Opinion
F062492 Super. Ct. No. 10CEJ300263-1
08-11-2011
CHRISTINA O., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FRESNO COUNTY, Respondent; FRESNO COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, Real Party in Interest.
Judith Sanders, for Petitioner. No appearance for Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
OPINION
THE COURT
Before Cornell, Acting P.J., Gomes, J. and Detjen, J.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING; petition for extraordinary writ review. Mary Dolas, Commissioner.
Judith Sanders, for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Petitioner seeks an extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452) from the juvenile court's orders issued at a contested six-month review hearing terminating reunification services and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing as to her daughter Miranda. We will deny the petition.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
Petitioner and Grant, an unmarried couple, are the parents of Miranda who was one year old when these dependency proceedings were initiated in March 2010. At that time, the household consisted of petitioner, Grant, Miranda and Grant's three-year-old son, Miguel. Grant also has two older children who were placed for adoption after he failed to reunify with them.
Grant did not file a writ petition.
Though petitioner initiated these dependency proceedings, Grant's history and circumstances factor significantly in this case because he and petitioner remained an intact couple throughout these proceedings. In 2000, Grant was arrested for child endangerment after he caused his then four-year-old daughter to break both of her legs. He had stolen some food and was running from authorities while pushing his children in a stroller. During the pursuit, the stroller broke and his daughter was injured. The Merced County Human Services Agency (agency) took the children into protective custody and Grant was ordered to undergo two psychological evaluations. Both psychologists diagnosed Grant as having chronic mental health conditions that impaired his ability to parent and rendered him incapable of benefitting from reunification services.
In March 2010, Merced County Sheriff's deputies responded to an altercation between petitioner and Grant. During the altercation, petitioner cut her wrist with a kitchen knife and had to be involuntarily admitted for psychiatric treatment. Grant was arrested for misdemeanor domestic violence. During the arrest, he became physically violent and had to be restrained by three deputies. Miguel and Miranda, then three years old and one year old respectively, were taken into protective custody by the agency and placed in foster care. Since Miranda is the sole subject of this writ petition, our summary of the facts will address her only.
In April 2010, the juvenile court adjudged Miranda a dependent child pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b) (failure to protect) and set a dispositional hearing which was ultimately conducted the following August. Meanwhile, petitioner and Grant relocated to Fresno County. They also completed psychological evaluations in May. The psychologist who evaluated Grant opined that Grant suffers from chronic mental disabilities that are unlikely to change and that render him unable to parent his children or benefit from reunification services. The psychologist who evaluated petitioner characterized her as "passive-dependent" and stated that petitioner refused to admit that Grant had been violent despite his well-documented history of abuse and instability. The psychologist opined that petitioner had a limited grasp of domestic violence and did not want to disrupt her relationship with Grant by critically evaluating his abusive behavior. The psychologist concluded that petitioner could benefit from reunification services and recommended that petitioner separate from Grant, participate in weekly long-term individual therapy, continue her education, visit Miranda separately from Grant and complete a 12-week parenting course.
In July 2010, Grant was evaluated by another psychologist who proposed that Grant might benefit from reunification services if he accepted the existence of his mental disability and treated it with medication.
In August 2010, at the dispositional hearing, the juvenile court ordered Miranda removed from petitioner and Grant's custody and ordered them to participate in a plan of reunification. Petitioner's reunification plan required her to participate in individual therapy and complete a parenting program. Grant's plan required him to complete mental health and anger management assessments, including following any recommendations, and complete a parenting program. The court set an interim review hearing for December 2010 and a six-month review hearing for February 2011.
By December 2010, petitioner had completed a parenting course and was participating in weekly therapy. Grant was attending parenting classes and anger management sessions but denied having any mental health problems and refused to pursue mental health treatment. In its report for the interim review hearing, the agency recommended the court continue services for them and transfer the case to Fresno.
In January 2011, the Fresno County juvenile court (juvenile court) accepted the case from Merced County and ordered the Fresno County Department of Social Services (department) to offer petitioner and Grant the services previously ordered with the added requirement that petitioner complete domestic violence and mental health evaluations and any recommended treatment.
In February 2011, the department submitted its report for the six-month review hearing set for that month. By that time, Miranda and Miguel had been placed with petitioner's relatives who were willing to adopt the children if reunification failed. The department reported that petitioner and Grant were participating in their reunifications services plans but that Grant was not committed to completing his plan. The department recommended the juvenile court continue reunification services for them at the six-month review hearing.
Minor's counsel objected to the department's recommendation and the six-month review hearing was continued and set as a contested hearing.
Meanwhile, petitioner completed a domestic violence assessment. She tested within the low range on the domestic violence inventory, indicating that she is not violence-oriented and does not have serious control problems. Despite those results, the evaluator recommended that she complete an anger management program.
Petitioner also completed a mental health evaluation. The evaluating clinician reported that she displayed significant sadness, anxiety, and dependence and expressed remorse about causing Miranda's removal by participating in domestic violence. The clinician also reported that petitioner was unemployed and socially isolated and that her support system was minimal. He opined that petitioner would benefit from skills training, advanced education, and job placement.
In March 2011, petitioner's therapist responded to a request by petitioner's attorney for an update on petitioner's progress. In a letter dated March 30, 2011, the therapist reported that petitioner was making progress in treatment and would benefit from ongoing therapy and reunification efforts with Miranda. The therapist stated that treatment included recognizing and understanding the cycle of domestic violence. Petitioner denied there was domestic violence in her relationship with Grant but acknowledged that communication issues and problems in the relationship led to her self-mutilation. The therapist also addressed petitioner's decision to remain with Grant and the possible consequences if she left him. Petitioner was prepared to leave Grant in order to regain custody of Miranda but expressed concern about the financial hardship that would result. The therapist advised petitioner's attorney that if the juvenile court or the department believed petitioner needed to separate from Grant, then she would need financial assistance and help obtaining housing.
In May 2011, the department filed an addendum report recommending the juvenile court terminate petitioner and Grant's reunification services because of Grant's resistance to treatment and petitioner's ongoing relationship with him and denial that domestic violence existed in the relationship. To that end, the department proposed that the court find that petitioner was provided reasonable services but did not participate regularly in her court-ordered services and made moderate progress in alleviating the problem necessitating Miranda's removal.
Also in May 2011, the juvenile court conducted the contested six-month review hearing. After hearing testimony, including that of the social worker, the court found that Miranda could not be safely returned to petitioner and Grant's custody. The court also found that the department provided petitioner and Grant reasonable reunification services but that they failed to regularly participate in them and make substantive progress. Consequently, the court terminated their reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing. This petition ensued.
DISCUSSION
Termination of Reunification Services at the Six-Month Review Hearing
Petitioner contends there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's findings that she failed to regularly participate and make substantive progress in her court-ordered services and that she was provided reasonable reunification services. Therefore, she further contends, the court erred in terminating her reunification services.
Section 366.21, subdivision (e) governs the proceedings at the six-month review hearing. Where, as here, the child was under the age of three when initially removed and the juvenile court determines that the child cannot be safely returned to parental custody, the court may schedule a section 366.26 hearing if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent failed to participate regularly and make substantive progress in a court-ordered treatment plan. If, however, the court finds that the parent was not provided reasonable services, the court must continue the case to the 12-month review hearing. (§ 366.21, subd. (e).)
Section 366.21, subdivision (e) also requires the juvenile court to continue services to the 12-month review hearing if it finds there is a substantial probability the child will be returned to parental custody within six months. However, petitioner does not argue there was a substantial probability of return.
We review the juvenile court's findings and orders for substantial evidence. (In re Brison C. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1373, 1378-1379.) In so doing, we draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the court's rulings and affirm them if supported by substantial evidence even if other evidence supports a contrary conclusion. (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 947.) Petitioner bears the burden of showing that the finding or order is not supported by substantial evidence. (Ibid.)
On the facts of this record and for the reasons discussed below, we affirm the juvenile court's findings and order terminating petitioner's reunification services.
A. Regular Participation and Substantive Progress
Petitioner contends she fully complied with her court-ordered services, citing evidence that she completed a parenting program, mental health and domestic violence evaluations, and participated in individual therapy. In light of such evidence, she argues, the juvenile court erred in finding she failed to regularly participate and make substantive progress in her court-ordered services.
As stated above, our focus on review is not to determine whether there is evidence that would support a contrary finding. Rather, we examine the record to determine whether substantial evidence supports the finding that was made.
In this case, the juvenile court acknowledged that petitioner participated in her reunification services but concluded that she chose to remain in an unhealthy relationship with Grant rather than separate from him and establish a better life for herself and Miranda. In the court's view, petitioner's resistance and lack of growth evidenced a failure to regularly participate and make substantive progress in her services plan. We concur and conclude substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's finding.
Under the circumstances, the juvenile court could properly terminate services and schedule a section 366.26 hearing unless it found that petitioner was not provided reasonable services. In this case, the court found that she was provided reasonable services and we agree.
B. Reasonableness of Services
Petitioner contends that the department made no effort to help her separate from Grant even though it knew she needed such assistance. Its failure to do so, she further contends, was unreasonable. Therefore, she argues, the juvenile court erred in finding that she was provided reasonable services.
The purpose of reunification services is to correct the conditions that led to removal of the dependent child. (In re Joanna Y. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 433, 438.) To that end, they must put the family on notice as to what must be accomplished to reunite the family and be specifically tailored to eliminate those conditions. (In re Dino E. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1768, 1777.) Moreover, the department must make a good faith effort to implement the reunification plan. (In re John B. (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 268, 275.)
Reunification services need not be perfect to be reasonable. The "standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might have been provided, but whether they were reasonable under the circumstances. [Citation.]" (Elijah R. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 965, 969.) Further, a parent is presumed capable of complying with a reasonable services plan. (In re Christina L. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 404, 415.)
Here, petitioner knew that Miranda was removed from her custody because Grant was mentally unstable and because she and Grant exposed Miranda to domestic violence. Therefore, she was on notice that she needed to eliminate the danger her circumstances posed to Miranda if she wanted to reunify with her. Further, the court provided her individual therapy to gain insight into, and decide how to eliminate, domestic violence from her family. However, after many months of therapy, petitioner had little understanding of domestic violence and denied that she and Grant engaged in it. In addition, she had no plan to separate from Grant even though it was apparent that she would not reunify with Miranda unless she did.
As to the department's efforts, petitioner correctly states that the social worker did not provide any assistance that would enable her to separate from Grant. The social worker testified to that effect at the hearing. She also testified that petitioner did not ask for such assistance. Perhaps under ideal circumstances, the social worker would have encouraged and facilitated petitioner's separation from Grant. Nevertheless, the social worker's failure to do so is not unreasonable given petitioner's denial of the domestic violence and reticence about leaving Grant. We conclude substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's reasonable services finding.
Having concluded petitioner was provided reasonable reunification services, we affirm the juvenile court's orders terminating petitioner's reunification services and setting the section 366.26 hearing.
DISPOSITION
The petition for extraordinary writ is denied. This opinion is final forthwith as to this court.