Opinion
C.A. No. 02A-10-010 WCC.
Submitted: October 1, 2003.
Decided: December 23, 2003.
Appeal from Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board. DENIED.
Jonathan Church, 168 Ramunno Circle, Hockessin, DE 19707. Pro se.
Stephanie Ferguson, 401 Brewster Drive, Newark, DE 19711. Pro se.
Stephani Ballard, Esquire, Department of Justice, 800 N. French Street, Wilmington, DE 19801. Attorney for Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board.
ORDER
This 23rd day of December, 2003, after consideration of the appeal of Jonathan Church ("Appellant") from the August 21, 2002 decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board ("Board") and upon review of the briefs and the record below, it appears to the Court that:
1. Appellant employed Stephanie Ferguson ("Appellee") as a babysitter for his children from June 2001 until May 16, 2002. Appellee worked part-time during the school year, while Appellee attended college full-time and full-time during the summer months. She received $8.00 an hour. While the specific date is in dispute, around the end of April or the beginning of May 2002, Appellee approached Appellant and requested a raise. Appellee explained that she had another job offer that paid $9.00 an hour and she wanted a raise in exchange for continued employment with Appellant. In response, Appellant told her that he wanted to create a job description for the position, as the duties had changed, and he wanted to evaluate her performance when she reached one year of employment with him. Appellant later explained that he would not give Appellee a raise. Thereafter, Appellee became separated from her employment with Appellant and the facts surrounding how this occurred are at issue in this dispute.
Appellee would have reached one year of employment with Appellant in June 2002.
2. On May 19, 2002, Appellee filed for unemployment benefits. In a May 31, 2002 decision, the Claims Deputy from the Department of Labor granted Appellee benefits for the week of May 25, 2002 because Appellee was not permitted to work out her two week notice, but as of June 1, 2002, the Claims Deputy disqualified Appellee from the receipt of benefits. The Claims Deputy found that the Appellee voluntarily left her employment without good cause.
See Claim Deputy Decision at 1. The rejection of benefits was based on the statutory mandate that "[a]n individual shall be disqualified for [unemployment compensation] benefits: (1) [f]or the week in which the individual left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work and for each week thereafter until the individual has been employed in each of 4 subsequent weeks (whether or not consecutive) and has earned wages in covered employment equal to not less than 4 times the weekly benefit amount." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19 Del. C. § 3315(1) (2003).
3. Thereafter, the Appellee appealed the Claims Deputy's decision to an Appeals Referee. The Appeals Referee presided over a hearing on July 8, 2002, where both Appellee and Appellant testified and were unrepresented. The Referee found a direct conflict surrounding the events that occurred between Appellant and Appellee, but since several inconsistencies existed in Appellee's explanation of the meetings with Appellant, found the Appellant to be more credible. The Referee affirmed the decision of the Claims Deputy and found that Appellee left her work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work. The Referee explained that "[m]ere dissatisfaction with one's hourly wage certainly does not meet the good cause criteria" of § 3315(1). The Referee found that Appellee's reasons for leaving her employment were personal ones and therefore were not attributable to her employment with the Appellant.
Appellant testified via telephone. Appellee testified in-person at the hearing.
See Referee Decision at 4.
Id. at 3.
4. Subsequently, Appellee appealed to the Board and on August 21, 2002, the Board held a hearing. However, Appellant, Mr. Church, did not attend this hearing. The Board found Appellee's testimony to be credible that she was terminated from her employment on May 19, 2002. As a result, the Board reversed the decision of the Referee. The Board found that Appellee's testimony was supported by evidence that Appellant placed a job advertisement to fill Appellee's position on May 15, 2002. This occurred shortly after Appellee requested a raise. The Board explained that "[i]n a discharge case, the burden of proof is on the employer to show that claimant engaged in some sort of willful or wanton conduct which would justify her discharge and disqualification from benefits." The Board found that Appellee's request for a raise was not willful or wonton conduct and that there was no evidence of any other misconduct on the part of Appellee. As a result, the Board found that Appellee was discharged from her employment without just cause and is therefore entitled to unemployment compensation benefits. Consequently, Appellant requested on August 29, 2002 that the Board grant him a rehearing. Appellant's application for reconsideration before the Board was denied. The Board explained that while Appellant was properly notified of the date, time and place of the hearing, he chose not to attend for personal reasons connected with his business. The Board further explained that Appellant's testimony and evidence from the hearing before the Referee was part of the record considered by the Board. Appellant now appeals the Board's decision to this Court pursuant to title 10, section 3323 of the Delaware Code.
See Board Decision at 2.
Id.
5. The function of this Court on review of an Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board decision is to determine whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence and is free from legal error. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. This Court does not weigh the evidence, determine questions of credibility, or make factual findings in the first instance. Rather, this Court's role is to determine whether the evidence is legally adequate to support the Board's findings.
See General Motors Corp. v. Freeman, 164 A.2d 686, 688 (Del. 1960); Attix v. Voshell, 579 A.2d 1125, 1127 (Del.Super.Ct. 1989).
See Boughton v. Div. of Unemployment Ins. of the Dep't of Labor, 300 A.2d 25, 26-27 (Del.Super.Ct. 1972); Ridings v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 407 A.2d 238, 239 (Del.Super.Ct. 1979).
See Oceanport Ind., Inc. v. Wilmington Stevedores, Inc., 636 A.2d 892, 899 (Del. 1994); Breeding v. Contractors-One-Inc., 549 A.2d 1102, 1104 (Del. 1988); Battista v. Chrysler Corp., 517 A.2d 295, 297 (Del.Super.Ct. 1986).
See Trotman v. Bayhealth Med. Ctr., Inc., 2000 WL 33109616 (Del.Super.Ct.) (quoting Messina v. Future Ford Sales, Inc., 1997 WL 358571 (Del.Super.)).
6. In this appeal, the Appellant attempts to present his version of the facts, which are dissimilar from the facts presented by the Appellee at the Board hearing. The crux of the Appellant's argument is that the Appellee voluntarily left her employment with the Appellant. This is a factual dispute that was within the province of the Board to decide. The role of this Court is to merely review the Board's decision, as this Court does not weigh evidence, determine credibility or make factual findings. The Appellant had an opportunity to present his version of the facts at the hearing before the Board on August 21, 2002, but unfortunately, he missed this opportunity. This appeal does not afford the Appellant an opportunity to re-litigate his case because this Court will not disturb the Board's decision absent legal error or a decision unsupported by substantial evidence.
7. In order for a disqualification of unemployment compensation benefits, an employer must establish "just cause." To establish "just cause," an employer must demonstrate "a willful or wanton act in violation of either the employer's interests, or of the employee's duties, or of the employee's expected standard of conduct." The Board found that the evidence was sufficient to show that Appellee's behavior did not rise to the level of willful or wanton conduct. It is clear that the Appellant's placing of an advertisement to obtain someone to replace the Appellee before terminating her was a key factor in the Board's decision. This provided objective evidence beyond the pointing of fingers by the parties on which the Board could fairly rely and this evidence reasonably reflected an intent by the Appellant to terminate the Appellee. While the Board may have viewed this evidence in a different light if addressed by the Appellant, it was not afforded that opportunity due to the Appellant's absence from the hearing. Based upon the limited record before the Board, the Court must agree that there was sufficient, substantial evidence present to support such a finding and that the Board's decision was free from legal error.
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19 Del. C. § 3315 (2003).
Abex Corp. v. Todd, 235 A.2d 271, 272 (Del.Super.Ct. 1967); Masanque v. Playtex Apparel, Inc., 2002 WL 1352438 (Del.Super.).
8. The Court finds the Board's decision in this matter to be factually and legally supported by the evidence presented. The Board's decision is therefore AFFIRMED for the reasons set forth above.
IT IS SO ORDERED.