Opinion
14-21-00037-CR
05-19-2022
TIAUNDRA KAE CHRISTON, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
Do Not Publish - Tex.R.App.P. 47.2(b).
On Appeal from the 56th District Court Galveston County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 19-CR-0268
Panel consists of Justices Jewell, Zimmerer, and Hassan.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Kevin Jewell Justice
A jury convicted appellant Tiaundra Kae Christon of tampering with a human corpse and assessed punishment at twenty years' confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division and a $10,000 fine. On appeal, she raises two issues challenging the judgment of conviction. First, she asserts the trial court abused its discretion in excluding copies of certified judgments of her co-defendant's family violence convictions, which appellant says support her duress defense. We overrule this issue because we conclude that appellant did not preserve error. Second, appellant contends her counsel was ineffective during the punishment phase for (1) failing to object to the introduction of an extraneous offense and (2) not requesting a limiting instruction. We overrule this issue because we conclude that the extraneous offense evidence was admissible and the trial court's punishment charge included a proper limiting instruction.
We affirm the judgment.
Background
On October 28, 2018, appellant called 911 from a park in College Station to report that her nearly two-year-old daughter, Hannah, was missing. Because the missing person was a young child, a host of emergency personnel responded, including police officers, firefighters, and other nearby agency officials. First responders described appellant as "hysterical." She told the officers-including College Station Police Department ("CSPD") Corporal Gary Southerland, whose body camera recorded his interactions with appellant and others-that she and Hannah were playing in the playground area of the park when she left Hannah in her stroller and walked back to her vehicle, parked several hundred yards away and out of sight of the playground, to retrieve a drink. When she returned, Hannah was not in her stroller. Appellant provided the officers with Hannah's description, including her clothing, age, weight, and height. Officials sent emergency alerts to phones in nearby neighborhoods to notify residents that a child was missing.
We refer to the decedent in this case by a pseudonym. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.10(a)(3).
Footnote matter not available.
Appellant told the officers that, when she realized Hannah was missing, she asked two men who were fishing in a nearby pond if they had seen her. The men confirmed to police that they helped appellant look for Hannah, but they said they had not seen or heard a child while they were fishing.
Officers believed it was very unusual for a mother to have left a two-year-old child in a stroller to walk several hundred yards away and out of view to retrieve something from her car. They were also concerned that Hannah had been left unattended about 120 feet from a pond. Searchers used sonar directed at the pond to determine whether a body was in the water, but these efforts revealed nothing. Moreover, search dogs brought to the park were unable to detect Hannah's scent, which indicated to police that Hannah had not been at the park. Near appellant's parked vehicle, a Department of Public Safety ("DPS") trooper found a doll wrapped in a trash bag in a dumpster. The doll's arms and legs had been lengthened to make it look more like a toddler, and its clothing matched appellant's description of Hannah's clothes. When asked about the doll, appellant claimed that she had never seen it before.
As the investigation continued, officers believed that much of what appellant told them was not "adding up." Appellant agreed to accompany officers to the CSPD station for an interview. Detectives Robert Wilson and Rebecca Smith interviewed appellant from noon to about 10:00 p.m. Appellant was not handcuffed or threatened during the interview, and she was provided several breaks. During her interview, appellant told the detectives about her visit to the park that morning, as described above. The detectives were concerned that she would leave her daughter alone in the park while she returned to her vehicle, and Detective Wilson thought appellant was untruthful. Appellant told investigators that the previous day, October 27, she and Hannah were at a Walmart store in Bryan. Officers were able to secure and view a security camera video recording from the Walmart that day. The recording showed appellant pushing a cart with what appeared to be a child in the basket. The officers noticed, however, that the "child" appeared stiff and unmoving.
The detectives requested appellant's consent to search her apartment, and she agreed. While appellant's interview continued, another group of officers proceeded to appellant's apartment and conducted the search. Based on cadaver dog alerts, and confirmed by subsequent forensic testing, officers discovered the possible presence of blood in a mop bucket and a washing machine that contained clothes. Officers also found clothing that appeared to be the same type as that worn by the "child" in the Walmart surveillance video, as well as the same type and brand of trash bag in which the doll was wrapped when officers found it in the park dumpster.
During her interview, appellant also told the detectives that she was engaged to Kenny Hewett, who lived and worked in Center, Texas, near the Louisiana border. According to appellant, on October 21, she took Hannah to Houston, where Hewett's mother lived. While in Houston, she, Hewett, and Hannah stayed with Hewett's mother the night of October 21, and then stayed in several hotels. Appellant stated that she returned to the College Station area on October 24 and Hewett went back to work in Center. Hewett became a person of interest in the investigation at that time because officers were unable to determine whether Hannah was alive, and the officers knew that Hewett had been with appellant in Houston before October 24.
Near the end of her interview, the Brazos County District Attorney's Office accepted charges against appellant for filing a false report to a peace officer and abandoning or endangering a child. Appellant was arrested on these charges and taken to the Brazos County Jail. Appellant's parents were informed, and they went to the jail to talk with her. They spoke to appellant via video, which was recorded and watched live by CSPD Detective Justin Oehlke. During this conversation, appellant's parents urged her to tell them what happened. Appellant ultimately told them that Hannah had died and that she could show them where her body was. She told her parents that Hannah was not in Bryan and that her body was in the water. Appellant's father told her that he wanted her to show police where Hannah's body was, and appellant replied, "Okay."
Appellant's father told Detective Oehlke that appellant said Hannah was dead and her body was out of town. The detective asked appellant's parents if she would speak with police detectives again, and appellant's father said that appellant was willing to do so and would show officers where her daughter's body could be found. Detective Oehlke confirmed that appellant wanted to speak with officers again and then took her to the Brazos County Sheriff's Office. There, she met with Detective Wilson, Texas Ranger Joshua Ray, and Bryan Police Department Detective Sean Davis. Appellant waived her Miranda rights and agreed to speak with the officers. She confirmed that Hannah was dead but gave inconsistent accounts of the surrounding circumstances. In one version, appellant said that, while she, Hewett, and Hannah were at a hotel, Hewett put Hannah in a bathtub after whipping her and placed Hannah's face under the running water. Appellant told Hewett to stop. She said it looked like Hannah was dying when she took her out of the bathtub. Appellant suggested calling 911, but Hewett said that Hannah would be okay. Appellant said that she attempted to resuscitate Hannah and was holding her in the hotel's bed. She and Hewett went to sleep, believing that Hannah would wake up. But Hannah never awoke. They cleaned the hotel room and left. According to appellant, Hannah's body remained in her car for two days. Appellant and Hewett then dumped the body in Moses Bayou near Texas City. According to appellant, she and Hewett planned to act like Hannah went missing, which was "kind of" Hewett's idea. She said it was her idea to use a doll as a substitute for Hannah, and appellant attempted to make the doll appear more lifelike.
Appellant said she did not tell this story to officers sooner because she was scared that Hewett might learn about what she said. She was afraid of Hewett because he "knew things" and she did not want to lose anyone she was close to. She claimed that if it had just been her, she would have called 911. She denied that Hewett had threatened her to prevent her from talking to police.
Hewett had several family violence convictions involving women other than appellant. He also had been subject to a protective order involving another woman.
Officers brought appellant and Hewett to a location near Texas City, and they showed the officers where they dumped Hannah's body. On October 31, officers with the Galveston County Sheriff's Office recovered Hannah's body.
The Galveston County medical examiner performed an autopsy on November 2. Hannah's body was in an early state of decomposition. The body had no significant internal injuries or bone fractures. However, there were areas of subcutaneous hemorrhage, which suggested bruising. The medical examiner could not determine a cause of death.
Appellant and Hewett were charged with tampering with a human corpse in Galveston County. Hewett pleaded guilty. During her trial, appellant's defensive theory was that she was under duress from Hewett at the time she committed the offense. A jury found her guilty and, after a punishment hearing, assessed her punishment at twenty years' confinement and a $10,000 fine.
The Brazos County charges against appellant were dismissed.
Appellant timely noticed this appeal.
Exclusion of Evidence
In appellant's first issue, she contends the trial abused its discretion by excluding from evidence certified copies of Hewett's family violence convictions to establish her duress defense.
A. Standard of Review
We review a trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. Gonzalez v. State, 544 S.W.3d 363, 370 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). A trial court abuses its discretion when its ruling lies outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. Id. We will uphold the trial court's ruling if it is reasonably supported by the record and is correct under any theory of law applicable to the case. Willover v. State, 70 S.W.3d 841, 845 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Seidule v. State, 622 S.W.3d 480, 489 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, no pet.). This is so even if that theory is not mentioned by the trial court or the appellee. See Spielbauer v. State, 622 S.W.3d 314, 319 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (burden of preserving error for appellate review rests on party challenging trial court's ruling).
B. Relevant Facts
During questioning of Corporal Sutherland, but outside the jury's presence, appellant's counsel noted that Hewett had pleaded guilty to tampering with Hannah's body and had been sentenced to twenty years' incarceration. Counsel stated that Hewett had a documented history of family violence-aggravated assault, terroristic threat, and an emergency protective order. Counsel explained that he wanted to introduce certified copies of Hewett's records because appellant's defense was duress-that Hewett "in essence . . . forced her to sort of go along with this." Counsel did not attempt to introduce the evidence at that time, but asked questions about whether some victims of family violence are reluctant to admit that it had occurred.
Another witness, Detective Wilson, acknowledged on cross-examination that Hewett had "a long history" of family violence convictions. However, when appellant's counsel attempted to ask questions about Hewett's criminal history, the State objected on relevance and improper impeachment grounds. The trial court sustained the State's objections. The detective testified that appellant appeared to be protecting Hewett rather than Hannah and that appellant appeared to be manipulative. He stated that appellant's report of Hannah as missing "was very well planned." Although he acknowledged that appellant appeared upset, the detective wondered whether it was "an act or . . . real grief." When asked whether appellant could have "a legitimate fear" about Hewett, Detective Wilson responded, "Is she protecting him or is she covering for both of them?" When asked whether, in his opinion, appellant was calculated and manipulating, the detective responded,
It's one of those things where it's a judgment call. At one point I said, "Why didn't we have this conversation on day one?" I mean, we have a 163 ]sic] officers over the last three, four days looking for this child. We could have had this conversation the very first time we met. She could have told me. She could have told me where [Hannah] was. She could have told me what [Hewett] did. We would have protected her and her family.In sum, the detective's testimony indicated that he had reservations about whether Hewett influenced appellant to remain silent about Hannah's death.
Appellant's counsel asked for a brief recess. Outside the jury's presence, counsel informed the trial court that Hewett had "a judgment for assault family violence, an information on assault family violence, a judgment on aggravated assault family violence, an information on assault family violence, an emergency protective order and another assault family violence," all "certified out of Harris County." Counsel stated, "Given your ruling, I take it that you're not going to let me get these into evidence, correct?" The trial court inquired as to the legal basis for admissibility, and counsel responded that the evidence "goes to solidify the theory that I have that she was acting under duress because he's got prior convictions for [family violence]." The State objected: "If they want to call the co-defendant to impeach him properly, then that would be [relevant]. But there is no basis for him to just offer in the criminal history of [a] person that's never been a witness in this - never been a testifying witness in this case." The State further objected that it was improper character conformity evidence and that Hewett's past convictions did not support appellant's duress defense because they did not show any threat of imminent harm to appellant by Hewett. After a brief conference outside the jury's presence, however, the trial court revisited its ruling:
THE COURT: What he's saying is that as the police officer up here has testified that he didn't really see the defense of duress or abuse, which is I believe a general characterization of what he said, that he wants to introduce, "Hey, you did know that he has multiple convictions that involve family violence." And I believe you've got a protective order involved in there, previous protective order?
[Appellant's counsel]: Not involving her. None of these --
THE COURT: Not involved with her, but he's trying to introduce, "Well, you just said that you don't see any family violence issues and yet, you know that here these cases are on this defendant."
. . . . I'm going to overrule your objection. I'm allowing it.
As Detective Wilson's cross-examination resumed, the detective agreed that Hewett had some convictions for "family violence related matters." Trial counsel showed the detective the purportedly certified copies of Hewett's convictions, and the detective agreed that they reflected "three judgments of assault family violence and one protective order," which were "indicative of cases or incidents he had involving women." Trial counsel then offered this evidence for admission, and the State reiterated its previous objections. The trial court held a brief bench conference and stated that, because counsel had impeached Detective Wilson's previous testimony, the documents themselves were not admissible. Appellant's trial counsel agreed, and the trial court did not admit the exhibits. When appellant's counsel attempted to question the detective further about the details of these convictions, the State objected on grounds of "improper impeachment," and the trial court sustained the State's objection.
The State clarified on re-direct examination that none of the family violence convictions involved appellant and that appellant specifically stated during her interviews with Detective Wilson that Hewett had neither threatened her nor instructed her not to say anything regarding Hannah.
C. Analysis
Appellant contends that "Defense Exhibits # 1, 3, 4 & 5 should have been admitted into evidence because they were self-authenticated. Pursuant to T.R.E. 901, certified copies of prior judgments are self-authenticating and no foundation is required for their admittance." Appellant urges that she was harmed by the trial court's exclusion of this evidence because "she was denied the right to show much more information through these exhibits," such as "the dates of convictions, whether Hewett was enhanced due to previous convictions, who the victims were in the Informations and in the protective Order and the date of the protective order."
Generally, to preserve error regarding a trial court's decision to exclude evidence, the complaining party must comply with Rule of Evidence 103 by making an offer of proof setting forth the substance of the proffered evidence. Mays v. State, 285 S.W.3d 884, 889 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Such an offer of proof may consist of a concise statement by counsel or it may be in question-and-answer form. Id. If in the form of a statement, the proffer "'must include a reasonably specific summary of the evidence and must state the relevance of the evidence unless the relevance is apparent, so that the court can determine whether the evidence is relevant and admissible.'" Id. (quoting Warner v. State, 969 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (per curiam)).
Appellant did not make an offer of proof showing the excluded evidence's substance. Appellant identified the exhibits as Hewett's prior family violence history involving women other than appellant and suggested that these records were admissible to support appellant's duress defense. But appellant did not include the documents themselves in our record as an offer of proof. Moreover, the excluded and allegedly harmful details contained in those documents do not appear in the record nor are they shown by any statements appellant's trial counsel made to the trial court. To be sure, appellant's counsel suggested that Hewett's prior convictions for family violence toward other unnamed women "solidified" the theory that appellant was acting under duress. But "this sort of summary, in the most general and cursory terms, without any of the meat of the actual evidence, will not suffice to preserve error." Id.; see also Holmes v. State, 323 S.W.3d 163, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) ("Here we must have what Rule 103(a)(2) requires: a record that shows the excluded evidence so that we can judge its admissibility and determine whether the trial court abused its discretion by excluding it."); Washington v. State, 567 S.W.3d 430, 447 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. ref'd). Accordingly, we conclude that appellant has not preserved her complaint.
We overrule appellant's first issue.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
In appellant's second issue, she asserts that her trial counsel was ineffective during the punishment phase in (1) failing to object to the introduction of an extraneous offense and (2) failing to request a limiting instruction.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
We examine claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under the familiar two-prong standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688 (1984). See Robinson v. State, 461 S.W.3d 194, 202 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. ref'd). Under Strickland, the defendant must prove that her trial counsel's representation was deficient and that the deficient performance was so serious that it deprived her of a fair trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Counsel's performance is deficient if it falls below an objective standard of reasonableness, based on prevailing professional norms. Id. at 688. The prejudice prong requires showing a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different but for trial counsel's deficient performance. Id. at 688-92.
Our review of trial counsel's representation is highly deferential and presumes that counsel's actions fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. See Garza v. State, 213 S.W.3d 338, 348 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Donald v. State, 543 S.W.3d 466, 477 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.). The Court of Criminal Appeals has also stated that if counsel has not had an opportunity to explain the challenged actions, we may not find deficient performance unless the conduct was "so outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in it." Goodspeed v. State, 187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
To argue successfully that trial counsel's failure to object amounted to ineffective assistance, appellant must show, at a minimum, that the trial court would have erred in overruling such an objection. See Prine v. State, 537 S.W.3d 113, 117-18 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); Orellana v. State, 489 S.W.3d 537, 549 (Tex. App.- Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. ref'd). The failure to object to admissible evidence is not ineffective assistance. Sifuentes v. State, 494 S.W.3d 806, 812 (Tex. App.- Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.).
B. Relevant Facts
During the punishment phase, the State elicited testimony from Hannah's biological father, Tabodrick Anderson, regarding text messages between him and appellant concerning appellant's use of "weed." The trial court admitted "screen grabs" of these text conversations. Appellant's counsel objected to their admission on authentication grounds, but the trial court overruled appellant's objection. In addition to admitting the screen grabs, the State elicited the following testimony from Anderson:
Q. And starting with 2:20, you say, At yo house obviously. And she replied?
A. Who got weed.
Q. You said, Don't know. And she said?
A. Really.
Q. And you said, you on yo way or not? Sorry I can't talk right now. You said it three times. Can I call you later? And she said?
A. We will never have sex again and you will never sleep in my house again.
Q. And then you replied, Not the sex. I can't sleep here. And then, it looks like on State's 215 she replies?
A. We are no longer cool and we are going to get along. If you try to make things hard for me with [Hannah], I will put you on child support. If you don't have money for me by the first for [Hannah, ] I will put you on child support.
Q. And you said, All behind weed, pot head. Stop texting. And she said.
A. You just ma[de] your baby mother your enemy, not smart.
Q. Then you replied, behind weed. Who cares? All I want is my daughter. Don't need you for that. And she replied?
A. I will be there when I have weed. . . . I will be there when I have weed. Then again, if you do not watch [Hannah], when I'm at work or try to make things --
Q. Then State's 216?
A. Then try to make things hard I will put you on child support.
Q. And then you said, Who? You will be home as soon as you find weed. Got it? Then she talks more about child support, and then you say, Sounds to me like you after a [pay]day. And then she replied?
A. I hope you turn your life around and do something one day so [Hannah] has a father to look up to.
Q. Then you said, looking as[s]?
A. When I get my degrees and find me a good man, we will look back and laugh.
Q. Then you responded with multiple emojis. Then you say, In the meantime find you some weed so you can then come home to your daughter who I'm with all the time. And then she responded how?
A. You completely fucked up with me. Now you can say I have my baby mama. She's a bitch and she's trying to make my life a living hell. And it will all be true. LOL. N[aa] she be with us.
Q. Then we're looking at State's 218. You responded, Never will I say that. Never always with me. With me now.
Then she responds how?
A. Ha ha. Always you will be too poor to care or to take care of her at my house, Loser.
Q. Then you said, Waiting to go to mine. Have you found some weed yet? And she responded?
A. Like I said, we will not -- we are not cool. You will see a different side of me and the way I treat you now. I hope this is better for you honestly. No LOL. LOL yeah. I know.
Q. Then you said, I grow tired of you. Goodbye now.
Then looking at State's 219. And again you had stated, I grow tired of you. Goodbye now?
A I'm not stupid[, ] haven't cared since I found out.
Q Then you said, . . . Seems like you're avoiding your daughter to get back at me because you can't find weed when I have to go
for orientation for this job soon, and you've spoke on making your life hard because you couldn't find weed. In fact, this is intentionally trying to make things harder, just so we are both clear who the real hateful is. Then she said?
A. Not reading that, but getting weed now, Boy.
Q. Then you responded?
A. Shaking my head.
Later, during closing argument, the State referred to Anderson's relationship with appellant: "Now, we heard from Tabodrick. It sounds like he has a pretty --had a pretty toxic relationship with his child's mother. And you know that's between them two. I showed you the texts between them just to show you what kind of mother she is. Using her child like a tool to get weed. That's what we're talking about here, that's what we're dealing with."
C. Analysis
Appellant contends that the quoted testimony from Anderson "was character conformity evidence and was prejudicial for the jury to hear prior to deciding what appellant's punishment would be." She complains that her counsel was ineffective for failing to object to this "character conformity evidence" under Texas Rule of Evidence 404(b), "which was harmful to appellant, and it surely cannot be construed as any trial strategy." She further contends that counsel "failed to object, failed to move for a mistrial, failed to request a Rule 403 T.R.E. balancing test, failed to request a limiting instruction at the time the evidence was admitted, and failed to have [a] hearing outside [the] presence of [the] jury."
During a trial's guilt-innocence phase, the State generally may not introduce evidence of bad acts similar to the charged offense to prevent an accused from being prosecuted for some collateral crime or misconduct. Roberts v. State, 29 S.W.3d 596, 600-01 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. ref'd). But evidence of extraneous crimes or bad acts may be admitted during the punishment phase of trial if the judge deems it relevant to sentencing. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 37.07, § 3(a)(1). A trial court has wide discretion in deciding the admissibility of evidence presented during a trial's punishment phase. See Humaran v. State, 478 S.W.3d 887, 904 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. ref'd). The broad wording of article 37.07 renders admissible, at the punishment phase, evidence that showed that appellant either used marijuana or possibly withheld custody of Hannah from Anderson until appellant obtained marijuana. Counsel's failure to object to admissible evidence is not ineffective assistance. See Sifuentes, 494 S.W.3d at 812-14 (holding that trial counsel's failure to object to admissible victim impact statement did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel).
Article 37.07 further provides, "After the introduction of such evidence has been concluded, and if the jury has the responsibility of assessing the punishment, the court shall give such additional written instructions as may be necessary and the order of procedure and the rules governing the conduct of the trial shall be the same as are applicable on the issue of guilt or innocence." Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 37.07, § 3(b). Here, the punishment charge reflects that the court included a limiting instruction concerning extraneous bad acts:
The State has introduced evidence of extraneous crimes or bad acts other than the one charged in the indictment in this case. You are instructed that if there is any evidence before you in this case regarding the Defendant's having committed offenses other than the offense alleged against her in the indictment in this case, you cannot consider said evidence for any purpose unless you find and believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant committed such other offenses, if any were committed. Furthermore, this evidence was admitted only for the purpose of assisting you, if it does, in determining the proper punishment for the offense for which you have found the Defendant guilty.
Because the court gave a limiting instruction to the jury, appellant has not shown that her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request such an instruction. See Lemons v. State, 426 S.W.3d 267, 274-75 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2013, pet. ref'd); see also Cate v. State, 124 S.W.3d 922, 927 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2004, pet. ref'd).
Appellant also asserts that her counsel was ineffective because the defense received no notice of the extraneous conduct that the State introduced at the punishment stage of trial. Although appellant would have been entitled to such notice under article 37.07, the State was only required to provide such notice if appellant timely filed a request for it. Autry v. State, 27 S.W.3d 177, 182 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, pet. ref'd) (citing Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 37.07 § 3(g)). The clerk's record does not contain any such request. It is possible that counsel received oral notice of the State's intent to introduce the evidence. See id. Appellant's counsel did not claim surprise by the text messages or Anderson's testimony, and appellant does not argue on appeal that her counsel would have taken different steps to rebut or object to the evidence had she received written notice of the extraneous bad acts. See id.; see also Loredo v. State, 157 S.W.3d 26, 31 (Tex. App.-Waco 2004, pet. ref'd) (in the absence of a showing of surprise or an explanation of different steps that would have been taken had counsel received written notice of extraneous bad acts, there was no showing of prejudice due to purported ineffective assistance in requesting such written notice).
Trial counsel's failure to file pre-trial motions generally does not result in ineffective assistance of counsel. See Willis v. State, 867 S.W.2d 852, 856 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, pet. ref'd).
In a case such as today's where no motion for new trial was filed, we must presume "that counsel had a strategy if any reasonably sound strategic motivation could be imagined." Lindsey v. State, 582 S.W.3d 810, 817 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist] 2019, no pet.). Counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to extraneous offense or bad acts evidence that was admissible during the punishment phase, and appellant has not otherwise shown that her trial counsel provided ineffective assistance.
We overrule appellant's second issue.
Conclusion
Having overruled both of appellant's issues, we affirm the trial court's judgment.