Opinion
Civil Action 4:22-CV-521
07-24-2023
CHRISTINA L.,[1] Plaintiff v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration Defendant
MANNION, D.J.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
William I. Arbuckle, U.S. Magistrate Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Christina L., an adult who lives in the Middle District of Pennsylvania, seeks judicial review of the final decision of the Acting Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §405(g) and 42 U.S.C. §1383(c)(3).
This matter has been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge to issue a report and recommendation. After reviewing the parties' briefs, the Commissioner's final decision, and the relevant portions of the certified administrative transcript, we find the Commissioner's final decision is not supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commissioner's final decision be VACATED and this case be REMANDED for further proceedings.
II. BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On July 15, 2019, Plaintiff protectively filed applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. (Admin. Tr. 11; Doc. 12-2, p. 12). In these applications, Plaintiff alleged she became disabled on May 17, 2019, due to the following conditions: bipolar disorder I, asthma, generalized anxiety disorder, hypertension, panic disorder without agoraphobia, severe recurrent major depression, dysthymia (persistent depressive disorder), and fatigue. (Admin. Tr. 229; Doc. 12-6, p. 3). Plaintiff alleges that the combination of these conditions affects her ability to squat, bend, stand, sit, kneel, complete tasks, concentrate, and understand. (Admin. Tr. 256; Doc. 12-6, p. 30). Plaintiff also alleges that these conditions affect her memory. Id. Plaintiff completed high school and attended three years of college. (Admin. Tr. 230; Doc. 12-6, p. 4). Before the onset of her impairments, Plaintiff worked as a “psychiatric aide, teacher's aide, bindery worker, and laborer, stores.” (Admin. Tr. 20; Doc. 12-2, p. 21).
On November 27, 2019, Plaintiff's applications were denied at the initial level of administrative review. (Admin. Tr. 11; Doc. 12-2, p. 12). On June 11, 2020, Plaintiff's applications were denied on reconsideration. Id. On July 1, 2020, Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing. Id.
On October 2, 2020, Plaintiff, assisted by her counsel, appeared and testified during a hearing before Administrative Law Judge Theodore Burock (the “ALJ”). (Admin. Tr. 11, 21; Doc. Doc. 12-2, pp. 12, 22). On November 17, 2020, the ALJ issued a decision denying Plaintiff's applications for benefits. (Admin. Tr. 21; Doc. 12-2, p. 22). On January 20, 2021, Plaintiff requested that the Appeals Council of the Office of Disability Adjudication and Review (“Appeals Council”) review the ALJ's decision. (Admin. Tr. 202; Doc. 12-4, p. 76). Along with her request, Plaintiff submitted a medication list from Walmart dated November 27, 2018, to February 27, 2020, that was not available to the ALJ when his decision was issued. (Admin. Tr. 2; Doc. 12-2, p. 3).
On February 3, 2022, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review. (Admin. Tr. 1-4; Doc. 12-2, pp. 2-5).
On April 8, 2022, Plaintiff filed a complaint in the district court. (Doc. 1). In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ's decision denying her applications is incorrect and is not supported by substantial evidence. (Doc. 1, ¶ 13). As relief, Plaintiff requests that the Court reverse the ALJ's decision and award benefits, or in the alternative remand this matter for a new administrative hearing. (Doc. 1, ¶ 14).
On July 9, 2021, the Commissioner filed an answer. (Doc. 11). In the answer, the Commissioner maintains that the decision denying Plaintiff's is correct and is supported by substantial evidence. (Doc. 11, ¶ 9). Along with her answer, the Commissioner filed a certified transcript of the administrative record. (Doc. 12).
Plaintiff's Brief (Doc. 13), the Commissioner's Brief (Doc. 14), and Plaintiff's Reply (Doc. 15) have been filed. This matter is now ready to decide.
III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Before delving into the merits of this case, it is helpful to restate the legal principles governing judicial review of social security appeals, and the five-step sequential evaluation process. We will also discuss the framework for an ALJ's evaluation of a claimant's symptoms because it is relevant to the arguments raised in this case.
A. Substantial Evidence Review - the Role of This Court
A district court's review of ALJ decisions in social security cases is limited to the question of whether substantial evidence supports the findings of the final decision-maker. Substantial evidence “does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance of the evidence but more than a mere scintilla. A single piece of evidence is not substantial evidence if the ALJ ignores countervailing evidence or fails to resolve a conflict created by the evidence. But in an adequately developed factual record, substantial evidence may be “something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [the ALJ's decision] from being supported by substantial evidence.” In determining if the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) the court may consider any evidence that was presented to the ALJ.
See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3); Johnson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 200 (3d Cir. 2008); Ficca v. Astrue, 901 F.Supp.2d 533, 536 (M.D. Pa. 2012).
Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988).
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971).
Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir. 1993).
Consolo v. Fed. Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966).
Matthews v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 589, 593 (3d Cir. 2001) (“when the Appeals Council has denied review the district court may affirm, modify, or reverse the Commissioner's decision, with or without a remand based on the record that was made before the ALJ (Sentence Four review).”). The claimant and Commissioner are obligated to support each contention in the argument section of their briefs with s reference to the record where appropriate. L.R. 83.40.4; United States v. Claxton, 766 F.3d 280, 307 (3d Cir. 2014) (“parties . . . bear the responsibility to comb the record and point the Court to the facts that support their arguments.”); Ciongoli v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 15-7449, 2016 WL 6821085 (D.N.J. Nov. 16, 2016) (noting that it is not the Court's role to comb the record hunting for evidence that the ALJ overlooked).
The Supreme Court has underscored the limited scope of district court review in this field, noting that:
The phrase “substantial evidence” is a “term of art” used throughout administrative law to describe how courts are to review agency factfinding. T-Mobile South, LLC v. Roswell, 574 U.S. __, __, 135 S.Ct. 808, 815, 190 L.Ed.2d 679 (2015). Under the substantial-evidence standard, a court looks to an existing administrative record and asks whether it contains “sufficien[t] evidence” to support the agency's factual determinations. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938) (emphasis deleted). And whatever the meaning of “substantial” in other contexts, the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high. Substantial evidence, this Court has said, is “more than a mere scintilla.” Ibid.; see, e.g., Perales, 402 U.S. at 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420 (internal quotation marks omitted). It means-and means only-“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Consolidated Edison, 305 U.S. at 229, 59 S.Ct. 206. See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 153, 119 S.Ct. 1816, 144 L.Ed.2d 143 (1999) (comparing the substantial-evidence standard to the deferential clearly-erroneous standard).
Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019).
To determine whether substantial evidence supports the final decision, the court must decide not only whether “more than a scintilla” of evidence supports the ALJ's findings, but also whether those findings were made based on a correct application of the law. In doing so, however, the court is enjoined to refrain from trying to re-weigh evidence and “must not substitute [its] own judgment for that of the fact finder.”
See Arnold v. Colvin, No. 3:12-CV-02417, 2014 WL 940205, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2014) (“[I]t has been held that an ALJ's errors of law denote a lack of substantial evidence.”) (alterations omitted); Burton v. Schweiker, 512 F.Supp. 913, 914 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (“The Secretary's determination as to the status of a claim requires the correct application of the law to the facts.”); see also Wright v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 675, 678 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that the scope of review on legal matters is plenary); Ficca v. Astrue, 901 F.Supp.2d 533, 536 (M.D. Pa. 2012) (“[T]he court has plenary review of all legal issues . . . .”).
Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 611 (3d Cir. 2014).
Furthermore, meaningful review cannot occur unless the final decision is adequately explained. As the Court of Appeals has noted on this score:
In Burnett, we held that an ALJ must clearly set forth the reasons for his decision. 220 F.3d at 119. Conclusory statements . . . are insufficient. The ALJ must provide a “discussion of the evidence” and an “explanation of reasoning” for his conclusion sufficient to enable judicial review. Id. at 120; see Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 505 & n. 3 (3d Cir. 2004). The ALJ, of course, need not employ particular “magic” words: “Burnett does not require the ALJ to use particular language or adhere to a particular format in conducting his analysis.” Jones, 364 F.3d at 505.
Diaz v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 577 F.3d 500, 504 (3d Cir. 2009).
B. Standards Governing the ALJ's Application of The Five-Step Sequential Evaluation Process
To receive benefits under the Social Security Act by reason of disability, a claimant must demonstrate an inability to “engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” To satisfy this requirement, a claimant must have a severe physical or mental impairment that makes it impossible to do his or her previous work or any other substantial gainful activity that exists in the national economy. To receive benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, a claimant must show that he or she contributed to the insurance program, is under retirement age, and became disabled prior to the date on which he or she was last insured. Unlike disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, “[i]nsured status is irrelevant in determining a claimant's eligibility for supplemental security income benefits” under Title XVI of the Social Security Act.In making this determination at the administrative level, the ALJ follows a five-step sequential evaluation process. Under this process, the ALJ must sequentially determine: (1) whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) whether the claimant's impairment meets or equals a listed impairment; (4) whether the claimant is able to do his or her past relevant work; and (5) whether the claimant is able to do any other work, considering his or her age, education, work experience and residual functional capacity (“RFC”).
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a); 20 C.F.R. § 416.905(a).
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a); 20 C.F.R. § 416.905(a).
Snyder v. Colvin, No. 3:16-CV-01689, 2017 WL 1078330, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 22, 2017).
Between steps three and four, the ALJ must also assess a claimant's RFC. RFC is defined as “that which an individual is still able to do despite the limitations caused by his or her impairment(s).” In making this assessment, the ALJ considers all the claimant's medically determinable impairments, including any non-severe impairments identified by the ALJ at step two of his or her analysis.
Burnett v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 121 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e); 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1).
At steps one through four, the claimant bears the initial burden of demonstrating the existence of a medically determinable impairment that prevents him or her from engaging in any of his or her past relevant work. Once this burden has been met by the claimant, it shifts to the Commissioner at step five to show that jobs exist in significant number in the national economy that the claimant could perform that are consistent with the claimant's age, education, work experience and RFC.
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5); 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(H)(i) (incorporating 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5) by reference); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512; 20 C.F.R. § 416.912; Mason, 994 F.2d at 1064.
C. Standards Governing An ALJ's Symptom Evaluation
In social security cases, “symptoms” are defined as the claimant's “own description of [his or her] physical or mental impairment.” The Social Security Regulations and Rulings set out a two-step process to evaluate a claimant's symptoms.
First, the ALJ must consider whether there is an underlying medically determinable impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the claimant's symptoms. If there is no medically determinable impairment, or if there is a medically determinable impairment but that impairment could not reasonably be expected to produce the claimant's symptoms, an ALJ will not find that those symptoms affect the claimant's ability to perform work-related activities. An ALJ does not consider whether the severity of an individual's symptoms is supported by the objective medical evidence at the first step of this analysis.
SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304 at *4.
SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304 at *3.
Second, the ALJ must evaluate the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the symptoms caused by the claimant's medically determinable impairments. SSR 16-3p explains:
If an individual's statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of symptoms are consistent with the objective medical evidence and the other evidence of record, we will determine that the individual's symptoms are more likely to reduce his or her capacities to perform work-related activities for an adult. . . . In contrast, if an individual's statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of symptoms are inconsistent with the objective medical evidence and the other evidence, we will determine that the individual's symptoms are less likely to reduce his or her capacities to perform work-related activities or abilities to function independently, appropriately, and effectively in an age-appropriate manner.
We may or may not find an individual's symptoms and related limitations consistent with the evidence in his or her record. We will explain which of an individual's symptoms we found consistent or inconsistent with the evidence in his or her record and how our evaluation of the individual's symptoms led to our conclusions. We will evaluate an individual's symptoms considering all the evidence in his or her record.
2017 WL 5180304 at *8.
When evaluating a claimant's symptoms, an ALJ considers objective evidence, a claimant's statements about the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of his or her symptoms, statements made by medical sources in opinions and treatment records, and statements about a claimant's symptoms made by non-medical sources. This evidence is evaluated based on the following factors:
(1) the claimant's daily activities;
(2) the location, duration, frequency, and intensity of the claimant's pain or other symptoms;
(3) any factor that precipitates or aggravates the claimant's pain or other symptoms;
(4) the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication the claimant takes or has taken to alleviate his or her pain or other symptoms;
(5) any treatment, other than medication, the claimant receives or has received for relief of his or her pain or other symptoms;
(6) any measures the claimant uses or has used to relieve his or her pain or other symptoms (e.g., lying flat on your back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes every hour, sleeping on a board, etc.); and
(7) any other factors concerning functional limitations and restrictions due to pain or other symptoms.
The ALJ is required to discuss the factors pertinent to the evidence of record, but will not discuss a factor where it is not relevant.
SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304 at *8.
Although the “statements of the individual concerning his or her symptoms must be carefully considered, the ALJ is not required to credit them.” The ALJ is, however, required to explain which of an individual's symptoms he or she finds consistent or inconsistent with the evidence in the record.
Chandler v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 363 (3d Cir. 2011).
SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304 at *8.
This evaluation is extremely subjective. Some claimants may experience symptoms differently and may be limited by symptoms to a greater or lesser extent than other claimants with the same medical impairments, objective evidence, and non-medical evidence. For this reason, district courts generally afford great deference to an ALJ's symptom evaluation.
SSR 16-3, 2017 WL 5180304 at *4.
IV. DISCUSSION
In her statement of errors, Plaintiff raises the following issues:
1. The ALJ failed to properly evaluate [Ms. L's] mental impairments.
2. The ALJ's multiple errors with symptom evaluation compel reversal.(Doc. 13, p. 1).
We will begin our analysis by summarizing the ALJ's findings, and then will address Plaintiff's argument that the ALJ erred in his symptom evaluation and did not adequately explain his findings. Because we find that this argument has considerable merit, we will not address Plaintiff's argument that the ALJ did not properly evaluate her mental impairments.
A. The ALJ's Decision Denying Plaintiff's Applications
In his November 2020 decision, the ALJ found that Plaintiff met the insured status requirement of Title II of the Social Security Act through December 31, 2020. (Admin. Tr. 13; Doc. 12-2, p. 14). Then, Plaintiff's applications were evaluated at steps one through four of the sequential evaluation process.
At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not engage in substantial gainful activity at any point between May 17, 2019, (Plaintiff's alleged onset date) and November 17, 2020, (the date the ALJ decision was issued) (“the relevant period”). (Admin. Tr. 13-14; Doc. 12-2, pp. 14-15).
At step two, the ALJ found that, during the relevant period, Plaintiff had one medically determinable severe impairment, asthma. (Admin. Tr. 14-16; Doc. 12-2, pp. 15-17). The ALJ also identified the following medically determinable non-severe impairments: hypertension, dermoid cyst of the scalp, anxiety disorder, panic disorder, agoraphobia, bipolar II disorder, and major depression. Id.
At step three, the ALJ found that, during the relevant period, Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Admin. Tr. 16; Doc. 12-2, p. 17).
Between steps three and four, the ALJ assessed Plaintiff's RFC. The ALJ found that, during the relevant period, Plaintiff retained the RFC to engage in all ranges of work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567 and 20 C.F.R. § 416.967 but with the following environmental limitations:
No concentrated exposure to extreme cold or heat, humidity, fumes, odors, dust, gases or poor ventilation.(Admin. Tr. 16; Doc. 12-2, p. 17).
At step four, the ALJ found that, during the relevant period, Plaintiff could engage in her past relevant work as a psychiatric aide, teacher's aide, bindery worker, and laborer, stores as these occupations were actually performed by Plaintiff and as these occupations are generally performed in the national economy. (Admin. Tr. 20; Doc. 12-2, p. 21). The ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act because she could return to this work.
B. Substantial Evidence Does Not Support the ALJ's Symptom Evaluation
Although Plaintiff's only “severe” impairment recognized in this case is asthma, the majority of her symptoms and limitations appear to be caused by her mental impairments. Throughout the evidentiary record in this case Plaintiff made statements about the symptoms her allegedly “non-severe” mental impairments cause. She reported that she has between 10 and 20 panic attacks per month. (Admin. Tr. 44; Doc. 12-2, p. 45). These attacks sometimes last for hours, and have no clear aggravating factor. Id. She reports difficulty sleeping, psychomotor retardation, crying spells, feelings of hopelessness, loss of usual interest, irritability, fatigue, loss of energy, diminished self-esteem, difficulty concentrating, diminished sense of pleasure and social withdrawal. (Admin. Tr. 368; Doc. 12-7, p. 49).
Longitudinal records in this case demonstrate that, during the relevant period Plaintiff attended monthly appointments with a psychologist (Dr. Rivera), and took medication prescribed by a psychiatrist (Dr. Taswir). The ALJ acknowledged that Plaintiff's medications “have included” Abilify, Trintellix, Fluoxetine, Aripiprazole (another name for Abilify), Lamotrigine and Hydroxyzine. (Admin. Tr. 17; Doc. 12-2, p. 18). Our review of the record suggests that, in addition to these medications Plaintiff was, at times, also prescribed Latuda and Cymbalta (Admin. Tr. 361; Doc. 12-7, p. 42), Wellbutrin and Prestiq (Desvanlafaxine) (Admin. Tr. 361; Doc. 12-7, p. 42), Sinequan (Doxepin), Prozac, and diphenhydram-acetaminophen (Admin. Tr. 356-57; Doc. 12-7, pp. 37-38). Further, Plaintiff was taking up to six different medications at one time to manage her mental health-related symptoms. (Admin. Tr. 356-57; Doc. 12-7, pp. 37-38) (identifying Plaintiff's current mental health-related medications as Abilify 5mg, Prestiq 50mg, diphenhydram-acetaminophen, Sinequan 100mg, Hydrocyzine 25mg, and Lamotrigine 200mg). From July 2019 to January 2020, those medications were frequently increased or changed.
Plaintiff argues that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ's evaluation of her symptoms because he mischaracterized the nature or her treatment, and type, dosage and effectiveness of her medications. This argument has considerable merit.
A claimant's symptoms are analyzed using the framework set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and 20 C.F.R. § 416.929. This framework requires and ALJ to consider, where relevant, the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication the claimant takes or has taken to alleviate her symptoms, and any treatment, other than medication, the claimant receives or has received for relief of her symptoms. Those factors are highly relevant in this case. Social Security Ruling 16-3p directs that when evaluating symptom intensity, an ALJ considers a claimant's attempts to seek treatment and compliance with prescribed treatment, and suggests that “[p]ersistent attempts to obtain relief of symptoms, such as increasing dosages and changing medications, trying a variety of treatments, referrals to specialists, or changing treating sources may be an indication that [the claimant's] symptoms are a source of distress and may show that they are intense and persistent.” The ALJ did not discuss this factor in his decision.
2017 WL 5180304 at *9.
In this case, the record clearly demonstrates that Plaintiff sought regular treatment that included both medication and psychotherapy, complied with her medication regimen, and sought frequent adjustments because her symptoms persisted. The ALJ decision, however, does not provide any discussion of how this evidence was analyzed. Instead, the ALJ described Plaintiff's care as “conservative” without discussing the treatment modalities Plaintiff pursued. Although the ALJ did list some of the medications Plaintiff tried, he did not mention that Plaintiff took many of those medications simultaneously or that those medications were frequently adjusted. Then, without explaining his analysis of the evidence relevant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(iv)-(v) and 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(3)(iv)-(v), the ALJ found that Plaintiff's statements about the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of her symptoms were not entirely consistent with the medical and other evidence in the record. (Admin. Tr. 17; Doc. 12-2, p. 19).
Moreover, we find that this error undermined the ALJ's decision at multiple steps of the sequential evaluation process. The ALJ characterized the nature of Plaintiff's mental health treatment as “conservative” five times in his decision.
“There is no bright-line rule for what constitutes ‘conservative' versus ‘radical' treatment.” We find that the ALJ's use of this term, without any clear discussion of what it means in this case, is problematic. For example, at step two the ALJ branded Plaintiff's mental health impairments non-severe in part because her treatment was “conservative in nature.” (Admin. Tr. 14; Doc. 12-2, p. 16). The ALJ found a medical opinion was persuasive because it was consistent with Plaintiff's “stability” with “conservative care.” (Admin. Tr. 19; Doc. 12-2, p. 20) (finding Dr. Kajic's opinion persuasive). The ALJ also explained that his RFC assessment, which included no mental health-related limitations, was supported by Plaintiff's ability to manage her symptoms with “conservative care.” (Admin. Tr. 20; Doc. 12-2, p. 21). We find that remand is required because the ALJ's analysis of Plaintiff's mental health-related limitations is not sufficiently explained to permit meaningful review.
Krista M. Kijakazi, Civ. NO. MJM-21-2474, 2023 WL 2500306 at *6 (D. Md. Mar. 14, 2023) (quoting Brian H. v. Saul, No. 5:19-CV-00029, 2020 WL 4551672, at *9 (W.D. Va. July 13, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, No. 5:19-CV-29, 2020 WL 4548127 (W.D. Va. Aug. 6, 2020)).
V. RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's request for relief be GRANTED as follows:
(1) The final decision of the Commissioner should be VACATED.
(2) This case should be REMANDED to the Commissioner for further proceedings pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
(3) Final judgment should be issued in Plaintiff's favor.
(4) The Clerk of Court should be DIRECTED to close this case.
NOTICE OF LOCAL RULE 72.3
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Local Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.