Opinion
CASE NO. C07-1434RSM.
February 11, 2008
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT THEREOF
I. INTRODUCTION
This matter comes before the Court on defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum in Support Thereof. (Dkt. #4). Defendants argue that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents this Court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Fed.R.Civ.P.") 12(b)(1) because plaintiff's claims are inextricably intertwined with a state court judgment. Alternatively, defendants argue that plaintiff's claims should be dismissed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) under the tort rule of "favorable termination." Plaintiff, appearing pro se, responds that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply because plaintiff is not asking this Court to review a state court judgment. Plaintiff also responds that defendants misconstrue the tort rule of "favorable termination," thereby making it inapplicable to the instant case.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court agrees with defendants, and GRANTS defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum in Support Thereof.
II. DISCUSSION
A. BackgroundThe instant case arises out of a criminal trial in King County Superior Court for the State of Washington in which plaintiff William W. Chism, II ("Mr. Chism") was found guilty of second degree assault. (Dkt. #1, Plaintiff's Complaint, ¶ 21). During this trial, Mr. Chism alleges that defendant King County Superior Court Judge Paris Kallas ("Judge Kallas") made three improper rulings. ( Id. at ¶ 1). First, Mr. Chism contends that Judge Kallas allowed the State to refer to the complainant as a "victim" throughout the trial, despite the fact that the sole issue during trial was whether Mr. Chism acted in self-defense. ( Id. at ¶ 22). Second, Mr. Chism argues that Judge Kallas improperly admitted evidence which had no material connection to the crime charged. ( Id. at ¶ 24). Lastly, Mr. Chism argues that Judge Kallas improperly excluded favorable testimony. ( Id. at ¶ 25). Each of these errors were set forth on appeal by Mr. Chism to Division One of the Court of Appeals for the State of Washington. ( Id. at ¶ 2). The appellate court, comprised of defendant Judge Susan Agid ("Judge Agid"), defendant Judge Ann Schindler ("Judge Schindler"), and Judge William Baker ("Judge Baker"), affirmed Mr. Chism's conviction. ( Id., Ex. B). Shortly thereafter, Mr. Chism filed a petition for discretionary review to the Washington State Supreme Court, raising the same three issues he raised to the Court of Appeals. ( Id. at ¶ 28). The Washington Supreme Court denied the petition. ( Id. at ¶ 29).
Mr. Chism has completed his sentence and has been released from custody. (Dkt. #1, Plaintiff's Complaint, ¶ 3).
Judge Baker is not a named defendant in the instant case.
Based on these events, Mr. Chism filed the instant complaint in this Court for deprivation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Mr. Chism specifically alleges that Judge Kallas violated his "constitutionally secured right to a fair trial." ( Id. at ¶ 1). Furthermore, Mr. Chism alleges that Judge Agid and Judge Schindler affirmed his conviction by either disagreeing or ignoring well-establish precedent. ( Id. at ¶ 2). He argues that "the appellate review . . . lacks integrity." ( Id.). As a result, Mr. Chism alleges that each of the judges deprived him of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and that the judges' acts and omissions were a material factor in his unlawful conviction. ( Id. at ¶ 5). The defendants now move to dismiss plaintiff's complaint.
B. Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) addresses the court's subject matter jurisdiction. See id. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). They possess only that power authorized by United States Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree. Id. The burden of establishing the subject matter jurisdiction rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction. Id. When considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), the Court is not restricted to the face of the pleadings, but may review any evidence, such as affidavits and testimony, to resolve factual disputes concerning the existence of jurisdiction. McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1988).
Meanwhile, under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the Court must dismiss a complaint if a plaintiff can prove no set of facts to support a claim which would entitle him to relief. Van Buskirk v. Cable News Network, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002); Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). In deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all material allegations in the complaint and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786, 788 (9th Cir. 2002); Associated Gen. Contractors v. Metro. Water Dist., 159 F.3d 1178, 1181 (9th Cir. 1998). However, conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss. Associated Gen. Contractors, 159 F.3d at 1181. When a complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim, "leave to amend should be granted unless the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency." Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986). C. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a federal court cannot entertain constitutional claims that are inextricably intertwined with a state court's judgment. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 286, n. 1, 125 S.Ct. 1517 (2005); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482, n. 16, 103 S.Ct. 1303 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416, 44 S.Ct. 149 (1923). In other words, "a party losing in state court is barred from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state court's judgment in a United States district court, based on the losing party's claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser's federal rights." Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06, 114 S.Ct. 2647 (1994) (emphasis added). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257, the United States Supreme Court is the only federal court with jurisdiction to hear such an appeal. See id. Therefore, federal district courts are courts of original, not appellate, jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. Federal district courts simply have "no authority to review the final determinations of a state court in judicial proceedings . . . even when the challenge to the state court decision involves federal constitutional issues." Worldwide Church of God v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 890-91 (9th Cir. 1986).
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not, however, operate to devoid federal district courts of subject matter jurisdiction entirely when reviewing state court decisions. In fact, the Supreme Court has expressly held that the doctrine has a narrow application. See Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 284. For example, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not touch the writ of habeas corpus. See Plyler v. Moore, 129 F.3d 728, 732 (4th Cir. 1997); Ritter v. Ross, 992 F.2d 750, 753 (7th Cir. 1993); Blake v. Papadakos, 953 F.2d 68, 71, n. 2 (3d Cir. 1992). Federal habeas corpus law expressly provides for federal collateral review of final state court judgments, and requires exhaustion of state remedies as a precondition for federal relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Additionally, the doctrine does not impact bankruptcy law, as bankruptcy courts are empowered to avoid state judgments. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548, 549. The Supreme Court has also held that Rooker-Feldman does not apply to a suit in which review is sought in federal district court of an "executive action, including determinations made by a state administrative agency." Verizon Maryland Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 535 U.S. 635, 644, n. 3, 122 S.Ct. 1753 (2002). The doctrine also does not apply to a federal court suit brought by a nonparty to the state court suit. Johnson, 512 U.S. at 1006.
Nevertheless, case law is clear in establishing that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine operates to bar de facto appeals from state court decisions. See Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1161 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine generally bars federal district courts "from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over a suit that is a de facto appeal from a state court judgment") (emphasis in original). For example, in Worldwide Church of God, defendants who lost at state court brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in federal district court. 805 F.3d at 890. They named the state superior court as a defendant, alleged as a legal wrong that the state court jury verdict was unconstitutional, and sought an injunction against the enforcement of the state court judgment based on the verdict. Id. The Ninth Circuit held that the federal suit was barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Id. at 893.
Here, Mr. Chism's complaint filed in this Court fits squarely within the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Mr. Chism is a state court loser who is seeking review and ultimately rejection of the state court judgments against him. As Mr. Chism alleges in his complaint, he brings his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint because the defendants "deprived [Mr. Chism] of his constitutionally secured right to a fair trial . . . which materially prejudiced [Mr. Chism] at trial." (Dkt. #1, Plaintiff's Complaint, ¶ 1). Specifically, and as mentioned above, Mr. Chism alleges that Judge Kallas improperly allowed the State to refer to the complainant as a "victim" throughout trial, improperly admitted prejudicial evidence, and improperly excluded favorable testimony. ( Id. at ¶¶ 22, 24, 25). However, and as Mr. Chism admits in his complaint, the state trial court was affirmed by Division One of the Court of Appeals for the State of Washington as to each alleged error made by Judge Kallas. ( Id. at ¶ 2). Additionally, the Washington State Supreme Court denied Mr. Chism's petition for discretionary review. ( Id. at ¶ 29).
Notwithstanding these facts, Mr. Chism argues that Rooker-Feldman does not apply because he is not asking this Court to reverse a mistake or error made at the state court level. (Dkt. #8 at 5). Rather, Mr. Chism argues that he is asking this Court to decide whether the state court judges committed misconduct. ( Id.). Thus, Mr. Chism argues that his complaint is not a de facto appeal, but rather an independent claim that the state court judges acted illegally, thereby violating his constitutionally protected rights. ( Id.).
Regardless of the way in which Mr. Chism characterizes his claims, he cannot avoid the substance underlying those claims. The basis for Mr. Chism's complaint in this Court is that Judge Kallas made improper rulings, and Judge Agid and Judge Schindler ignored precedent by affirming Judge Kallas' rulings. The complaint, therefore, is precisely a de facto appeal to this Court of a state court decision. Finding that the state court judges acted illegally would effectively reverse the judgment made by the state appellate court, because it would reject the findings made by Judge Agid and Judge Schindler that the alleged errors made by Judge Kallas during trial were not improper. Furthermore, Mr. Chism cannot avoid Rooker-Feldman simply by claiming that his federally protected constitutional rights are at stake. See Johnson, 512 U.S. at 1006; Worldwide Church of God, 805 F.2d at 891. As a court of original jurisdiction, this Court is prohibited from undertaking such a task under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
Ultimately, state court losers complaining of injuries caused by state court judgments cannot invite a federal district court to review and reject those judgments. See Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 284. As a result, the Court finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and plaintiff's claims shall be dismissed with prejudice. While leave to amend a complaint is liberally granted, it is not necessary where, as here, the defects in the complaint cannot be cured. See Schreiber, 806 F.2d at 1401.
D. Defendants' Remaining Arguments
The Court finds it unnecessary to address defendants' alternative arguments because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine operates to dismiss plaintiff's complaint.
III. CONCLUSION
Having reviewed defendants' motion, plaintiff's response, defendants' reply, and the remainder of the record, the Court hereby finds and orders:(1) Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum in Support Thereof (Dkt. #4) is GRANTED. Plaintiff's claims are dismissed with prejudice. The case is now CLOSED.
(2) The Clerk is directed to forward a copy of this Order to all counsel of record and to pro se plaintiff at the following address: 2100 Newfield Lane, Austin, TX 78703.