 Program:
Unless otherwise specified, all subsequent references are to Title 24 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
"[The federal Department of Housing and Urban Development] pays rental subsidies so eligible families can afford decent, safe and sanitary housing. [The Section 8 Program is] generally administered by State or local governmental entities called public housing agencies (PHAs)." (§ 982.1(a)(1).)
Section 982.555 provides that a PHA must provide a participant with an informal administrative hearing to determine whether the PHA has acted in accordance with law whenever the PHA makes "[a] determination to terminate assistance for a participant family because of the family's action or failure to act." (24 C.F.R. § 982.555 (a)(1)(v).) Section 982.555(e) outlines the procedures to be used at such hearings. Section 982.555(e)(5) provides, "Evidence. The PHA and the family must be given the opportunity to present evidence, and may question any witnesses. Evidence may be considered without regard to admissibility under the rules of evidence applicable to judicial proceedings."
In accordance with these provisions, courts have concluded that the ordinary rules of evidence, including those pertaining to hearsay, do not apply at informal hearings conducted pursuant to section 982.555(e). (Gammons v. Massachusetts Dept. of Housing and Community Development (D. Mass. 2007) 502 F.Supp.2d 161, 165-166 ["the use of hearsay at the Section 8 hearing was permissible and did not violate the due process clause"]; Tomlinson v. Machin (M.D. Fla.) 2007 WL 141192, *6 ["In a PHA informal hearing, the Hearing Officer is not meant to apply the rules of evidence applicable to judicial proceedings; thus, it is clear by the plain meaning of § 982.555(a)(5) that hearsay statements and copies of documents may be considered by the Hearing Officer in an informal PHA hearing without regard to the rules of evidence"].)
2. Application
Cintron does not contest that the ordinary evidentiary rules limiting the use of hearsay evidence are inapplicable in the section 982.555(e) hearing context. However, Cintron claims that this type of evidence must still bear indicia of reliability and be probative, and that the use of such evidence must be fundamentally fair. Assuming for the sake of argument that such limitations exist, Cintron does not contend that any of the hearsay evidence that was admitted in this case fails to meet these standards. Our own review of the evidence indicates that the hearsay evidence was reliable and was generally corroborated by Bishop's nonhearsay testimony. Further, Cintron does not claim that she suffered prejudice from the admission of such evidence. In light of Bishop's nonhearsay testimony regarding Cintron's activities, we conclude that Cintron was not prejudiced by the admission of hearsay evidence.
With respect to the allegedly "irrelevant and prejudicial information" concerning Cintron's prior tenancies, Cintron cites no authority indicating that it was improper for the hearing officer to consider this evidence. Further, Cintron makes no argument as to prejudice, and we see none, particularly since the hearing officer stated that he gave this evidence "little weight."
Finally, while Cintron argues that it was error for the trial court to consider such evidence in denying her petition, the only arguments Cintron presented in her brief are those we have rejected above. Accordingly, we conclude that the hearing officer and the trial court did not commit reversible error in considering hearsay evidence or evidence pertaining to Cintron's prior tenancies.
B. The trial court exercised its independent judgment in denying Cintron's petition
Cintron claims that the trial court failed to exercise its independent judgment in considering her petition. Cintron states that the "record . . . does not support the proposition that the Superior Court properly tested the reliability of the evidence," and argues that, in denying her petition, the court improperly relied on Bishop's testimony and on Cintron's declaration in support of her request for a temporary restraining order.
"If the administrative decision involved or substantially affected a 'fundamental vested right,' the superior court exercises its independent judgment upon the evidence disclosed in a limited trial de novo in which the court must examine the administrative record for errors of law and exercise its independent judgment upon the evidence. [Citations.]" (JKH Enterprises, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1046, 1057.)
In their briefing in the trial court, both Cintron and the Authority took the position that the independent judgment standard applied to the trial court's consideration of Cintron's petition. During the hearing on Cintron's petition, the trial court stated that it would be "exercising [its] independent judgment," in ruling on the petition. In its order denying Cintron's petition, the trial court stated that it had reviewed the transcript of the informal hearing and the administrative record, and concluded that Cintron had failed to carry her burden of establishing that the hearing officer's findings were not "supported by the weight of the evidence." We determined in part III.A., ante, that the trial court did not err in relying on Bishop's testimony in denying Cintron's petition. Similarly, it was proper for the trial court to consider the statements Cintron made in her request for a temporary restraining order, particularly in light of Bishop's testimony that Cintron had made "wild and crazy allegations" about Bishop and Scott.
We conclude that the record indicates that the trial court properly exercised its independent judgment in denying Cintron's petition.
IV.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: HUFFMAN, Acting P. J., O'ROURKE, J.