Opinion
CIVIL ACTION No. 01-1782
February 25, 2004
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff David Choi asserts claims for defamation and false light invasion of privacy arising out of the publication of the minutes of the 25th General Assembly of the Korean Presbyterian Church in America's ("KPCA") annual meeting. Defendants In Hwa Sohn, Se Won Han, Seong Koo Choi and Dae Soon Kim are current and former officers of the KPCA General Assembly. Before the court is the defendants' motion for summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, the defendants' motion is granted.
I. Background
On May 25, 2000, the General Assembly, the highest governing body of the KPCA, convened its annual meeting in Tacoma, Washington. At the meeting, David Choi, a pastor and former member of the KPCA, was reprimanded for his role in litigation involving a Korean Presbyterian theological seminary located in New York City. The details of the discipline stemming from Mr. Choi's ordeal were published at page 81 of the General Assembly's minutes. The relevant portion of the translated minutes at the center of this case read as follows:
2. Defendant Rev. Choi Yiyul (David Choi):
We received a letter on the morning of Thursday, May 25th, 2000, from Jack Bernard, the legal counsel for the defendant who filed a lawsuit against the General Assembly of the Korean Presbyterian Church, stating the lawsuit is being withdrawn. Upon this fact, this court reviewed the matter and rules as follows.
Ruling: Defendant Choi Yiyul (David Choi) is asked to give an official apology at the 25th General Assembly of the Korean Presbyterian Church meeting, and from today and on, cannot be involved in any matters relating to New York Theological Seminary.
II. Discussion
A court may grant a party's motion for summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed R. Civ. P 56(c). Rule 56(c)
mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be "no genuine issue as to any material fact," since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's Defamation Claim
Plaintiff's defamation claim is based on his assertion that "the contents of page 81 of the Minutes is false, libelous, and defamatory in its language, context and innuendo because plaintiff's efforts to amicably conclude the Seminary litigation are described as warranting a public apology and also as disqualifying plaintiff from further participation in the business of the Seminary." Count IV of Pl's Compl. at § 19. Defendants argue that the published minutes plaintiff complains of cannot be construed as defamatory. Defendants further assert that the information communicated is true and privileged.
The tort of defamation has been codified in Pennsylvania at 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8343:
§ 8343. Burden of proof
(a) BURDEN OF PLAINTIFF.-IN AN ACTION FOR DEFAMATION, THE PLAINTIFF HAS THE BURDEN OF PROVING, WHEN THE ISSUE IS PROPERLY RAISED:
(1) The defamatory character of the communication. (2) Its publication by the defendant. (3) Its application to the plaintiff. (4) The understanding by the recipient of its defamatory meaning. (5) The understanding by the recipient of it as intended to be applied to the plaintiff. (6) Special harm resulting to the plaintiff from its publication. (7) Abuse of a conditionally privileged occasion.
(b) BURDEN OF DEFENDANT. — IN AN ACTION FOR DEFAMATION, THE DEFENDANT HAS THE BURDEN OF PROVING, WHEN THE ISSUE IS PROPERLY RAISED:
(1) The truth of the defamatory communication. (2) The privileged character of the occasion on which it was published. (3) The character of the subject matter of defamatory comment as of public concern.
The court notes that the affirmative defenses codified at § 8343(b) are independent grounds for a defendant to defeat a claim of defamation. That is, each defense may stand on its own. See Fanelle v. LoJack Corp., No. 99-4292, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17767 at *7 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 7, 2000) (stating that § 8343 provides for three affirmative defenses to defamation).
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8343. "Initially, it is the function of the court to determine whether the communication complained of is capable of a defamatory meaning." Maier v. Maretti, 671 A.2d 701, 704 (Pa.Super. 1995) (citing Rybas v. Wapner, 457 A.2d 108, 110 ( Pa. Super. 1983)).
A communication is defamatory if it tends to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him. Elia v. Erie Ins. Exch., 634 A.2d 657 (Pa.Super. 1993). . . . A communication is also defamatory if it ascribes to another conduct, character or a condition that would adversely affect his fitness for the proper conduct of his proper business, trade or profession. Gordon v. Lancaster Osteopathic Hospital Ass'n, 340 Pa. Super. 253, 489 A.2d 1364 (1985).Maier, 671 A.2d at 704. In considering the defamatory nature of a communication, the court
must evaluate "the effect [it] is fairly calculated to produce, the impression it would naturally engender, in the minds of the average persons among whom it is intended to circulate." Corabi [ v. Curtis Publishing Co.], 273 A.2d [899], 907 [(Pa. 1971)]. While it is not enough that a statement is embarrassing or annoying, see Bogash v. Elkins, 405 Pa. 437, 176 A.2d 677, 678 (Pa. 1962), a court should not dismiss a complaint unless it is "clear that the publication is incapable of a defamatory meaning." Vitteck v. Washington Broad. Co., 256 Pa. Super. 427, 389 A.2d 1197, 1200-01 ( Pa. Super. 1978).Tucker v. Fischbein, 237 F.3d 275, 282 (3d Cir. 2001).
The minutes at issue accurately described the discipline imposed on plaintiff and the resolution of a matter before the KPCA's General Assembly. They do not disparage his conduct, reputation or character. Moreover, the context within which they were published, as a means of keeping the KPCA membership abreast of relevant church affairs, undermines the validity of plaintiff's defamation claim. Plaintiff offers no evidence to support the proposition that the minutes are capable of a defamatory meaning. Absent such evidence, and considering the nature of the information published, the court finds that the minutes are incapable of a defamatory meaning.
Defendants also assert that they are entitled to summary judgment with respect to plaintiff's defamation claim because the information published was true. Under Pennsylvania law, truth is an affirmative defense to an action for defamation. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8343(b)(1). Plaintiff fails to contest the veracity of the published minutes. In fact, his "Counterstatement of Undisputed Material Facts" reviews, in greater detail, the KPCA's actions and states that "KPCA's Judiciary Committee sentenced Revs. Lee and Choi, ordering them to dismiss the Seminary litigation and apologize to the membership, in default of which they would no longer be ordained as ministers of KPCA" Pl's Resp. to Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. at 2. The admission that the KPCA minutes accurately reflected the punishment imposed precludes plaintiff's defamation claim.
Defendants finally contend that the publication was protected by conditional privilege, an affirmative defense found at 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8343(b)(2). "Communications made on a proper occasion, from a proper motive, in a proper manner, and based upon reasonable cause are privileged." Davis v. Resources for Human Dev., 770 A.2d 353, 358 ( Pa. Super. 2001). A conditional privilege exists when the "circumstances are such as to lead any one of several persons having a common interest in a particular subject matter correctly or reasonably to believe that facts exist which another sharing such common interest is entitled to know." Maier, 671 A.2d at 706; Davis, 770 A.2d at 358 (citations omitted). "`Once a matter is deemed conditionally privileged, the plaintiff must establish that the conditional privilege was abused by the defendant.'" Davis, 770 A.2d at 359 (quoting Miketic v. Baron, 675 A.2d 324, 329 (Pa.Super. 1996)). An abuse occurs
when the publication is actuated by malice or negligence, is made for a purpose other than that for which the privilege is given or to a person not reasonably believed to be necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose of the privilege or includes defamatory matter not necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose. Beckman v. Dunn, 276 Pa. Super. 527, 419 A.2d 583 (1980).Maier, 671 A.2d at 707 n. 1; see also Rockwell v. Allegheny Health, Educ. Research Found., 19 F. Supp.2d 401, 408 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (describing the parameters of the conditional privilege).
In this case, each member of the KPCA had a legitimate interest in, and was entitled to, information about the General Assembly's action. Plaintiff does not contest the existence of a conditional privilege in the case at bar. Instead he attempts to argue that the defendants abused the conditional privilege since the "General Assembly has no power to discipline ministers under the supervision of the Eastern Presbytery." Pl's Resp. at 15-16. Because the General Assembly allegedly lacks the power to impose this type of discipline, plaintiff argues, "the questioned publication is beyond the power or authority of the publisher." Pl's Resp. at 16. But plaintiff's contention that the action taken by the church was ultra vires poses an issue which, under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, this secular court is without authority to address. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 708-09, 720-23 (1976).
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs False Light Invasion of Privacy Claim
Defendants also move for summary judgment on plaintiff's false light invasion of privacy claim. The allegation supporting the plaintiff's claim for false light invasion of privacy is similar to the allegation underlying his claim for defamation. At Count III of his Complaint, plaintiff alleges that "[t]he Minutes in their entirety falsely portray plaintiff has [sic] having committed wrongdoings such as disqualify him from any further participation in the affairs of the Seminary, as an officer or director, or in any other capacity, when in fact, there was never any accusation of wrongdoing against plaintiff." Count III of Pl's Compl. at ¶ 14. Under Pennsylvania law, the tort of false light invasion of privacy is defined as:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if
(a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
(b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be placed.Curran v. Children's Serv. Ctr. of Wyoming County, Inc., 578 A.2d 8, 12 (Pa.Super. 1990) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E); see also Lin v. Rohm Haas Co., 293 F. Supp.2d 505, 521-22 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (detailing the elements of a false light invasion of privacy).
Plaintiff's claim for false light invasion of privacy fails as a matter of law because plaintiff has provided no evidence to support any of its requisite elements. He fails to demonstrate how the publication of minutes, which accurately detailed the discipline imposed on him by the church, placed him in a false light. Having failed to offer any evidence on this point, plaintiff naturally cannot demonstrate that any false light in which he was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. Nor can plaintiff satisfy his burden of proving that the defendants knew of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the published minutes and the false light in which he would be placed. In the absence of any evidence to support his false light invasion of privacy claim, the court must grant the defendant's motion for summary judgment.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted in an order accompanying this memorandum.
ORDER
On this ___ day of February, 2004, upon consideration of the defendant's motion for summary judgment, and for the reasons given in the accompanying memorandum, it is hereby ORDERED that the defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.