Chukwu v. Attorney General

174 Citing cases

  1. Saravia v. Attorney Gen. U.S.

    905 F.3d 729 (3d Cir. 2018)   Cited 43 times
    Holding that an IJ must follow circuit precedent despite the BIA's "subsequent contrary decision"

    We will vacate and remand. 484 F.3d 185 (3d Cir. 2007).Id. at 192.

  2. Lin v. Atty. Gen. of U.S.

    340 F. App'x 788 (3d Cir. 2009)

    In addition, although the IJ may reasonably expect corroboration of certain points, IJs have a duty to develop the record, and thus may deny a claim for lack of corroboration only when "(1) the IJ identifies facts for which it is reasonable to expect the applicant to produce corroboration, (2) the applicant fails to corroborate, and (3) the applicant fails to adequately explain that failure." Chukwu v. Att'y Gen., 484 F.3d 185, 191-92 (3d Cir. 2007). The provisions of the REAL ID Act regarding credibility determinations and corroboration apply here, the former because Lin filed her asylum application after May 11, 2005, see Chukwu, 484 F.3d at 189, and the latter because they were effective immediately upon enactment, see id. at 191.

  3. Sandie v. Attorney General of U.S.

    562 F.3d 246 (3d Cir. 2009)   Cited 156 times
    Holding that the IJ could require further corroborating evidence even when the record "include[d] statements from multiple witnesses and two experts"

    In fact, credible testimony alone is not always sufficient to meet the burden of proof. See, e.g., Chukwu v. Att'y Gen., 484 F.3d 185, 192 (3d Cir. 2007) ("Where the trier of fact determines that the applicant should provide evidence that corroborates otherwise credible testimony, such evidence must be provided unless the applicant does not have the evidence and cannot reasonably obtain the evidence."); Chen v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2005) ("[E]ven a credible asylum applicant may be required to supply corroborating evidence in order to meet [her] burden of proof.") (internal quotation marks omitted); Kayembe, 334 F.3d at 235 ("If the BIA's decision can be found to be supported by substantial evidence, even if Kayembe's testimony is credible, then the absence of a finding on credibility is not significant to the disposition of the case."); Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 554 ("We . . . hold that the BIA may sometimes require otherwise-credible applicants to supply corroborating evidence in order to meet their burden of proof.").

  4. Luziga v. Attorney Gen. U. S.

    937 F.3d 244 (3d Cir. 2019)   Cited 36 times
    In Luziga, the Third Circuit vacated a particularly serious crime finding after the IJ "failed to first consider the elements of [the] offense," and the BIA "stated that it would consider the 'elements' of Luziga's offense, [but] listed as 'elements' specific offense characteristics such as loss amount."

    However, corroborating evidence may be required when it is reasonable to expect it, such as for "facts [that] are central" to a claim and easily verified. Chukwu v. Att’y Gen. , 484 F.3d 185, 192 (3d Cir. 2007). Before requiring corroborating evidence, i.e., deciding that "failure to corroborate undermines" a claim, an IJ must follow the Abdulai inquiry. Saravia v. Att’y Gen. , 905 F.3d 729, 736 (3d Cir. 2018).

  5. Igwestevens v. Att'y Gen. U.S.

    373 F. App'x 271 (3d Cir. 2010)

    See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) Igwe-Stevens is an ethnic member of the Ibo tribe (sometimes spelled "Igbo," see Chukwu v. Att'y Gen., 484 F.3d 185, 187 (3d Cir. 2007)). Before the Immigration Judge ("IJ"), he testified that his father was a member of a political organization called the Ohaneze, which sought better treatment for ethnic Ibos in Nigeria.

  6. Xue Mei Chen v. Attorney General of the United States

    305 F. App'x 838 (3d Cir. 2009)

    We review the IJ's factual finding for substantial evidence and must uphold them "'unless any reason able adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.'" Chukwu v. Att'y Gen., 484 F.3d 185, 189 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)). Nevertheless, The IJ's conclusions "must be based on the record, not on conjecture or unsupported suppositions about conditions in the applicant's country."

  7. Ndou v. Attorney Gen. U.S.

    No. 17-2313 (3d Cir. Dec. 28, 2018)

    This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. In Toure v. Attorney General, 443 F.3d 310 (3d Cir. 2006), and Chukwu v. Attorney General, 484 F.3d 185 (3d Cir. 2007), we considered a provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), 18 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4), addressing what an immigration judge ("IJ") needs to do to develop record evidence once she determines that an applicant's story requires corroboration. We held that the "IJ must give the applicant notice of what corroboration will be expected and an opportunity to present an explanation if the applicant cannot produce such corroboration."

  8. Singh v. Attorney Gen. of the United States

    No. 17-1940 (3d Cir. Nov. 15, 2017)

    The clear-probability standard for withholding of removal is more difficult to meet than the reasonable-possibility standard for asylum. Chukwu v. Att'y Gen. of U.S., 484 F.3d 185, 188 (3d Cir. 2007). To obtain CAT relief, an applicant must show "that it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal."

  9. Soeung v. Holder

    677 F.3d 484 (1st Cir. 2012)   Cited 26 times
    Vacating dismissal of petition where BIA made "no finding at all on the adequacy of Soeung's explanation for failing to provide the required corroboration"

    However, before the failure to produce corroborating evidence can be held against an applicant, there must be explicit findings that (1) it was reasonable to expect the applicant to produce corroboration and (2) the applicant's failure to do so was not adequately explained. See Chukwu v. Att'y Gen., 484 F.3d 185, 191–92 (3d Cir.2007). Once made, these findings are entitled to deference.

  10. Singh v. Attorney General of the U.S.

    450 F. App'x 148 (3d Cir. 2011)

    "[A]n adverse credibility finding [can] be based on inconsistencies, but only if the inconsistencies relate[] to facts at the heart of the claim, rather than to unimportant details." Chukwu v. Att'y Gen., 484 F.3d 185, 189 (3d Cir. 2007). The REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B, 119 Stat. 231, 302-23 (2005), changed the standard of review for adverse credibility findings for petitions filed on or after May 11, 2005.