It is well settled that a receiver's possession of assets and property is tantamount to possession by the court itself. Chronowski v Park Sproat Corp, 306 Mich 676, 685; 11 NW2d 286 (1943). A receiver is not appointed as the agent of, or for the benefit of, one party or the other; rather he or she is appointed to protect and benefit both parties equally.
It is well settled that a receiver's possession of assets and property is tantamount to possession by the court itself. Chronowski v. Park Sproat Corp, 306 Mich 676, 685; 11 NW2d 286 (1943). A receiver is not appointed as the agent of or for the benefit of one party or the other; rather he or she is appointed to protect and benefit both parties equally.
In this capacity, he is charged with preserving the assets of the debtor for the benefit of both debtor and creditors and his jurisdiction over these assets is, in effect, that of the court itself. Chronowski v Park-Sproat Corp, 306 Mich. 676; 11 N.W.2d 286 (1943). Westgate v Westgate, 294 Mich. 88; 292 N.W. 569 (1940).
"[A] note or memorandum may be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the statute of frauds even though it consists of several separate papers and documents, not all of which are signed by the party to be charged, and none of which is a sufficient memorandum in itself." Kelly-Stehney & Assoc., Inc. v. MacDonald's Indus. Prods., Inc., 265 Mich. App. 105, 113, 693 N.W.2d 394, 399 (2005) (quoting 4 Corbin, Contracts (rev. ed.) § 23.3, p. 771); Miller v. Americor Lending Grp., Inc., 2007 WL 107664, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 9, 2007) (citing Kelly-Stehney and applying it to M.C.L. § 566.132); 11 Mich. Civ. Jur. Statute of Frauds § 110 (2012) ("A complete contract binding under the statute may be gathered from letters, writings, and telegrams between the parties relating to the subject matter of the contract, and connected with each other so that they may be said to constitute one paper relating to the contract." (citing Ryan v. United States, 136 U.S. 68, 83 10 S. Ct. 913, 918 (1890) and Chronowski v. Park Sproat Corp., 306 Mich. 676, 684, 11 N.W.2d 286, 289 (1943))). Whether a contract is signed depends on whether a person intended to authenticate a writing.
We apply this rule in the present case and hold that defendant cannot avoid an otherwise proper agreement on the ground it was ultra vires. See e.g., 2 Clark, Receivers §§ 433.3, 492(a); 66 Am.Jur.2d, Receivers, §§ 238, 407; 75 C.J.S. Receivers §§ 174, 244; Tobey v. Poulin, 141 Me. 58, 38 A.2d 826 (1944); Strong v. Burden, 311 Ill. App. 255, 35 N.E.2d 699 (1941); Davidson v. Whitfield, 186 Okla. 536, 99 P.2d 156, 158 (1941); Chronowski v. Park Sproat Corp., 306 Mich. 676, 11 N.W.2d 286, 288 (1943). Cf. Yetzer v. Applegate, 85 Iowa 121, 52 N.W. 118 (1892).