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Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Sullivan

Supreme Court of Ohio
Dec 14, 1992
603 N.E.2d 983 (Ohio 1992)

Opinion

No. 92-1342

Submitted October 20, 1992 —

Decided December 14, 1992.

ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 91-25.

Relator, Cincinnati Bar Association, filed a complaint, on August 19, 1991, against respondent, Sharon A. Sullivan (Registration No. 0001002), charging her with multiple violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The matter was heard by a panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court ("board") on July 2, 1992.

Relator's complaint arose from Sullivan's behavior in a lawsuit between Michael and Elizabeth Short and Sullivan's client, Harry A. Ralston. Throughout the litigation, Sullivan was habitually late — missing deadlines, missing or arriving late for hearings, and repeatedly failing to comply promptly and fully with court orders.

The Shorts filed their complaint in the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas on January 26, 1989. Two days later, Ralston was served with the complaint, which was accompanied by a set of interrogatories.

Soon after the interrogatories were served, Sullivan told her client to answer them, but took no further action. In September 1989, after prodding by the court and opposing counsel, Sullivan promised to serve the answers by the end of September. She broke this promise. In November 1989, Sullivan again told her client to answer the interrogatories. Nothing happened.

On December 6, plaintiffs filed a motion to compel answers to the interrogatories. The common pleas court granted this motion on January 12, 1990, and ordered the defense to pay attorney fees of $127.50. (Sullivan made no effort to pay these fees until June 25, 1990.) On January 12, Sullivan filed the answers with the court, but did not serve them on plaintiffs, as Civ.R. 33(A) requires, until February 7. Nor did Ralston sign or swear to the answers, as Civ.R. 33(A) also requires.

On February 22, 1990, the court found Sullivan and her client in contempt for failing to obey the court's January 12 discovery order. The court fined them $500, plus $100 per day until the interrogatories were properly answered. These fines were not paid.

On April 20, 1990, plaintiffs moved under Civ.R. 37 for sanctions against the defense, because Sullivan still had not served proper answers to the interrogatories. Plaintiffs asked the court to enter judgment in their favor on the issue of liability as a sanction. On May 2, the court granted plaintiffs' motion, but expressly reserved the right to vacate this ruling if Sullivan and her client paid the outstanding fines. Yet, the fines continued to go unpaid.

Due to Sullivan's continuing failure to obey the court's orders, the court entered judgment for plaintiffs as to liability on June 26, 1990. This left the issue of damages for resolution, but the defense did not contest the amount. After a hearing on damages, the court awarded plaintiffs $340,000. Had the liability issue gone to trial, Ralston might have prevailed: his case had already proven strong enough to withstand plaintiffs' summary judgment motion, and even plaintiffs' counsel regarded Ralston's case as "defensible" and "probably * * * winnable."

Sullivan also failed to file a timely answer to the complaint. On February 28, 1989, one day after the answer was due, see Civ.R. 12(A)(1), Sullivan filed a motion to enlarge the time for answering. She did so in part because Ralston asked her to "drag this out."

In March 1989, by stipulation between counsel, the answer date was extended to May 26, 1989. Sullivan missed this deadline. As a result, the plaintiffs moved for a default judgment on June 2, 1989. Sullivan filed no response to this motion; however, on August 2, she finally filed an answer, along with a motion for leave to file out of time. This motion was granted.

Moreover, Sullivan prejudiced her client by missing scheduled court sessions. On January 30, 1990, the court heard plaintiffs' motion for a show cause order, resulting in the February 22 contempt finding against not only Sullivan, but her client. Sullivan missed the hearing. Sullivan also missed a court session on April 11, 1990, and was late for several hearings.

The panel found that Sullivan's dilatory handling of the litigation violated DR 1-102(A)(5) (conduct prejudicial to administration of justice), 1-102(A)(6) (conduct reflecting adversely on fitness to practice law), 6-101(A)(2) (handling a legal matter without adequate preparation), 6-101(A)(3) (neglecting an entrusted legal matter), 7-101(A)(1) (failure to seek client's lawful objectives), 7-101(A)(2) (failure to carry out contract of professional employment), 7-102(A)(3) (causing prejudice to client), and 7-106(A) (disregarding a tribunal's ruling).

In addition to her chronic tardiness, Sullivan showed flagrant disrespect for the court on February 22, 1990. At a hearing before Judge Ann Marie Tracey, Sullivan entered the courtroom with a bumper sticker reading "Keep Judge Tracey" on her valise. Judge Tracey was unsure whether Sullivan was attempting to sway her, but the judge recused herself to avoid the appearance of impropriety. The panel found that Sullivan had violated DR 1-102(A)(5), 1-102(A)(6), and 7-106(C)(6) (undignified or discourteous conduct before a tribunal) by displaying the bumper sticker in court.

The panel noted that this court has disciplined Sullivan before. See Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Sullivan (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 157, 571 N.E.2d 436 (public reprimand for neglecting an entrusted legal matter and failing to carry out a contract of professional employment). Moreover, Sullivan did not obey our order to pay the costs of the earlier proceeding. We twice held her in contempt and finally suspended her from the practice of law on January 15, 1992, whereupon she paid and was reinstated. See 62 Ohio St.3d 1429, 578 N.E.2d 821; 62 Ohio St.3d 1447, 579 N.E.2d 492; 62 Ohio St.3d 1505, 583 N.E.2d 1317.

The panel recommended an indefinite suspension. The board concurred in the panel's findings and recommendation.

Beth A. Myers, Deborah DeLong and Edwin W. Patterson III, for relator.

Sharon A. Sullivan, pro se.


We concur in the findings and recommendations of the board. Sharon A. Sullivan is indefinitely suspended from the practice of law in Ohio. Costs taxed to respondent.

Judgment accordingly.

MOYER, C.J., SWEENEY, HOLMES, DOUGLAS, WRIGHT, H. BROWN and RESNICK, JJ., concur.


Summaries of

Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Sullivan

Supreme Court of Ohio
Dec 14, 1992
603 N.E.2d 983 (Ohio 1992)
Case details for

Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Sullivan

Case Details

Full title:CINCINNATI BAR ASSOCIATION v. SULLIVAN

Court:Supreme Court of Ohio

Date published: Dec 14, 1992

Citations

603 N.E.2d 983 (Ohio 1992)
603 N.E.2d 983

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