All of these cases dealt with policies issued prior to the change in policy provisions prescribed by the Texas Insurance Commission in 1963, which omitted all previous requirements of actual ownership from the definition of "owned automobile" and substituted therefor the above quoted new definition contained in the present policy. Viator v. American General Insurance Company, 411 S.W.2d 762 (Tex.Civ.App. 1967, n. r. e.); Cimarron Insurance Co. v. Price, 409 S.W.2d 601 (Tex.Civ.App. 1966, n. r. e.); Traders General Insurance Company v. Lucas, 281 S.W.2d 188 (Tex.Civ.App. 1955, n. r. e.). Davis v. St. Paul-Mercury Indemnity Company, 294 F.2d 641 (4th cir. 1961); Churchman v. Ingram, 56 So.2d 297 (La.App. 1951). In New York Fire Marine Underwriters, Inc. v. Fleming, 276 F. Supp. 479 (E.D. Texas 1967), the Court recognized that the requirement of ownership of the automobile ;by the named insured had not been considered by the Supreme Court of Texas since the ownership requirement was deleted from the standard policy and held under the "Erie" doctrine that if the named insured might incur some liability due to the operation or use of the automobile, the policy is effective even though he may not actually own the "owned automobile."

The failure of the Bank to object to Special Issue No. 3 as submitted by the court is not cured by requesting other special issues on the same subject even though the requested issues may be correct. Cimarron Insurance Co. v. Price, 409 S.W.2d 601 (Tex.Civ.App.--Austin 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.); City of Dallas v. Priolo, supra. Since no objection was made by the Bank to the form or substance of the agency issue, any complaint of the issue was waived.

The complaint made is that the court erred in refusing to submit the special requested issue instead of Special Issue No. 2. Appellant's point of error in this court and in its Amended Motion for New Trial is that the court erred in failing to submit Defendant's Requested Special Issue No. A. There is no point in this court or in the motion for new trial complaining of the failure of the court to include the element of 'accident' in Special Issue No. 1, or elsewhere in the charge, unless it is implied from the points dealing with the requested special issue. The failure to object to Special Issue No. 1 for the reason that it failed to include the element of accident is not cured by requesting a special issue on the same subject even though the requested issue may be correct. Cimarron Insurance Co. v. Price, 409 S.W.2d 601 (Tex.Civ.App. — Austin 1966, err. ref., n.r.e.). A ground of error not distinctly set forth in the motion for new trial is waived.

this State that a failure to comply with the statutory requirements relating to the transfer of a house trailer does not render the transfer void as between the parties. Elder Chevrolet Co. v. Bailey County Motor Co., 151 S.W.2d 938 (Tex.Civ.App. — El Paso 1941); Truck Insurance Exchange v. Schuenemann, 391 S.W.2d 130 (Tex.Civ.App. — San Antonio 1965, n.r.e.). And see Pioneer Mutual Compensation Co. v. Diaz, 142 Tex. 184, 177 S.W.2d 202 (1944); Empire Gas Fuel Co. v. Meugge, 135 Tex. 520, 143 S.W.2d 763 (1940); Clemons v. Lyles, 249 S.W.2d 287 (Tex.Civ.App. — Galveston 1952, ref. n.r.e.); Hicksbaugh Lumber Co. v. Fidelity Casualty Co. of New York, 177 S.W.2d 802 (Tex.Civ.App. — Galveston 1944); Strickland Transportation Co. v. Ingram, 403 S.W.2d 192 (Tex.Civ.App. — Texarkana 1966); National Auto and Casualty Insurance Co. v. Alford, 265 S.W.2d 862 (Tex.Civ.App. — Eastland 1954, n.r.e.); Viator v. American General Ins. Co., 411 S.W.2d 762 (Tex.Civ.App. — Beaumont 1967, ref'd n.r.e.); Cimarron Insurance Co., Inc. v. Price, 409 S.W.2d 601 (Tex.Civ.App. — Austin 1966, n.r.e); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Snyder, 470 S.W.2d 282 (Tex.Civ.App. — Amarillo 1971). This would also be true under the same circumstances if the Nebraska Bank knew of the transfer to Long.