Clearly, we would seek to give effect to Chester's intent if we were trying to identify a beneficiary whom he designated. E.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Hardwick, 299 Mich. 696, 1 N.W.2d 43 (1942); Chrysler Corp. v. Gutt, 293 Mich. 420, 292 N.W. 354 (1940). However, there is no difficulty in ascertaining whom he intended: clearly, Margaret, whether his lawful wife or not, would take were she not ineligible under an unrelated rule of law.

A. Erroneous description of Sharon Mollison as beneficiary: Having found as a fact that it was the intention of the deceased, Hosea Daniel, to name defendant Sharon Mollison as beneficiary, it is this Court's conclusion that the giving of erroneous name and the error in referring to her as his daughter does not in any way vitiate the legal effectiveness of his naming Sharon Mollison as beneficiary under the policy. The Court believes that the conclusion in this regard is fully sustained by the following cases decided by the Michigan Supreme Court: Ester v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 298 Mich. 330, 299 N.W. 96; Howard v. Chrysler Corporation, 275 Mich. 706, 267 N.W. 585; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Gray, 290 Mich. 219, 287 N.W. 441; Chrysler Corporation v. Gutt, 293 Mich. 420, 292 N.W. 354, and Chrysler Corporation v. Hardwick, 299 Mich. 696, 1 N.W.2d 43. B. Change of beneficiary to Sharon Mollison was legally effective: The group policy of insurance contained the following provision relating to the procedural steps required to accomplish a change of beneficiary:

The designation "wife" is in no way controlling. It is descriptive only and the fact that neither Daisy L. nor Daisy E. was his wife does not prevent one from taking the benefit. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Sower, 273 Mich. 423; Howard v. Chrysler Corporation, 275 Mich. 706; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Gray, 290 Mich. 219; Chrysler Corporation v. Gutt, 293 Mich. 420; Alexander v. Prudential Ins. Co., 293 Mich. 522; and Ester v. Prudential Ins. Co., 298 Mich. 330. As we have indicated, it appears to have been a matter of little concern to Sterling W. as to whether Daisy L. or Daisy E. should be considered his beneficiary.

" See, also, Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Gray, 290 Mich. 219; Chrysler Corp. v. Gutt, 293 Mich. 420. Under the above authority the rule is well established that in language designating a beneficiary of insurance, reference to relationship or status is mere descriptio personae. It follows that Robert Alexander had a legal right to name Rita Alexander as his beneficiary, even though she never became his wife.