Christenson v. State

Full title: CHRISTENSON v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Date published: Dec 2, 1992

262 Ga. 638 (Ga. 1992)

423 S.E.2d 252

Opinion

S92P1078.

DECIDED DECEMBER 2, 1992. RECONSIDERATION DENIED DECEMBER 17, 1992.

Murder. Harris Superior Court. Before Judge Struble, from Middle Circuit.

Stephen B. Bright, Charlotta Norby, Richard A. Bunn, for appellant.

Douglas C. Pullen, District Attorney, J. Mark Shelnutt, Assistant District Attorney, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, C. A. Benjamin Woolf, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

FLETCHER, Justice.

In Christenson v. State, 261 Ga. 80 ( 402 S.E.2d 41) (1991), we affirmed Christenson's conviction for murder and armed robbery, but remanded the case to the trial court for further hearing on two penalty-phase issues in this death-penalty case. Specifically, we directed the court on remand to determine (1) whether the district attorney's questions to the defendant's character witnesses were based on reliable information supported by admissible evidence, and (2) whether the defendant's confession to an extrinsic crime was voluntary and admissible in this case. Id. at 90-92.

On remand, the court conducted the required hearing and set forth its detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law in a 19-page order.

1. The proceedings on remand afforded the defendant a full and fair opportunity to address the issues contemplated by our remand.

2. The record supports the findings of the remand court and its conclusion that the prosecutor's cross-examination of the defendant's sentencing-phase witnesses was proper and that the defendant's confession to an extrinsic crime was properly admitted in evidence in this case.

3. As we held previously, the evidence supports the jury's finding that the offense of murder was committed during the commission of armed robbery. OCGA § 17-10-30 (b) (2). Now that we have the benefit of the proceedings on remand, we find that Christenson's death sentence was not imposed as the result of passion, prejudice, or other arbitrary factor. OCGA § 17-10-35 (c) (1). His death sentence is neither excessive nor disproportionate to penalties imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant. OCGA § 17-10-35 (c) (3). The similar cases listed in the Appendix support the imposition of a death sentence in this case.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Benham, J., who dissents.

FLETCHER, Justice.

APPENDIX.

Meders v. State, 261 Ga. 806 ( 411 S.E.2d 491) (1992); Miller v. State, 259 Ga. 296 ( 380 S.E.2d 690) (1989); Lee v. State, 258 Ga. 82 ( 365 S.E.2d 99) (1988); Frazier v. State, 257 Ga. 690 ( 362 S.E.2d 351) (1987); Ford v. State, 257 Ga. 461 ( 360 S.E.2d 258) (1987); Romine v. State, 256 Ga. 521 ( 350 S.E.2d 446) (1986); Cargill v. State, 255 Ga. 616 ( 340 S.E.2d 891) (1986); Ingram v. State, 253 Ga. 622 ( 323 S.E.2d 801) (1984); Finney v. State, 253 Ga. 346 ( 320 S.E.2d 147) (1984); Spivey v. State, 253 Ga. 187 ( 319 S.E.2d 420) (1984); Roberts v. State, 252 Ga. 227 ( 314 S.E.2d 83) (1984); Putman v. State, 251 Ga. 605 ( 308 S.E.2d 145) (1983); Mincey v. State, 251 Ga. 255 ( 304 S.E.2d 882) (1983); Wilson v. State, 250 Ga. 630 ( 300 S.E.2d 640) (1983); Rivers v. State, 250 Ga. 288 ( 298 S.E.2d 10) (1982); Jones v. State, 249 Ga. 605 ( 293 S.E.2d 708) (1982); Berryhill v. State, 249 Ga. 442 ( 291 S.E.2d 685) (1982); Solomon v. State, 247 Ga. 27 ( 277 S.E.2d 1) (1981); Dick v. State, 246 Ga. 697 ( 273 S.E.2d 124) (1980); Jones v. State, 243 Ga. 820 ( 256 S.E.2d 907) (1979); Amadeo v. State, 243 Ga. 627 ( 255 S.E.2d 718) (1979); Corn v. State, 240 Ga. 130 ( 240 S.E.2d 694) (1977); Peek v. State, 239 Ga. 422 ( 238 S.E.2d 12) (1977); Birt v. State, 236 Ga. 815 ( 225 S.E.2d 248) (1976); Pulliam v. State, 236 Ga. 460 ( 224 S.E.2d 8) (1976); Dobbs v. State, 236 Ga. 427 ( 224 S.E.2d 3) (1976); Goodwin v. State, 236 Ga. 339 ( 223 S.E.2d 703) (1976); Mitchell v. State, 234 Ga. 160 ( 214 S.E.2d 900) (1975); Moore v. State, 233 Ga. 861 ( 213 S.E.2d 829) (1975); Gregg v. State, 233 Ga. 117 ( 210 S.E.2d 659) (1974).

DECIDED DECEMBER 2, 1992 — RECONSIDERATION DENIED DECEMBER 17, 1992.

BENHAM, Justice, dissenting.

For the reasons stated in the dissent I filed in Christenson v. State, 261 Ga. 80, 92 ( 402 S.E.2d 41) (1991), I respectfully dissent from the affirmance of appellant's death sentence.