We find no error in the district court's holding that the plaintiffs' untimely claims are not saved by equitable estoppel. 12 We distinguish between the federal doctrine of equitable tolling, which "is not available in state causes of action in New York," Jang Ho Choi v. Beautri Realty Corp., 135 A.D.3d 451, 452 (1st Dep't 2016), and the New York doctrine of equitable estoppel. We have "used 'equitable tolling' to mean fraudulent concealment of a cause of action that has 'in some sense accrued earlier,' and to mean fraudulent concealment that postpones the accrual of a cause of action."
“[T]he doctrine of equitable tolling is not available in state causes of action in New York.” Jang Ho Choi v. Beautri Realty Corp., 22 N.Y.S.3d 431, 432 (App. Div. 2016); Shared Commc'ns Servs. of ESR, Inc. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 832 N.Y.S.2d 32, 33 (App. Div. 2007) (“The doctrine of equitable tolling is generally applied to federal causes of action in New York.”); see also O'Hara v. Bayliner, 679 N.E.2d 1049, 1054 (N.Y. 1997) (referring to tolling as an “exceptional Federal [ ] remedy.”).
But "[t]he federal doctrine of 'equitable tolling' does not apply to New York causes of action." Dowe v. Leeds Brown L, P.C., 419 F.Supp.3d 748, 761 n. 6 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (citing Jang Ho Choi v. Beautri Realty Corp., 135 A.D.3d 451 (1st Dep't. 2016)). Accordingly, this case is inapplicable here.
First, equitable tolling is not available to state causes of action under New York law. See Jang Ho Chi v. Beautri Realty Corp., 22 N.Y.S.3d 431, 432 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016); Kampuries v. Am. Honda Motor, 204 F. Supp. 3d 484, 492, n.8 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (collecting cases). Second, where tolling is applied in New York, the requirements are the same as under Illinois law.
The federal doctrine of "equitable tolling" does not apply to New York causes of action. Jang Ho Choi v. Beautri Realty Corp., 135 A.D.3d 451, 22 N.Y.S.3d 431, 432 (2016). "A plaintiff seeking to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel must establish that subsequent and specific actions by defendants somehow kept him or her from timely bringing suit."
"[T]he doctrine of equitable tolling is not available in state causes of action in New York." Jang Ho Choi v. Beautri Realty Corp., 22 N.Y.S.3d 431, 432 (1st Dep't 2016). Also, under New York law, Plaintiff's imprisonment does not toll the statute of limitations.
As an initial matter, equitable tolling "is a doctrine generally applied to federal, as opposed to state, causes of action." Kwas v. Intergraph Gov't Sols., No. 15CV5897JFBAYS, 2016 WL 4502039, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2016) ; Von Hoffmann v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 202 F.Supp.2d 252, 264 (S.D.N.Y.2002) ("The doctrine of equitable tolling does not apply to these state law claims, as the doctrine only tolls the statute of limitations with regard to federally created causes of action."); Jang Ho Choi v. Beautri Realty Corp., 22 N.Y.S.3d 431, 432, 135 A.D.3d 451 (2016) ("[T]he doctrine of equitable tolling is not available in state causes of action in New York."); Shared Commc'ns Servs. of ESR, Inc. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 38 A.D.3d 325, 832 N.Y.S.2d 32, 33–34 (2007) ("The doctrine of equitable tolling is generally applied to federal causes of action in New York."); but seeDe Sole v. Knoedler Gallery, LLC, 137 F.Supp.3d 387, 423 (S.D.N.Y.2015) (" ‘Under New York law, the doctrines of equitable tolling or equitable estoppel may be invoked to defeat a statute of limitations defense when the plaintiff was induced by fraud, misrepresentations or deception to refrain from filing a timely action.’ " (quoting Marshall v. Hyundai Motor Am., 51 F.Supp.3d 451, 462 (S.D.N.Y.2014) ))
But "the doctrine of equitable tolling is not available in state causes of action in New York." Jang Ho Choi v. Beautri Realty Corp. , 135 A.D.3d 451, 22 N.Y.S.3d 431, 432 (1st Dep't 2016). Thus, that doctrine cannot render timely plaintiffs' claims, all of which are for causes of action under New York law.
Defendants established that the breach of fiduciary cause of action against the sponsor defendant St. Regis Residence Club (Sponsor) was time-barred under a three-year statute of limitations rather than a six-year period, because the cause of action is not based on fraud and seeks purely monetary relief (seeIDT Corp. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 12 N.Y.3d 132, 139, 879 N.Y.S.2d 355, 907 N.E.2d 268 [2009] ; Access Point Medical, LLC v. Mandell, 106 A.D.3d 40, 44, 963 N.Y.S.2d 44 [1st Dept. 2013] ). Plaintiff's arguments that the limitations period was tolled by equitable estoppel is unpersuasive because plaintiff failed sufficiently to allege that the Sponsor's affirmative wrongdoing prevented it from timely commencing this action (seePutter v. North Shore Univ. Hosp., 7 N.Y.3d 548, 552–553, 825 N.Y.S.2d 435, 858 N.E.2d 1140 [2006] ; Jang Ho Choi v. Beautri Realty Corp., 135 A.D.3d 451, 452, 22 N.Y.S.3d 431 [1st Dept. 2016] ). Further, the continuing wrong doctrine is inapplicable because plaintiff alleges only continuing damages from the initial alleged wrongful conduct, not continuing wrongful conduct (seeHenry v. Bank of Am., 147 A.D.3d 599, 601, 48 N.Y.S.3d 67 [1st Dept. 2017] ).
Any damages arising from defendant's alleged malpractice were sufficiently calculable for pleading purposes when the jury rendered its verdict on July 29, 2013, and the action commenced on September 17, 2018 is time-barred. Plaintiff has not shown that the statute was tolled or that plaintiff was actively misled or prevented in some extraordinary way from timely commencing a malpractice action (see Yarbro v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 140 A.D.3d 668, 668, 33 N.Y.S.3d 727 [1st Dept. 2016] ; Jang Ho Choi v. Beautri Realty Corp., 135 A.D.3d 451, 22 N.Y.S.3d 431 [1st Dept. 2016] ). Moreover, our decision on the prior appeal is not law of the case on facts not presented therein.