See also Page v. Turcott, 179 Tenn. 491 (10) ( 167 S.W.2d 350) and Naro v. State, 212 Ala. 5 (101 S 666) where the Supreme Court of Alabama said of itself: "This is a court of record, wherein the acts and proceedings of the court are enrolled as for a perpetual memorial, and . . . such courts `speak only through their records.'" The Supreme Court of Tennessee in Chrisman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 178 Tenn. 321, 326 ( 157 S.W.2d 831) in holding that a justice of peace court is not a court of record stated: "When the minutes of a court of record are signed by a judge they become the highest evidence of what was done in court and, so far as they are records of judicial proceedings, they import absolute verity, and are conclusive unless attacked for fraud." The General Assembly of Georgia apparently recognized that a court of record must enroll in permanent records its proceedings when it required the clerk of the superior courts "2. to attend all sessions of the court and keep fair and regular minutes of their proceedings from day to day, including a transcript of the judge's entry on his dockets. . .

The Court notices judicially that such thirty-day period expired on November 7, 1969. It is noted, parenthetically and for clarity, that a court of general sessions of Tennessee is not a court of record of Tennessee. Chrisman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (1942), 178 Tenn. 321, 157 S.W.2d 831, 832 [3]. Mr. Horne claims that his first attack on his detention by the state of Tennessee on October 8, 1969 by application for the state writ of habeas corpus preceded the execution on November 14, 1969 by the Governor of Tennessee of the aforementioned rendition warrant, so that he could not then attack the legality of his arrest under the Governor's warrant. He states that, after execution of such warrant, he filed his second application for the state writ of habeas corpus in the Criminal Court of Greene County, Tennessee on December 26, 1969, to test the legality of his arrest under the Governor's warrant as aforesaid.

The old definition of a court of record given by Blackstone is "that where the acts and judicial proceedings are enrolled in parchment for a perpetual memorial and testimony, which rolls are called the record of the court and are of such high and supereminent authority that their truth is not to be called in question." Chrisman v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 178 Tenn. 321, 325, 157 S.W.2d 831, 832-33 (1942). A "court of record" has also been defined as "being one the history of whose proceedings is perpetuated in writing.

The courts in which appellants rendered their services are not "courts of record" in the sense in which that term is generally used in Tennessee practice and procedure — that is, courts keeping regular minutes of their proceedings by written orders entered in permanent bound volumes.Page v. Turcott, 179 Tenn. 491, 503, 167 S.W.2d 350, 354 (1943); Chrisman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 178 Tenn. 321, 325, 157 S.W.2d 831, 832 (1942). Pursuant to statutes and rules of the Supreme Court hereinafter cited and discussed the Executive Secretary interpreted his authority to compensate counsel for indigents charged with a felony to be limited to services rendered (a) either in one of the regular trial courts of general jurisdiction or an appellate court or (b) for services rendered in a general sessions court or its equivalent, but only in cases which ultimately reached the regular circuit or criminal courts or appellate courts and were finally disposed of in those higher courts.

3 Blackstone 24. The characteristics of permanency and unquestioned verity are still accepted as basic to any definition of a court of record. See, e.g., DeKalb County v. Deason, 221 Ga. 237, 144 S.E.2d 446 (1965); Chrisman v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 178 Tenn. 321, 157 S.W.2d 831 (1942); see also 20 Am.Jur.2d Courts § 26 and 21 C.J.S. Courts § 5. The record in a court of record is the highest evidence of what was done and it is conclusive unless attacked for fraud. Chrisman v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, supra.

-mentioned minutes of the Court's actions are valid and efficacious — without authentication by the signature of the Trial Judge. If not, it seems to inescapably follow that (1) there is no valid and effective judgment on the verdict of the jury; and (2) there is no valid and efficacious ruling of the Court on defendant's motion for new trial. We have critically examined Johnson v. Johnson (1870), 49 Tenn. 521; Moore v. State (1871), 50 Tenn. 493 ; Bass v. State (1872), 65 Tenn. 579; State v. Farrow (1876), 67 Tenn. 571; Jackson v. Jackson (1878), 3 Tenn. Cas. 18; State v. True (1905), 116 Tenn. 294, 95 S.W. 1028; Crum v. Fillers (1926), 6 Tenn. App. 547; Wilkenson v. Johnson City Shale Brick Corp. (1928), 156 Tenn. 373, 299 S.W. 1056, 2 S.W.2d 89; State ex rel. Pierce v. Hardin (1931), 163 Tenn. 471, 43 S.W.2d 924; Mullen v. State (1932), 164 Tenn. 523, 51 S.W.2d 497; Hines v. Thompson (1940), 25 Tenn. App. 86, 148 S.W.2d 376; Hamilton v. State (1941), 177 Tenn. 282, 148 S.W.2d 375; Chrisman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (1942), 178 Tenn. 321, 157 S.W.2d 831; McClain v. State (1948), 186 Tenn. 401, 210 S.W.2d 680; Gilpin v. Burrage (1948), 188 Tenn. 80, 216 S.W.2d 732; Hickle v. Irick (1956), 42 Tenn. App. 183, 300 S.W.2d 54; Cobb v. Brown (1956), 42 Tenn. App. 595, 305 S.W.2d 241; Duboise v. State (1956), 200 Tenn. 93, 290 S.W.2d 646; Jackson v. Handell (1959), 46 Tenn. App. 234, 327 S.W.2d 55, and others. This collation leads to two prime conclusions, (1) that the law of Tennessee with respect to the question above stated has vaccilated to a distressing degree, and (2) that this highly significant judicial procedure should not be left in the penumbra.

The constitutionality of that Act was sustained by this Court (opinion by Chief Justice Green) in Hancock v. Davidson County, 171 Tenn. 420, 104 S.W.2d 824. In Chrisman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 178 Tenn. 321, 157 S.W.2d 831, the question was whether the General Sessions Court of Davidson County is "a court of record." This Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Green, fully considered the 1937 Act, and held that that Court is not a court of record.

In such case the third party acquires an equitable interest in the property, fund, or thing; and the law, acting upon the relationship of the parties and their treatment of the fund, establishes the requisite privity, creates a duty, and implies a promise which will support the action; Parker v. Jeffery, 26 Or. 186 ( 37 P. 712); Washburn v. Investment Co., 26 Or. 436 ( 36 P. 533, and 38 P. 620); Brower Lumber Co. v. Miller, 28 Or. 565 (52 Am. St. Rep. 807, 43 P. 659); First Nat. Bank v. Hovey, 34 Or. 162 ( 55 P. 535). These cases define the scope and illustrate the application of the rule giving the action, which was established by the earlier cases of Baker v. Eglin, 11 Or. 333 ( 8 P. 280); Hughes v. Oregon Ry. Nav. Co., 11 Or. 437 ( 5 P. 206); Schneider v. White, 12 Or. 503 ( 8 P. 652); and Chrisman v. Insurance Co., 16 Or. 283 ( 18 P. 466)."

In other words, a plaintiff, seeking to collect a fire insurance policy, must show that he was the owner of the property, or was otherwise interested in it at the time of its destruction; and unless he alleges such facts in his petition no cause of action will be stated, and therefore no judgment can be rendered in his behalf. May, Ins., pars. 2, 71, 72; 11 Am. Eng. Enc. Law, p. 312; 5 Lawson, Rights, Rem. Prac., pars. 2037, 2095; Insurance Co. v. Everett (Tex. Civ. App.), 36 S.W. 125; Bevin v. Insurance Co., 23 Conn. 244; Quarrier v. Insurance Co., 10 W. Va. 507; Freeman v. Insurance Co., 38 Barb., 247; Chrisman v. Insurance Co., 16 Or. 284, 18 P. 466; Dickerman v. Insurance Co. (Vt.), 30 A. 808." * * * "The petition does not show that the mortgage was given to secure any particular sum, and therefore it does not show that the building and loan association had any definite interest in the building at the time it was destroyed by fire. Facts not alleged cannot form the basis of a judgment.

A party suing on an insurance policy, to whom the same is not made, by its terms, primarily payable, must allege and prove his right to recover on the same. 2 May on Ins., sec. 590; Canfield v. Insurance Co., 13 N.W. Rep., 252; Chrisman v. Insurance Co., 16 Or. 283. Where a creditor has received payment, and the executor of the insured seeks to recover the money of such party, alleging he was not a creditor, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove such fact.