Although not cited by plaintiff, we must take issue with case law subsequent to Casey which seems to support plaintiff's position in the instant case. The first such cause is Chriswell v. Rosewell (1979), 70 Ill. App.3d 320, 388 N.E.2d 175. In Chriswell, the court rejected the argument that a county probation officer's claim for back pay was barred by the doctrine of laches.

See, e.g., Richter v. Prairie Farms Dairy, Inc., 2016 IL 119518, ¶ 52 (reversing dismissal of complaint based on res judicata and the statute of limitations but noting that, on remand, the defendant was "free to assert a laches defense"); Tillman v. Pritzker, 2020 IL App (4th) 190611, ¶ 33 (reversing denial of the plaintiff's petition for leave to file a taxpayer's suit, finding that the plaintiff should be permitted to file the complaint, but noting that the defendants' alternative arguments, including the defense of laches, could be raised on remand); Harper, 67 Ill.App.3d at 699 (reversing dismissal based on an insurance policy's exclusionary clause but noting that the trial court should hold an evidentiary hearing on the alternative defense of laches on remand). The sole exception is Chriswell v. Rosewell, 70 Ill.App.3d 320 (1979). However, that case involved the trial court's incorrect application of the laches doctrine and a remand to permit the trial court to properly consider the issue.

• 1 It is well established that an officer or employee unlawfully suspended is entitled to recover his salary loss during the period of suspension where the suspending officer is without authority, or having power, exerts it in a manner in contravention of statute. It is no defense that the employee has not done the work, for if the suspension is unlawful, the suspension is a mere forced vacation for which the employee must be paid as if he had never been suspended. ( Chriswell v. Rosewell (1979), 70 Ill. App.3d 320, 388 N.E.2d 175.) As an employee, plaintiff was entitled to his salary unless and until he was lawfully suspended or discharged. Plaintiff has a clear legal right to compensation absent the establishment of an affirmative defense.

See, e.g. , Genius v. Cty. of Cook , 2011 WL 9558925, *17 (Ill.App.Ct.2011) (plaintiff could have brought mandamus action when the “District was without authority to suspend [plaintiff] for more than 30 days without filing written charges before the Civil Service Commission and providing him with an opportunity to be heard in his own defense.”); Szewczyk v. Bd. of Fire & Police Comm'rs of Vill. of Richmond , 381 Ill.App.3d 159, 319 Ill.Dec. 426, 885 N.E.2d 1106, 1114 (2008) (“denial of a hearing is properly remedied through mandamus” when police officer was terminated without a hearing as required by the Police and Fire Commissioners Act); Chriswell v. Rosewell , 70 Ill.App.3d 320, 26 Ill.Dec. 551, 388 N.E.2d 175, 177 (1979) (mandamus was proper because the chief probation officer, who indefinitely suspended the probation officer, was only statutorily authorized to issue suspensions for thirty days or less and only if notice of charges and hearing were provided). Ores argues that mandamus was unavailable because he “is challenging ... [Jones's] decision to discipline him at all, which is a discretionary decision.”

But in addition to alleging that Dart, Alderden, and Wright acted in a random and unauthorized manner, Battle also must assert that he has availed himself of state post-deprivation remedies or that the available remedies were inadequate. One such post-suspension remedy available in Illinois is a writ of mandamus. Genius v. Cnty. of Cook, No. 1-08-3277, 2011 WL 9558925, at **16-17 (Ill. App. Ct. Oct. 25, 2011) (holding that after plaintiff's suspension without a hearing, he could have filed an action in circuit court to compel the filing of charges and an opportunity for a hearing); Chriswell v. Rosewell, 388 N.E.2d 175, 177 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (issuing a mandamus, awarding back pay, and stating that "[i]t is well established that an officer or employee unlawfully suspended is entitled to recover the salary lost during the period of suspension"); People ex rel. Hilger v. Myers, 252 N.E.2d 924, 926 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969) (issuing mandamus for backpay). Another is a civil action for back pay. See Burton v. Sheahan, No. 98 C 5614, 2001 WL 563777, at *7 (N.D. Ill. May 22, 2001) (holding that correctional officer suspended without pay had an adequate state-law post-suspension remedy under the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act).

In this instance, just as in Burton, Ellis could have filed a mandamus action, which Illinois courts have recognized as a proper remedy to compel a public official to perform his duty to pay a salary to an employee who is lawfully entitled to it. Burton 98-5614, 2001 U.S Dist. Lexis 25789 at *21 (citing People ex rel. Hilger v. Myers, 252 N.E.2d 924, 926 (Ill.App. 1st Dist. 1969));Chriswell v. Rosewell, 388 N.E.2d 175, 177 (Ill.App. 1st Dist. 1979). Another available option to Ellis was a state-court action under the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act, § 820 Ill. Comp. Stat. 115/1 (2004), which was created with the purpose of assisting employees who seek redress from employers for wrongfully withholding benefits. Miller v. J.M.

Burton could have filed a mandamus action, which Illinois courts have recognized as a proper remedy to compel a public official to perform his duty to pay a salary to an employee who is lawfully entitled to it. See, e.g.,Peopleex rel. Hilger v. Myers, 252 N.E.2d 924, 926 (Ill.App.Ct. 1969); Chriswell v. Rosewell, 388 N.E.2d 175, 177 (Ill.App.Ct. 1979) ("[i]t is well established that an officer or employee unlawfully suspended is entitled to recover the salary lost during the period of suspension"). In the alternative, Burton could have pursued a state-court action under the Illinois Wage Payment And Collection Act, 820 ILCS 115/1, et seq. (1999), which allows employees to seek redress for an employer's wrongful withholding of employee benefits.

¶ 20 Plaintiff cites Chriswell v. Rosewell, 70 Ill.App.3d 320, 324 (1979), for a similar proposition, but that case did not involve the Administrative Review Law or its predecessor, the Administrative Review Act. So the case speaks not at all to the jurisdictional bar plaintiff faces here because of the Administrative Review Law's applicability.

¶ 21 Plaintiff cites Chriswell v. Rosewell, 70 Ill.App.3d 320, 324 (1979) for a similar proposition, but that case did not involve the ARL or its predecessor, the Administrative Review Act. So the case speaks not at all to the jurisdictional bar plaintiff faces here because of the ARL's applicability.

Defendant maintains that plaintiffs have not established a clear and undoubted right to mandamus, that confusion or disorder will result from the reimbursement, that an award of such "money damages" is inappropriate here and that if reimbursement is appropriate, the court properly found that it should not begin until the date of plaintiffs' demand on defendant. We believe that plaintiffs correctly assert that it is the date on which plaintiffs have a clear legal right to relief rather than the date of plaintiffs' demand on defendant which determines the extent of relief in this case ( cf. Chriswell v. Rosewell (1979), 70 Ill. App.3d 320, 324, 388 N.E.2d 175, 178), particularly since a demand is unnecessary where, as here, the duty to act is of a public nature (see People ex rel. Busch v. Green (1917), 281 Ill. 52, 58, 117 N.E. 764, 766). Thus, we conclude that plaintiffs are entitled to relief beginning with services rendered on January 1, 1980.