Plaintiff next argues that a contract should be construed to favor the party it was designed to protect, and I agree that this is the law. Christmas v. Cooley, (1965) 158 Colo. 297, 406 P.2d 333. With unfailing aim, plaintiff says the provision was intended to protect plaintiff, but the evidence just as easily supports the opposite conclusion. The evidence established to my satisfaction that the party to be protected was the takeout lender who was required to keep a couple of million dollars on hand for use by the borrower if he decided to make claim for the takeout loan. [Remember, there was no requirement that the borrower had to use Unisal's money if a better loan could be located elsewhere.] I think that one party to be protected was the takeout lender, and, at the very worst, it can't be said that only the borrower had any chips in the game.
"To ascertain whether certain provisions of an agreement are ambiguous, the language used must be examined and construed in harmony with the plain and generally accepted meaning of the words employed and by reference to all the parts and provisions of the agreement and the nature of the transaction which forms its subject matter." Christmas v. Cooley , 158 Colo. 297, 406 P.2d 333, 335 (1965). But, even if ambiguous, where a doubt exists as to the proper construction of a given clause, "a contract is construed most strongly against the drafter."
To ascertain whether certain provisions of a contract are ambiguous, "the language used therein must be examined and construed in harmony with the plain and generally accepted meaning of the words employed and by reference to all the parts and provisions of the agreement and the nature of the transaction which forms its subject matter." Christmas v. Cooley, 158 Colo. 297, 301, 406 P.2d 333, 335 (1965). A document is ambiguous "when it is reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning."
To ascertain whether certain provisions of an agreement are ambiguous, the language used must be examined and construed in harmony with the plain, popular, and generally accepted meaning of the words employed and with reference to all provisions of the document. See Florom v. Elliott Mfg., 867 F.2d 570, 575 (10th Cir. 1989); Christmas v. Cooley, 158 Colo. 297, 301, 406 P.2d 333, 336 (1965); Ray L. Atchison Constr. Co. v. Sossaman, 717 P.2d 988, 989 (Colo.App. 1985). Surface water is water from melted snow, falling rain, or rising springs, lying or flowing naturally on the earth's surface, not gathering into or forming any more definite body of water than a mere bog, swamp, slough, or marsh, and lost by percolation, evaporation or natural drainage.
The nature of the transaction which forms the contract subject matter must also be considered." In re Marriage of Thompson, 802 P.2d 1189, 1190 (Colo.Ct.App. 1990); accord Radiology ProfessionalCorp. v. Trinidad Area Health Ass'n, 195 Colo. 253, 577 P.2d 748 (1978); Christmas v. Cooley, 158 Colo. 297, 406 P.2d 333, 335 (1965). We agree with the district court that under this standard the term "master drainage plan" is ambiguous.
It is generally recognized in contract cases that any ambiguity or provision of doubtful meaning is construed against the party who wrote the contract. Christmas v. Cooley, 158 Colo. 297, 406 P.2d 333 (1965); Aleksich v. Mutual Benefit Health Accident Ass'n, 118 Mont. 223, 164 P.2d 372 (1945); Lilley-Ames Co. v. United States, 293 F.2d 630, 632, 154 Ct.Cl. 544, 548 (1961). This frequently arises in insurance policies, which have been the basis of a great deal of litigation.
Even if Premier were able to squeeze ambiguity out of these minutes, Colorado law would require this Court to construe the contract amendment against Premier as the party who drafted it. SeeChristmas v. Cooley , 158 Colo. 297, 406 P.2d 333, 336 (1965). With IMM's entitlement to its 2014 payments firmly established, the question arises of what to do about IMM's 2015 payments.
To ascertain whether a certain provision is ambiguous, “the instrument's language must be examined and construed in harmony with the plain and generally accepted meaning of the words employed, and reference must be made to all the provisions of the agreement.” Radiology Professional Corp. v. Trinidad Area Health Ass'n, 195 Colo. 253, 256, 577 P.2d 748, 750 (1978) (citingChristmas v. Cooley, 158 Colo. 297, 406 P.2d 333 (1965) ). While exclusionary clauses exempting the insurer from providing coverage in certain circumstances must be written in clear and specific language and construed in favor of coverage, a court may not add, delete, or rewrite terms to extend coverage. McGowan v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 100 P.3d 521, 523 (Colo.App.2004).
To ascertain whether a certain provision is ambiguous, "the instrument's language must be examined and construed in harmony with the plain and generally accepted meaning of the words employed, and reference must be made to all the provisions of the agreement." Radiology Professional Corp. v. Trinidad Area Health Ass'n, 195 Colo. 253, 256, 577 P.2d 748, 750 (1978)(citing Christmas v. Cooley, 158 Colo. 297, 406 P.2d 333 (1965)). While exclusionary clauses exempting the insurer from providing coverage in certain circumstances must be written in clear and specific language and construed in favor of coverage, a court may not add, delete, or rewrite terms to extend coverage.
To ascertain whether a certain provision is ambiguous, “the instrument's language must be examined and construed in harmony with the plain and generally accepted meaning of the words employed, and reference must be made to all the provisions of the agreement.” Radiology Professional Corp. v. Trinidad Area Health Ass'n, 195 Colo. 253, 256, 577 P.2d 748, 750 (1978) (citing Christmas v. Cooley, 158 Colo. 297, 406 P.2d 333 (1965)). Not only should strained constructions be avoided in favor of common constructions, but technical and legal definitions should also be avoided.