Christoffel v. United States

16 Citing cases

  1. Robinson v. United States

    335 F.2d 975 (D.C. Cir. 1964)

    Parole was granted and appellant was at liberty for approximately two years and was then returned to prison for parole violation. Appellant relies primarily upon Belton v. United States, 104 U.S.App.D.C. 81, 259 F.2d 811 (1958), Christoffel v. United States, 88 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 4, 190 F.2d 585, 588 (1951), and Blunt v. United States, 100 U.S.App.D.C. 266, 244 F.2d 355 (1957). Each of these cases is distinguishable in at least one very crucial aspect from the instant case in that as to each this court had jurisdiction by virtue of a pending direct appeal; that is not true here.

  2. Belton v. United States

    259 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1958)   Cited 31 times
    In Belton v. United States, 104 U.S. App.D.C. 81, 259 F.2d 811 (1958), we considered a strikingly similar error so prejudicial as to require reversal even though more than ten years had passed since the commission of the crime charged.

    " Christoffel v. United States, 88 U.S.App. D.C. 1, 6, 190 F.2d 585, 590. Chief Judge Stephens quoted the Supreme Court's reference in Forte v. United States, 1937, 302 U.S. 220, 223-224, 58 S.Ct. 180, 182, 82 L.Ed. 209, to the "full responsibility" of the Court of Appeals "for the exercise of a reasonable control over all the proceedings relating to the appeal," and said that the court lost none of its power to determine what the interests of justice required "by reason of the fact that the question [of conformity to the rules] was not brought to its attention until the court had heard argument and reached a decision upon the assumption" that procedural requirements had been met.

  3. People of Territory of Guam v. Reyes

    800 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1986)   Cited 6 times

    The right of an individual to a hearing on the merits of his appeal from a judgment imposing years of imprisonment, as in the matter before us, is a precious entitlement, so long recognized in our law that no elaboration is necessary to explain that it is a favored policy in a democratic society. The District of Columbia Circuit in Christoffel v. United States, 190 F.2d 585 (D.C.Cir. 1950) well expressed the concern that we should accord an individual convicted of a criminal offense the right to a hearing on the merits of his appeal notwithstanding his attorney's disregard of the rules of appellate procedure. The court stated in Christoffel:

  4. United States ex rel. Smith v. DiBella

    314 F. Supp. 446 (D. Conn. 1970)   Cited 7 times
    Holding that rigid adherence to a state procedural rule, which required an appellant to submit a motion to correct a trial court's findings within two weeks after the findings are filed, was "so lacking in fundamental fairness as to constitute `a miscarriage of justice which should not be permitted to occur.'"

    What more can a defendant do than to entrust his rights to an officer of the court?' 9 Moore's Federal Practice P204.19 (1969).         See also, Morris v. Florida, 393 U.S. 850, 89 S.Ct. 84, 21 L.Ed.2d 120 (1968) (dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black); Berman v. United States, 378 U.S. 530, 84 S.Ct. 1895, 12 L.Ed.2d 1012 (1964) (dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black); Christoffel v. United States, 88 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 190 F.2d 585 (1950).         In cases where an actual finding of lack of effective assistance of counsel has been made, courts have held that

  5. Lee v. Kemna

    213 F.3d 1037 (8th Cir. 2000)   Cited 23 times   3 Legal Analyses

    A review of case law reveals instances in which federal courts have found the state interest furthered by the rule in question was not adequate to bar federal habeas claims, because that state interest had already been fulfilled. See Smart v. Scully, 787 F.2d 816, 820 (2d Cir. 1986); see also Caston v. Costello, 74 F. Supp.2d 262, 274 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that a state appellate court's application of the "contemporaneous objection rule" did not preclude habeas review); United States ex re. Smith v. DiBella, 314 F. Supp. 446, 447 (D.Conn. 1970) (holding that rigid adherence to a state procedural rule, which required an appellant to submit a motion to correct a trial court's findings within two weeks after the findings are filed, was "so lacking in fundamental fairness as to constitute `a miscarriage of justice which should not be permitted to occur.'") (quoting Christoffel v. United States, 190 F.2d 585, 594 (D.C. Cir. 1950)). This line of authorities is exemplified by the decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Smart, 787 F.2d 816.

  6. U.S. v. Hashagen

    816 F.2d 899 (3d Cir. 1987)   Cited 29 times
    In Hashagen the appeal challenged rulings made prior to or at the trial so that the matters in dispute on the appeal were settled in the district court before the appeal was filed.

    For if the conviction is erroneous it is abhorrent to justice that a defendant shall nevertheless suffer such a penalty for the crime charged.Blunt v. United States, 244 F.2d 355, 361 (D.C.Cir. 1957); Christoffel v. United States, 190 F.2d 585, 590 (D.C.Cir. 1950). This interest in fair play, however, must also account for considerations of effective prosecution.

  7. Matter of Morrow

    564 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1977)   Cited 16 times
    Interpreting former Rule 802(c)

    Moreover, the clear holdings of cases under Rule 4, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, and its predecessor Rule 73 F.R.C.P., from which Rule 802(c) is derived, are that counsel's workload does not permit a finding of excusable neglect. See Files v. City of Rockford, 440 F.2d 811 (7 Cir. 1971); United States v. Bowen, 310 F.2d 45 (5 Cir. 1962); Tucker Products Corporation v. Helms, 171 F.2d 126 (9 Cir. 1948); Christoffel v. United States, 88 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 190 F.2d 585 (1950); Citizens Protective League v. Clark, 85 U.S.App.D.C. 282, 178 F.2d 703 (1950); Maghan v. Young, 80 U.S.App.D.C. 395, 154 F.2d 13 (1946). The Rules of Civil Procedure apply to the Bankruptcy Rules of Procedure.

  8. Stewart v. Bishop

    403 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1968)   Cited 28 times
    Questioning appellate jurisdiction in cases where district court did not rule on all claims raised by petitioner

    However, this court then ordered that "although" the appeal was premature, "upon due consideration" the "appeal would be held in abeyance" until a final order had been entered by the trial judge. This was fully within the discretion of a court of appeals to do. Cf. Lemke v. United States, 346 U.S. 325, 74 S.Ct. 1, 98 L.Ed. 3 (1953); Pryamid Motor Freight Corp. v. Ispass, 330 U.S. 695, 67 S.Ct. 954, 91 L.Ed. 1184 (1947); Stumpf v. Matthews, 89 U.S.App.D.C. 231, 195 F.2d 25 (1951); Christoffel v. United States, 88 U.S.App.D.C., 1, 190 F.2d 585, 588 (1951) (on reconsideration). Thus, petitioner's counsel was originally led to believe that although his notice of appeal was premature, it would be held in abeyance until a final order was entered by the district court, at which time a timely appeal would lie. This court did not dismiss the appeal. If the intent of the court was that counsel should file a new notice of appeal it would have dismissed the appeal rather than holding it in abeyance.

  9. Winter v. Crowley

    374 F.2d 317 (D.C. Cir. 1967)   Cited 11 times
    In Winter v. Crowley, 126 U.S.App.D.C. 103, 374 F.2d 317 (1967), the circuit court held that a change in circumstances considered by the earlier court as a basis for the custody decree requires the court to hear testimony and determine anew the question of custody.

    Foster Freed, Child Custody, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 423, 615, at 627 (1964). If possible, appeals involving liberty should not be allowed to lapse for procedural deficiencies. See Stumpf v. Matthews, 89 U.S.App.D.C. 231, 195 F.2d 25 (1951); Christoffel v. United States, 88 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 4, 190 F.2d 585, 588 (1951) (On Reconsideration). The same is true of appeals involving custody of children.

  10. Reid v. United States

    282 F.2d 293 (D.C. Cir. 1960)

    This court has the discretion to vacate its previous order, Belton v. United States, 104 U.S.App.D.C. 81, 259 F.2d 811; Blunt v. United States, 100 U.S. App.D.C. 266, 244 F.2d 355 and in similar circumstances has done so to avoid a miscarriage of justice, see Evans v. United States, 107 U.S.App.D.C. 324, 277 F.2d 354. In my opinion the proper administration of criminal justice requires that we not deny petitioner's present application if the case presents a question that is not plainly frivolous, see Christoffel v. United States, 88 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 10, 190 F.2d 585, 594. To determine whether such a question exists I would hold the petition in abeyance and appoint counsel to assist petitioner in making that showing, Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674, 78 S.Ct. 974, 2 L.Ed.2d 1060.