Opinion
3:24-CV-1306 (VDO)
10-21-2024
YAROSLAV CHURUK, Petitioner, v. WARDEN, FCI DANBURY, BUREAU OF PRISONS, Respondent.
ORDER
VERNON D. OLIVER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Petitioner Yaroslav Churuk filed this pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging the Bureau of Prisons' (“BOP”) application of his First Step Act (“FSA”) earned time credits. See Petition (“Pet.”), ECF No. 1. In response to the Court's order to show cause, Respondent, the Warden of Federal Correctional Institution (“FCI”) Danbury, where Petitioner is housed, contends that Petitioner is statutorily ineligible to earn FSA earned time credits because he is not a United States citizen and is subject to a removal order. Response, ECF No. 8.
For the following reasons, the Court agrees with Respondent and thus DENIES Petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
I. BACKGROUND
Petitioner was convicted in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania of Conspiracy to Participate in a Racketeering Enterprise and sentenced to 240 months' imprisonment and 3 years of supervised release. Pet. at 1. Petitioner is currently serving this sentence at FCI Danbury. Id. His statutory projected release date is May 15, 2030. See Resp't Ex. 1, ECF No. 8-1 at 6. Petitioner has filed a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, alleging BOP has denied him FSA earned time credits while he was on a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum, in transit, in the hospital, on suicide watch, or under investigation. See Pet. at 2-3.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A federal prisoner may petition for habeas relief if he is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). “A writ of habeas corpus under § 2241 is available to a federal prisoner who does not challenge the legality of his sentence, but challenges instead its execution subsequent to his conviction.” Carmona v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 243 F.3d 629, 632 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal citations omitted). A petition arising under § 2241 is thus the appropriate vehicle for challenging the computation of a prisoner's sentence. See Levine v. Apker, 455 F.3d 71, 78 (2d Cir. 2006). The petitioner “bears the burden of proving that he is being held contrary to law; and because the habeas proceeding is civil in nature, the petitioner must satisfy his burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.” Skaftouros v. United States, 667 F.3d 144, 158 (2d Cir. 2011).
III. DISCUSSION
The FSA encourages federal inmates to participate in evidence-based recidivism reduction programs (“EBRRs”) and other productive activities (“PAs”) by providing time credits to inmates who successfully completes such programs. See 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(C); 28 C.F.R. § 523.40(b); Dailey v. Pullen, No. 22-CV-1121 (SRU), 2023 WL 3456696, at *4 (D. Conn. May 15, 2023). An inmate classified as minimum or low risk of recidivism earns either ten or fifteen days of FSA time credits for every thirty days of successful participation in EBRRs or PAs. 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(A). The application of these time credits enables an inmate to be transferred earlier than the completion date of his sentence to prerelease custody, such as home confinement or placement at a residential reentry center, or to supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3624(g)(2), 3624(g)(3), 3632(d)(4)(C); see also Saleen v. Pullen, No. 23-CV-147 (AWT), 2023 WL 3603423, at *1 (D. Conn. Apr. 12, 2023) (“Prelease custody can be in the form of either home confinement or transfer to a residential reentry center.”). However, not all inmates are statutorily eligible to earn FSA time credits.
The FSA provides, in relevant part, that “[a] prisoner, except for an ineligible prisoner under subparagraph (D), who successfully completes evidence-based recidivism reduction programming or productive activities, shall earn time credits[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(A). “[S]ubparagraph (D)” enumerates a list of offenses that would disqualify an inmate from earning FSA credits. See 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(D). Petitioner argues that this subparagraph does not bar him from earning credits while on writs or in transit. See Pet. at 2. While true, a different subparagraph bars Petitioner from earning credits regardless of the circumstances described in his petition. See id. at 2-3.
Subparagraph E provides that “[a] prisoner is ineligible to apply time credits under subparagraph (C) if the prisoner is the subject of a final order of removal under any provision of the immigration laws (as such term is defined in section 101(a)(17) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(17))).” 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(E)(i). Immigration records provided by Respondent show that Petitioner is the subject of a final order of removal. See Resp't Ex. 1 at 10 (immigration detainer), 27 (order of removal). Thus, Petitioner is statutorily ineligible to earn FSA credits regardless of the circumstances cited in his petition. See, e.g., Flete-Garcia v. Stover, No. 23-CV-00746 (KAD), 2023 WL 8435854, at *2 (D. Conn. Nov. 29, 2023) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(E)) (concluding habeas petitioner was ineligible to earn FSA credits because he was subject to removal order);Murillo-Cabezas v. F.C.I. Otisville Warden, No. 23-CV-11329 (RA), 2024 WL 3638331, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2024) (reaching same conclusion).
As Petitioner is statutorily ineligible to earn FSA credits because he is subject to a final order of removal, he has not met his burden of “proving that he is being held contrary to law[.]” Skaftouros, 667 F.3d at 158. Accordingly, Petitioner's habeas corpus petition is DENIED.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the petition for writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 1) is DENIED. The Clerk is respectfully directed to close the case.
SO ORDERED.