Under the IGA, it is illegal for a lender to enter into a contract for credit with a consumer when the lender participates in an unlawful gambling enterprise. However, in Cie v. Comdata Network, Inc., 275 Ill.App.3d 759, 656 N.E.2d 123 (1st Dist. 1995), the court rejected the proposition that Section 28-7(a) of the IGA makes all loans for gambling void and unenforceable. In Cie, plaintiffs alleged that they had obtained loans at legal gambling establishments in the form of cash advances, which they would endorse for gambling chips, betting vouchers, or cash. Plaintiffs asked the trial court to construe their loans as void and unenforceable.
Under this maxim, a statute which specifies one exception to a general rule excludes other exceptions by implication. Cie v. Comdata Network, Inc., 275 Ill.App.3d 759, 761, 211 Ill.Dec. 931, 656 N.E.2d 123 (1995). Applying these principles to the case at bar, we believe the plain meaning of section 22--45 is clear: the issuance of a tax deed is incontestable except by appealing to a reviewing court or by filing a [281 Ill.App.3d 474] section 2--1401 petition.
In order to avoid the result being advocated in this litigation, the Illinois legislature tied the exemption to the "gambling games" themselves rather than to whether the specific persons or wagers at issue ran afoul of the Riverboat Gambling Act. Illinois case law supports this conclusion. See Cie v. Comdata Network, Inc., 656 N.E.2d 123, 127 (Ill.App. 1995), appeal denied, 662 N.E.2d 423 (1996) ("[I]t is clear that the types of gambling listed in subsection 28-1(b) [of the Loss Recovery Act] are expressly excepted from the definition of gambling.") (emphasis added); Moushon v. AAA Amusement, Inc., 641 N.E.2d 1201, 1203-1204 (Ill.App. 1994), appeal denied, 649 N.E.2d 418. The fact that Elgin Vinson improperly participated in a game of twenty-one (a game specifically authorized by the Gaming Board under the Riverboat Gambling Act) does not void the game's exemption from the Loss Recovery Statute. Vinson has failed to distinguish between the general authorization for "gambling games," from which the exemption to the Loss Recovery Act arises, and the regulatory framework vesting enforcement powers under the Riverboat Gambling Act in the Gaming Board.
Here, Langone has no way of knowing where the hypothetical John Doe gambling losers reside, and, thus, Langone cannot make a showing that the Court has jurisdiction over actions committed by those individuals, or that their conduct is subject to Illinois law. Cf. Cie v. Comdata Network, Inc., 656 N.E.2d 123, 129 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1995) ("Article 28 of the Criminal Code simply does not apply to gambling committed wholly outside of Illinois.").
Additionally, the ICIAA specifically exempts "private, enclosed offices occupied exclusively by smokers[,] even though such offices may be visited by nonsmokers" from the definition of "public places" and therefore from coverage. Having specifically excluded one type of office from coverage, the ICIAA does not contemplate other exclusions. Cie v. Comdata Network, Inc., 275 Ill. App.3d 759, 656 N.E.2d 123, 125, 211 Ill. Dec. 931, 933 (1995) ("a statute which specifies one exception to a general rule excludes other exceptions by implication"). Moreover, if there are two potentially applicable provisions within a statute, one general and the other specific, the latter controls.
Other jurisdictions have reached similar conclusions. (Accord, King International Corp. v. Voloshin (1976) 33 Conn.Supp. 166, 366 A.2d 1172, 1174-1175 ; Carnival Leisure Indus. v. Aubin (5th Cir. 1991) 938 F.2d 624, 626 ; Cie v. Comdata Network (1995) 275 Ill.App.3d 759, 211 Ill.Dec. 931, 656 N.E.2d 123, 128.) The only California case to disagree with this otherwise unbroken line of precedent is Crockford's Club, supra , 203 Cal.App.3d 1402, 250 Cal.Rptr. 728.
Consistent with this approach is the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, i.e., a statute that specifies one exception to a general rule excludes other exceptions by implication. See Cie v. Comdata Network, Inc., 275 Ill. App. 3d 759, 761 (1995). And because the posttrial motions were inappropriate, Forus concludes that they cannot serve to toll the 30-day period after the July 30, 2002, final order for deed.
Defendant asserts that the solicitation statute defines the offense only in terms of culpable conduct and not as to any result, and therefore jurisdiction is only proper where the words of solicitation were spoken. However, defendant's crime is distinguishable from a conduct-based offense such as gambling outside Illinois, as in Cie v. Comdata Network, Inc., 275 Ill. App. 3d 759, 656 N.E.2d 123 (1995), on which defendant partially relies. Although the offense of solicitation is complete upon the utterance of words of solicitation, no solicitation can occur unless the offending words are heard by another person.