Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:98-CV-2479-D.
August 17, 2000.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
The question presented is whether defendant is entitled to summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's termination-based age discrimination claim. For the reasons that follow, the court holds that it is.
I
The pertinent background facts of this case are set out in the court's July 10, 2000 memorandum opinion and order, see Christiason v. Hilite Industries, Inc., 2000 WL 963449, at*1 (N.D. Tex. July 10, 2000), and need not be repeated at length.
Plaintiff Sandra Christiason ("Christiason") sues defendant Hilite Industries, Inc. ("Hilite") for age discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. So far as pertinent to the present motion, Christiason alleges that Hilite terminated her employment based on her age and on her having reported unsafe working conditions at the plant where she worked.
Hilite moved for summary judgment as to inter alia Christiason's promotion-based age discrimination claim. In her complaint, Christiason also referred to termination-based age discrimination. Compl. at 6 ("Plaintiff submits. . . that she was terminated because of her age, over 40, and in retaliation for complaining of age discrimination."). In the court's July 10, 2000 opinion, it did not address Christiason's termination-based age discrimination cause of action because Hilite did not move for judgment on that claim. See Christiason, 2000 WL 963449, at *2-*5. Hilite later obtained leave of court to file a second summary judgment motion to address this cause of action.
II A
Christiason may prove age discrimination by direct or circumstantial evidence. Proof pursuant to the circumstantial evidence method — the more typical of the two — is assessed under the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2105 (2000). Christiason must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. at 2106. Once she meets this burden, Hilite is obligated to produce a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision at issue. See id. This is a burden of production, not persuasion. Id. Once Hilite meets this production burden, the presumption of discrimination disappears. Id. Christiason must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered are not the true reasons but are a pretext for discrimination. Id. "[T]he plaintiff may attempt to establish that [s]he was the victim of intentional discrimination 'by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.''' Id. (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981)). "[A] plaintiff's prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer's asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated." Id. at 2109. "[I]t is permissible for the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of discrimination from the falsity of the employer's explanation." Id. at 2108. "Proof that the defendant's explanation is unworthy of credence is simply one form of circumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional discrimination, and it may be quite persuasive." Id. At the summary judgment stage, the plaintiff need only raise a genuine issue of material fact. See Tutton v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 733 F. Supp. 1113, 1116 (N.D.Tex. 1990) (Fitzwater, J.).
"McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
In the Fifth Circuit, McDonnell Douglas applies to age discrimination claims. See, e.g., Bodenhelmer v. PPG Indus., Inc., 5 F.3d 955, 957 (5th Cir. 1993). In Reeves the Supreme Court noted that it had yet to decide this question. It assumed arguendo that the McDonnell Douglas framework was "fully applicable." Reeves, 120 S.Ct. at 2105.
B
Hilite concedes that Christiason can establish a prima facie case for termination-based age discrimination and that it must produce a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Christiason. See Christiason, 2000 WL 963449, at *2. Hilite contends that it fired Christiason because between September 1997 and June 1998, she was absent approximately 35 times. D. Br. at 3. Hilite's proffered reason meets its production burden. See, e.g., Hypes v. First Commerce Corp., 134 F.3d 721, 726 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (holding that employer had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating employee who, during five month period, missed work 16 full days and 23 half-days, exclusive of 25 days missed while on short-term disability leave).
C
Christiason is now obligated to produce evidence that would permit a reasonable trier of fact to find that Hilite's proffered reason was pretextual. See Christiason. 2000 WL 963449, at *3. She has failed to do so
Christiason spends considerable time in her brief arguing that Hilite committed discovery abuses by failing to respond to written interrogatories that would have informed her that Hilite hired a 41-year-old person as her replacement. See P. Br. at 6-7. This dispute is irrelevant because Hilite concedes that Christiason has established a prima facie case for termination-based age discrimination.
Christiason admits that she was frequently absent from work. P. Br. at 8. She asserts that before she began missing time from work, she complained that black dust was fouling the plant air. Christiason asserts that she later became ill as a direct and proximate result of the foul air, and that Hilite's inaction caused her to experience upper respiratory problems and resulted in her excessive absences. Christiason has failed, however, to offer any evidence of pretext. She posits that she was terminated due to her complaints about the black dust, because Hilite was trying to avoid paying for any of her medical expenses, and due to her age. She does not, however, submit any evidence that would permit a reasonable trier of fact to find that Hilite terminated her (or caused her to work in objectionable conditions) based on her age. Even if Hilite' s refusal to provide clean air at its facility directly caused Christiason's absences from work, that would not of itself be sufficient to support a claim of age discrimination.
Accordingly, the court grants Hilite's summary judgment motion and dismisses Christiason's termination-based age discrimination claim.
SO ORDERED.