Opinion
23A-CT-2456
06-26-2024
Cesar Cholula, Appellant-Plaintiff v. Delta Tau Delta a/k/a Epsilon Mu Chapter at Ball State University, Appellee-Defendant
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Donald K. McClellan McClellan & McClellan Muncie, Indiana ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE Maryanne Pelic Bunger & Robertson Bloomington, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Delaware Circuit Court The Honorable John M. Feick, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 18C04-2102-CT-17
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Donald K. McClellan McClellan & McClellan Muncie, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE Maryanne Pelic Bunger & Robertson Bloomington, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
WEISSMANN, JUDGE.
[¶1] Cesar Cholula fell down a flight of stairs at the Delta Tau Delta fraternity (DTD) at Ball State University during an early morning visit to the fraternity that ended in a fight. Cholula sued DTD for negligence. In response, DTD moved for summary judgment, claiming there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether it owed a duty to Cholula or whether DTD's breach of any duty proximately caused Cholula's fall.
[¶2] The trial court granted summary judgment to DTD, prompting this appeal by Cholula. Finding the proximate cause issue to be dispositive, we affirm.
Facts
[¶3] Cholula and two friends were drinking at a Muncie bar into the early morning. Mark Kanosky, a former member of DTD, invited the trio to the DTD fraternity house. The intoxicated group walked to the fraternity house, where they visited with a current DTD member in a second-floor room.
[¶4] The DTD chapter president confronted Cholula and his friends and demanded they leave. When the group refused, the verbal conflict escalated into physical conflict. Cholula attempted to tackle the DTD chapter president, who then became involved in an altercation with Kanosky. Other members of the DTD fraternity, at least some of whom also were intoxicated, joined the fray, which extended into the adjoining hallway.
[¶5] DTD fraternity member Chad Meek saw Cholula, whom Meek described as highly intoxicated, walking alone at the top of the stairs. Cholula stumbled and fell backward down the stairs. Meek saw no one touch or strike Cholula immediately before Cholula fell. No other witnesses saw Cholula's initial fall, and Cholula has no memory of the event.
[¶6] Cholula suffered a serious head injury in the fall that required his hospitalization and brain surgery. He sued DTD (both its Ball State and international branches) for negligence, claiming that his fall was caused by a DTD fraternity member shoving and/or striking him.
[¶7] The DTD fraternity moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion, summarily ruling that "there was no genuine issue of material fact . . . as to issues of duty and proximate cause." Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 16. Cholula filed a motion to correct error, alleging that the evidence was conflicting as to both proximate cause and duty. The court denied Cholula's motion to correct error, and Cholula appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[¶8] Cholula contends that genuine issues of material fact exist as to both proximate cause and duty. Even if we assume DTD breached a duty to Cholula, the designated evidence points to one conclusion: that DTD's breach of duty did not proximately cause Cholula's unfortunate fall. Summary judgment was thus proper.
[¶9] We apply the same standard as the trial court when reviewing summary judgment rulings. Fox v. Barker, 170 N.E.3d 662, 666 (Ind.Ct.App. 2021). The moving party (DTD) "bears the burden of showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. Summary judgment is improper if the moving party (DTD) fails to meet this burden or, if it does, the nonmoving party (Cholula) establishes a genuine issue of material fact. Id. During our review, "[w]e construe all factual inferences in the nonmoving party's favor and all doubts as to the existence of a material issue against the moving party." Id. at 665-66.
[¶10] To prevail on his negligence claim against DTD, Cholula bore the burden of proving: (1) a duty owed by DTD to Cholula; (2) breach of that duty by DTD; and (3) compensable injury proximately caused by DTD's breach of duty. Safeco Ins. Co. of Ind. v. Blue Sky Innovation Grp., Inc., 230 N.E.3d 898, 906 (Ind. 2024). "'Proximate cause' has two components: causation-in-fact and scope of liability." Kovach v. Caligor Midwest, 913 N.E.2d 193, 197 (Ind.Ct.App. 2009). "To establish factual causation, the plaintiff must show that but for the defendant's allegedly tortious act or omission, the injury at issue would not have occurred." Id. at 197-98. Causation-in-fact is ordinarily a factual question reserved for the factfinder but becomes a question of law when only a single conclusion may be drawn from the facts. Id. at 198. As for "scope of liability," the question is whether the injury was a natural and probable consequence of the defendant's conduct that, under the circumstances, should have been foreseen or anticipated. Id.
[¶11] Cholula asserts that summary judgment was improper because the record shows two versions of the events that led to Cholula's fall and resulting injuries. The first, based largely on Meek's testimony, is that Cholula's fall was not sparked by contact from anyone else and that an intoxicated Cholula simply lost his footing. The details of the second version of events-the version Cholula espouses-is that he fell down the stairs "because of the dangerous conditions that [DTD] had created." Appellant's Reply Brief, p. 12. Those "dangerous conditions," according to Cholula, primarily include the prior altercation during which Cholula allegedly was hit multiple times.
[¶12] But Cholula cites no evidence linking those "dangerous conditions" to his fall.Causation cannot be inferred merely from the allegation of a negligent act. Halterman v. Adams Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 991 N.E.2d 987, 990 (Ind.Ct.App. 2013). Nor may negligence be established through inferential speculation alone. Brown v. Buchmeier, 994 N.E.2d 291, 294 (Ind.Ct.App. 2013). "To prove causation, a plaintiff must present specific facts that would demonstrate the defendant's allegedly negligent behavior caused the plaintiff's injuries." Halterman, 991 N.E.2d at 990. Therefore, "[t]he mere allegation of a fall is insufficient to establish negligence, and negligence cannot be inferred from the mere fact of a fall." Brown, 994 N.E.2d at 294 .
Cholula does not rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor, and we therefore do not address it. See Griffin v. Menard, Inc., 175 N.E.3d 811, 815 (Ind. 2021) (finding that whether res ipsa loquitor applies in a premises liability case "is necessarily dependent on whether the defendant can be liable under premises liability in the first place").
[¶13] Cholula merely speculates that another person caused his fall. For instance, he does not cite any designated evidence suggesting he fell because of disorientation from the alleged blows. Nor does Cholula point to any designated evidence that anyone precipitated his fall by pushing or hitting him near the top of the stairs. In short, Cholula does not reveal any designated evidence refuting the evidence that Cholula fell on his own accord and not in response to, or because of, any other person's actions.
[¶14] Proximate cause requires a reasonable connection between the defendant's allegedly negligent conduct and the plaintiff's damages. Force v. New China Hy Buffet LCC, 217 N.E.3d 1275, 1278 (Ind.Ct.App. 2023). When, as here, the designated evidence points to only one conclusion-that the fall was an accident not caused by the defendant-summary judgment for the defendant is proper. See Brown, 994 N.E.2d at 295; see also Kincade v. MAC Corp., 773 N.E.2d 909, 912-13 (Ind.Ct.App. 2002) (affirming summary judgment based on "the lack of proximate cause linking any of the three defendants" to the plaintiff's injuries suffered in a fall down a staircase).
[¶15] Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to DTD. See Wabash Cnty. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, Inc. v. Thompson, 975 N.E.2d 362, 365 (Ind.Ct.App. 2012) ("[A] defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law when the undisputed material facts negate at least one element of the plaintiff's claim."). We affirm the trial court's entry of summary judgment for DTD.
Mathias, J. and Tavitas, J., concur.