Opinion
Case No. 09-13337.
September 3, 2009
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff initiated this pro se action against Defendants on August 24, 2009, challenging foreclosure proceedings related to real property located at 11395 Vaughan in Detroit, Michigan ("property"). On August 31, 2009, Plaintiff filed an "Ex Parte Emergency Motion for Automatic Stay of Proceedings in the 36th District Court or in the Alternative for Temporary Restraining Order." For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff's motion is denied.
Background
According to Plaintiff's Complaint and pending motion, on or about May 7, 2005, Plaintiff signed a mortgage on the property in connection with a loan from Defendant Wells Fargo Bank ("Wells Fargo"). (Compl. ¶ 5.) Plaintiff claims that he was not provided with the "Notice of Right to Cancel" document at the closing, in violation of the Truth in Lending Act. ( Id. ¶ 7.) Apparently Plaintiff subsequently defaulted on the loan and foreclosure proceedings were initiated, resulting in a foreclosure sale. Plaintiff alleges that Adrienne Sanders, who executed the Sheriff's Deed following the foreclosure sale, misrepresented that she was duly authorized to act as a "deputy Sheriff" when she in fact was not a deputy, undersheriff or sheriff. ( Id. ¶ 1; Mot. ¶ 3.)
It appears that proceedings subsequently were instituted in the 36th District Court for the State of Michigan to evict Plaintiff from the property. A hearing in the eviction proceedings was held in the 36th District Court on August 28, 2009. (Mot. ¶ 5.) Apparently a judge of the district court issued a Writ of Eviction, as Plaintiff now asks this Court to stay the writ or issue a temporary restraining order preventing Defendant Wells Fargo from evicting Plaintiff from the Property. ( Id. ¶ 8.)
Analysis
Plaintiff seeks relief from the state court's eviction order in his pending motion. Pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, this Court lacks subject matter to grant Plaintiff relief. Under that doctrine, "lower federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to review the decisions of state courts." Givens v. Homecomings Financial, 278 Fed. App'x 607, 608-09 (6th Cir. May 20, 2008) (unpublished opinion) (attached as Ex. 1) (citing D.C. Ct. of App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476, 103 S. Ct. 1303, 1311 (1983) and Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416, 44 S. Ct. 149, 150 (1923)). As the Supreme Court recently clarified, application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine "is confined to . . . cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting [federal] district court review and rejection of those judgments." Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S. Ct. 1517, 1521-22 (2005).
The circumstances of the present case are identical to those in Givens. Like the plaintiff in that case, Plaintiff lost a state court foreclosure and possession action that culminated in an eviction order. Givens, 278 Fed. App'x at 608. Also like the plaintiff in Givens, Plaintiff is asking a federal district court to temporarily enjoin the execution of the state court order. As the Sixth Circuit concluded in Givens, this Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiff's request.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED, that Plaintiff's Ex Parte Emergency Motion for Automatic Stay or Proceedings in the 36th District Court or in the Alternative for Temporary Restraining Order is DENIED.