Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 03-1114, SECTION "K" (5)
December 12, 2003
ORDER
Before this Court is a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. No. 9) filed by defendants Gary M. Stein, Edward J. Smith, and Woldenberg Village, Inc. After reviewing the pleadings, memoranda, and relevant law, the Court GRANTS the motion as meritorious.
Background
This Motion to Dismiss arises out of plaintiff's Complaint for age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("the Act"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. Plaintiff sued her former employer, Woldenberg Village, Inc., its board president, Gary M. Stein, and its executive director, Edward J. Smith, claiming these defendants discriminated against her because of her age.
On September 22, 2003, defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss with prejudice all claims against defendants Stein and Smith. Defendants contend that these men are not employers under the Act.
Legal Standard Analysis
To determine whether a motion to dismiss has merit, Jefferson v. Lead Ind. Ass'n. Inc., 106 F.3d 1245, 1250 (5th Cir. 1997) instructs that "[t]he standard to be applied to a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) is a familiar one." The district court must take the factual allegations of the complaint as true and resolve any ambiguities or doubts regarding the sufficiency of the claim in favor of the plaintiff. Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Ass'n., 987 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1993). The complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of her claim that would entitle her to relief. Fernandez-Monies, 987 F.2d at 284, 285; Leffall v. Dallas Independent School District, 28 F.3d 521, 524 (5th Cir. 1994). However, conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss. Fernandez-Monies, 987 F.2d at 284; Tuchman v. DSC Communications Corp., 14 F.3d 1061, 1067 (5th Cir. 1994).
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act defines an employer as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has twenty or more employees. . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 630(b). Only employers, and not individual supervisors, may be held liable under the Act. Stults v. Conoco. Inc., 76 F.3d 651, 655 (5th Cir. 1996). One cannot be held liable for discriminatory employment actions under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act unless that person "qualifies as an `employer' under the statute." Lusk v. Foxmeyer Health Corp., 129 F.3d 773, 777 (5th Cir. 1997). The Fifth Circuit has stated that "the purpose of the inclusion of the `agent' provision [in the statute's "employer" definition] was to incorporate respondeat superior principles into [the statute] rather than to impose individual liability on supervisory employees." Whitworth v. Lance. Inc., 1997 WL 446455 (W.D. Tex. 1997) (Citing Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649, 652 (5th Cir. 1994)).
Plaintiffs Complaint alleges that defendants Stein and Smith, as "officer(s)/director(s)/agent(s)" of defendant Woldenberg Village, Inc., owe a financial remedy for age discrimination. Complaint at ¶ I. It also states that plaintiff was employed by defendant Woldenberg Village, Inc. Complaint at ¶¶ II, III, IV, and VIII. Under the jurisprudence cited above, plaintiff cannot maintain an Age Discrimination in Employment Act claim against defendants Stein and Smith because these men were individual supervisors, not employers as defined by the Act. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that defendants Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. No. 9) is hereby GRANTED IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's Age Discrimination in Employment Act claims against individual defendants Gary M. Stein and Edward J. Smith are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.