Opinion
A147443
01-27-2017
CHRISTOPHER F., Plaintiff and Respondent, v. S.C., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (San Francisco City & County Super. Ct. No. FCS-07-342057)
Appellant S.C. challenges the entry of a domestic violence protective order against her in favor of respondent Christopher F. and the denial of her own request for a similar order. Because S.C. failed to provide a sufficient appellate record for proper evaluation of her claims, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
S.C. and Christopher F., the parents of a school-age son, C.J., are otherwise estranged. In June 2014, S.C. stipulated to a three-year stay away order limiting her contact with Christopher to e-mails regarding visitation arrangements for C.J. The order reserved to Christopher the right to seek a "CLETS" restraining order under the Domestic Violence Protection Act (Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq.; DVPA) if S.C. violated the stipulated order.
"CLETS" is an acronym for the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System, a computer system operated by the Department of Justice. (People v. Martinez (2000) 22 Cal.4th 106, 113; see Gov. Code, § 15151.) Restraining orders issued pursuant to the DVPA are required to be entered into CLETS to facilitate enforcement. (Fam. Code, § 6380.) --------
In June 2015, Christopher F. filed a request for a CLETS order, seeking protection for himself, C.J., his girlfriend, Rachel M., and her daughter. The request was premised on a violent assault by S.C. against both Rachel and Christopher at the time of a visitation exchange of C.J. The family court granted a temporary restraining order (TRO) protecting Christopher, but the order was denied as to Rachel and her daughter, apparently because they were not members of Christopher's family. A hearing on the request was postponed several times to September 9.
On September 1, 2015, S.C. filed her own request for a CLETS order against Christopher F. The request described several incidents during which Christopher caused S.C. apprehension, but only one example of violence was alleged. During the incident on which Christopher based his request for a CLETS order, S.C. contended, he had actually attacked her. S.C. was denied a TRO on grounds her request did not adequately describe recent events of abuse, and a joint hearing on the requests was scheduled for November.
A long cause hearing was held on November 13, 2015. Although the witness list shows that both Christopher F. and S.C. testified, there is no transcript of the hearing in the appellate record. Later that day, the family court issued a CLETS order against S.C., requiring her to stay away from and not contact Christopher and Rachel M. for a period of three years. The record does not contain a ruling on S.C.'s request for a CLETS order, but we assume it was denied.
II. DISCUSSION
S.C. contends the orders granting Christopher F.'s request for a CLETS order and denying her own request for a similar order were not supported by substantial evidence. She also claims the family court erred by including Rachel M. as a protected party in Christopher's CLETS order. We must affirm all the rulings of the family court because S.C. has not provided a sufficient appellate record to permit proper review of her claims of error.
"The purpose of the DVPA is 'to prevent acts of domestic violence, abuse . . . and to provide for a separation of the persons involved in the domestic violence for a period sufficient to enable these persons to seek a resolution of the causes of the violence.' [Citation.] To this end, the DVPA . . . . [¶] . . . permits a court, upon a showing of 'reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse' [citation], to issue a protective order restraining any person from contact, for the purpose of preventing a recurrence of domestic violence." (In re Marriage of Fregoso & Hernandez (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 698, 702.) In reviewing the evidence supporting such an order, we apply the substantial evidence standard of review. (In re Marriage of Evilsizor & Sweeney (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1416, 1424.)
"It is . . . a fundamental rule of appellate review that an appealed judgment or order is presumed correct. [Citation.] ' "All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown. . . ." [Citations.]' [Citation.] To overcome this presumption, the appellant must provide an adequate appellate record demonstrating error. [Citation.] . . . Where the appellant fails to provide an adequate record of the challenged proceedings, we must presume that the appealed judgment or order is correct, and on that basis, affirm." (Jade Fashion & Co., Inc. v. Harkham Industries, Inc. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 635, 643-644.)
When an appellant challenges an order of the court as not supported by the evidence, it is critical that the appellant provide the entire evidentiary record before the trial court. As noted above, a court order is presumed correct, and the appellant has the burden of demonstrating error. When an appellant contends that an order is not supported by the evidence, that burden consists of demonstrating that, in the entire evidentiary record, there is no substantial evidence to support the court's decision. (See, e.g., DiMartino v. City of Orinda (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 329, 336 [" 'In determining whether a judgment is supported by substantial evidence, we may not confine our consideration to isolated bits of evidence, but must view the whole record in a light most favorable to the judgment, resolving all evidentiary conflicts and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the decision of the trial court.' "].) It is commonly held that the omission of a relevant evidentiary hearing transcript renders an appellate record inadequate and requires affirmance of the court's order. (See DeLuca v. State Fish Co., Inc. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 671, 680, fn. 5; Foust v. San Jose Construction Co., Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 181, 186-187 [citing 12 prior decisions finding a record inadequate for failure to provide a hearing transcript].)
Necessarily, the primary evidence submitted to the family court with respect to the issuance of the requested CLETS orders was the testimony at the November 13, 2015 hearing. Both parties, Christopher F. and S.C., testified. The family court presumably listened to their testimony and entered orders it deemed appropriate based on its conclusions. Because S.C. claims the court's orders were not supported by the evidence, it was her obligation to provide the entire evidentiary record on which the family court based its ruling, particularly including a transcript of the hearing. If the hearing was not transcribed, or if S.C. could not afford a transcript, she could have proceeded by way of a settled statement. (Randall v. Mousseau (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 929, 931, 933-934 [an alternative to submitting a transcript on appeal is to obtain a settled statement].)
The importance of the hearing transcript is illustrated by S.C.'s claim that the family court erred in including Rachel M. as a protected party. The DVPA permits protection of "named family or household members." (Fam. Code, § 6320, subd. (a).) Because Rachel M. is not a member of Christopher F.'s family, she could only be included as a protected person if she lived in his household. Although Christopher provided no evidence regarding Rachel's residence in his request for a CLETS order, he could have supplemented that information through testimony at the hearing. In the absence of the hearing transcript, S.C. cannot demonstrate that no such evidence was provided, and we must affirm on the presumption that the family court's ruling was correct. Because S.C.'s other claims are also premised upon the sufficiency of the evidence, they fail for the same reason.
III. DISPOSITION
The family court's CLETS order of November 13, 2015, entered against S.C., is affirmed. The family court's denial of S.C.'s request for a CLETS order, assuming it occurred, is also affirmed.
/s/_________
Margulies, Acting P.J. We concur: /s/_________
Dondero, J. /s/_________
Banke, J.