Opinion
Civil Action 23-1738
06-10-2024
ANTHONY MICHAEL CIANCI, III, Plaintiff, v. M. ZAKEN; D. LEMASTER; and KAPOLKA, Defendants.
Arthur J. Schwab District Judge
Re: ECF No. 9 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MAUREEN P. KELLY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons that follow, it is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff s Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights (the “Complaint”), ECF No. 9, should be dismissed, sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted. Plaintiff should be granted leave to file an amended complaint, if appropriate.
II. REPORT
A. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff Anthony Michael Cianci III (“Plaintiff') was, at the time of filing, a state prisoner confined at the State Correctional Institution at Greene (“SCI-Greene”) in Waynesburg, Pennsylvania. ECF No. 9 at 2. This Court received Plaintiffs Complaint on October 5, 2023 without filing fee or motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). ECF No. 1.
An order directing Plaintiff to correct various filing deficiencies (the “Deficiency Order”) was issued on October 12, 2023. ECF No. 2. Since then, Plaintiff has moved for leave to proceed IFP. ECF No. 7. He also has been released from SCI-Greene. ECF No. 4.
As of the date of this Report and Recommendation, Plaintiff has never fully complied with the Deficiency Order. ECF Nos. 6 and 7. However, because his release from custody obviated the need to correct the remaining filing deficiencies, leave to proceed IFP was granted on June 5, 2024. ECF No. 8.
Plaintiff alleges that, in August of 2023, “[a]ll Defendants exposed [him] to poor and unsafe living condition, where the fire alarm went [off] daily and continuous[.]” ECF No. 9 at 5. He also alleges that a “lack of safety equipment caus[ed] [him] to slip [szc] fall.” Id. Finally, he alleges that Defendants retaliated against him for complaining about the above conditions. Id.
B. Legal Standard
28 U.S.C. § 1915 establishes the criteria for allowing an action to proceed IFP. Section 1915(e) requires the federal courts to review complaints filed by persons that are proceeding in forma pauperis and to dismiss, at any time, any action that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Thus, a court must dismiss, sua sponte, a complaint that lacks arguable merit in fact or law. Stackhouse v. Crocker, 266 Fed.Appx. 189,190 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989)).
The standard for reviewing a complaint under this section 1915(e)(2)(B) is the same as that for determining a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999); see also Banks v, Mozingo, No. 08-004,2009 WL 497572, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 26,2009) (Cercone, J.). Under that Rule, dismissal is appropriate if, reading the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and accepting all factual allegations as true, no relief could be granted under any “reasonable reading of the complaint” Phillips v. Cnty of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008). A complaint must be dismissed even if the claim to relief is “conceivable,” because a plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp, v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that, when determining whether to dismiss a complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a district court should apply a two-part test in order to determine whether a pleading's recitation of facts is sufficient. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2009). “First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions.” Id. at 210-11 (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). “Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “‘plausible claim for relief.'” Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
A court must employ less stringent standards when considering pro se pleadings than when judging the work product of an attorney. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). In a Section 1983 action, a court must liberally construe a pro se litigant's pleadings and “‘apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether a pro se litigant has mentioned it by name.'” Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Holley v. Dep't of Veteran Affairs, 165 F.3d 244, 247-48 (3d Cir. 1999)). “‘Since this is a § 1983 action, the [pro se] plaintiffs are entitled to relief if their complaint sufficiently alleges deprivation of any right secured by the Constitution.'” Higgins, 293 F.3d at 688 (quoting Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996)). That said, it is not proper for a court to assume that “the [plaintiff] can prove facts which [he or she] has not alleged, or that the defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged.” Assoc.'d Gen. Contractors of California, Inc, v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). A court further need not accept inferences drawn by a plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts as set forth in the complaint. See California Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys, v, Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 and 157-58 (3d Cir. 2004).
Finally, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that, in civil rights cases, a court must give a plaintiff the opportunity to amend a deficient complaint - regardless of whether the plaintiff requests to do so - when dismissing a case for failure to state a claim, unless doing so would be inequitable or futile. See Fletcher-Harlee Corp, v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007).
C. Legal Analysis
1. Personal involvement
In order for a claim to be cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must meet two threshold requirements. First, the alleged misconduct giving rise to the cause of action must have been committed by a person acting under color of state law; and second, the defendant's conduct must have deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), (overruled in part on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986)).
Additionally, liability under Section 1983 attaches only when a plaintiff shows that a defendant was personally involved in the deprivation of his or her federal rights. Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005). In cases involving a supervisory or reviewing defendant, personal involvement may be shown through ‘“allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence.'” Id. (quoting Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)). In situations where a supervising official knowingly permits a continuing custom or policy that results in harm to a plaintiff, Section 1983 liability may attach. See Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp, 838 F.2d 663, 673 (3d Cir. 1988) (overruled in part on other grounds by Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993)). At a minimum, liability in such a case is appropriate ‘“only where there are both (1) contemporaneous knowledge of the offending incident or knowledge of a prior pattern of similar incidents, and (2) circumstances under which the supervisor's inaction could be found to have communicated a message of approval to the offending subordinate.'” Colburn, 838 F.2d at 673 (quoting Chinchello v. Fenton, 805 F.2d 126, 133 (3d Cir. 1986)).
Here, Plaintiff has failed to make any allegations of fact with respect to any of Defendants' involvement in his alleged constitutional violations. Instead, it is unclear whether Plaintiff asserts that any Defendant is personally responsible for setting off the fire alarm, or for causing his fall, or for retaliating against him; how they allegedly did so; or whether he is suing them on a theory of supervisory liability. As such, as such, the present Complaint fails to state a claim, and should be dismissed.
2. Plaintiff fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim.
Conditions of confinement violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment if they satisfy two criteria. First, the conditions “must be, objectively, sufficiently serious” such that a “prison official's act or omission ... result[s] in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Only “extreme deprivations” are sufficient to make out a conditions of confinement claim. Hudson v. McMillen, 503 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1992). A plaintiff must prove that the deprivation is sufficiently serious when viewed within the context of “contemporary standards of decency.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36 (1993).
Second, the official responsible for the challenged conditions must exhibit a “sufficiently culpable state of mind,” which “[i]n prison-conditions cases ... is one of deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.
The deliberate indifference standard has been defined as requiring that “the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837.
[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference. . . . The Eighth Amendment does not outlaw cruel and unusual “conditions”; it outlaws cruel and unusual “punishments. ”Id. at 838 (emphasis added). This reasoning is grounded in the axiom that “only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain implicates the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 834 (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991) (internal quotation marks, emphasis, and citations omitted)).
Additionally, “prison officials who act reasonably cannot be found liable under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 845. Thus, a prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying humane conditions of confinement only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. “Only unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain or deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of prisoners are sufficiently egregious to rise to the level of a constitutional violation.” Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218,23 5 (3d Cir 2004) (internal quotations omitted).
In the instant case, Plaintiff has failed at least to show deliberate indifference on both of these bases. There is nothing in the Complaint from which this Court may conclude that any named Defendant was even aware of the fire alarm, much less that they allowed it to sound in a manner consistent with the “the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain implicates the Eighth Amendment.” Spruill, 372 F.3d at 235. C.f. Custer v. Clymer, No. 87-6919, 1988 WL 29294, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 1988) (dismissing as frivolous a prisoner's complaint regarding “the fire/smoke alarm at the State Correctional Institution at Frackville [that] goes off at frequent intervals, and has caused him hearing loss, headaches and stress related problems[,]” because “[t]here [was] nothing in the complaint or accompanying documents which indicates that the fire/smoke alarm problem at SCI Frackville was intentionally caused.”)
Similarly, Plaintiff has provided no indication that any named Defendant was aware of the conditions leading to his slip and fall. Indeed, he provides little to no information regarding those conditions in his Complaint.
Therefore, the averments in the Complaint are insufficient to state a claim for a violation of the Eighth Amendment.
3. Plaintiff fails to state a claim for First Amendment retaliation.
In order to state a prima facie retaliation claim under the First Amendment, a prisoner must plausibly allege that: (1) he engaged in constitutionally protected conduct; (2) he suffered an adverse action sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional rights; and (3) the constitutionally protected conduct was a “substantial or motivating” factor for the adverse action. Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001).
Here, Plaintiff fails at least on the second prong of this test. He provides no allegations as to whether he actually suffered any adverse actions for his complaints. As a result, he has not alleged facts that, if true, would allow this Court to conclude that whatever adverse actions he suffered - if any - were sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional rights.
4. Leave to Amend
Plaintiff should be granted leave to file an amended complaint in which to provide additional allegations of fact, as it is not clear whether it would be inequitable or futile to allow him to do so. Fletcher-Harlee, 482 F.3d at 251.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, it is respectfully recommended that the Complaint. ECF No. 9, be dismissed, sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted. Plaintiff should be granted leave to file an amended complaint, if appropriate.
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Local Rule 72.D.2, the parties are permitted to file written objections in accordance with the schedule established in the docket entry reflecting the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Objections are to be submitted to the Clerk of Court, United States District Court, 700 Grant Street, Room 3110, Pittsburgh, PA 15219.
Failure to timely file objections will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011).