Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:97CVP-146-S
June 9, 1999.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the court on motion of the defendants, Robert Wilson, Donald Taylor, Donald Husband, Roy Crowe, and Mike Blazer, corrections officers employed at Kentucky Correctional Psychiatric Center ("KCPC"), for summary judgment in this civil rights action. The plaintiff, Robert Lee Chinn ("Chinn"), pro se, has not responded to the motion.
The plaintiff, Robert Lee Chinn, has named an individual, Mike Siscalay, as a defendant in this action. It appears from the record that service was not made on such a person, and KCPC denies that an individual by that name was ever employed at the facility. Nothing has been offered to contradict this evidence. We will therefore dismiss the claims against Mike Siscalay, an unknown and unserved defendant.
Chinn, an inmate at KCPC, filed this action after he suffered a broken arm while being restrained and medicated after an altercation with another inmate.
The defendants have asserted various bases for summary judgment. Donald Husband had a scheduled day off on November 9, 1996, and thus was not present at KCPC when the incident occurred. Mike Blazer was assigned to and present in Unit 5-A, a unit separate from the unit where the incident occurred. Robert Wilson, Donald Taylor, and Roy Crowe, the officers who were actually involved in subduing Chinn, contend that there was no unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain upon him. They state that only that force which was necessary to subdue and secure Chinn under the circumstances was employed.
Failure to file an opposing memorandum may be sufficient grounds for granting the requested relief. See LR 7.1(c)(1). Nevertheless, in the interests of justice, this court will review and address the merits of the defendant's motion for summary judgment.
Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see. Canderm Pharmacal, Ltd. v. Elder Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 862 F.2d 597, 601 (6th Cir. 1988). The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
However, the moving party's burden may be discharged by demonstrating that there is an absence of evidence to support an essential element of the nonmoving party's case for which he or she has the burden of proof. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. Once the moving party demonstrates this lack of evidence, the burden passes to the nonmoving party to establish, after an adequate opportunity for discovery, the existence of a disputed factual element essential to his or her case with respect to which he or she bears the burden of proof. Id. If the record taken as a whole could not lead the trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, the motion for summary judgment should be granted. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
Chinn must show that he has been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that the defendants deprived him of that right under color of state law. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 1913, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has accepted the standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 89 L.Ed.2d (1986) with respect to the proof required to establish an Eighth Amendment violation in the context of an assault upon an inmate:
To be cruel and unusual punishment, conduct that does not purport to be punishment at all must involve more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner's interests or safety . . . It is obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith, that characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, whether that conduct occurs in connection with establishing conditions of confinement, supplying medical needs, or restoring official control over a tumultuous cellblock The infliction of pain in the course of a prison security measure, therefore, does not amount to cruel and unusual punishment simply because it may appear in retrospect that the degree of force authorized or applied for security purposes was unreasonable, and hence unnecessary in the strict sense.Whitley, 106 S.Ct. at 1084. "This standard is designed to strike an appropriate balance between the deference that should be accorded to prison officials in their administration of the prison and the constitutional right of prisoners to be free from cruel and unusual punishment." Doe v. Sullivan County, Tennessee, 956 F.2d 545, 550 (6th Cir. 1992), quoting, Roland v. Johnson, 856 F.2d 764, 769 (6th Cir. 1988). This standard has been held to apply to security officers at forensic medical facilities such as KCPC. See, Durham v. Nu'Man, 97 F.3d 862 (6th Cir. 1996).
The circumstances surrounding the incident are undisputed.
The incident occurred on November 6, 1996 on KCPC's Unit 3-D. Taylor witnessed Chinn, unprovoked, strike another inmate, Chester Lewis, in the head. Taylor stepped between Chinn and Lewis. Wilson grabbed Chinn by his shirt to restrain him. A struggle ensued, and Taylor then grabbed Chinn from behind in a bear hug to restrain him from striking the officers or attempting to strike Lewis again. Chinn continued to be physically and verbally abusive. Taylor, Wilson and Chinn then fell to the floor. Chinn landed face down on the floor with his right arm underneath him. Crowe arrived on the scene after the three men had fallen. He observed Chinn still hitting and kicking at Taylor and Wilson. He held Chinn's legs so that he couldn't kick anyone, until the Code 500 team arrived and placed Chinn in restraints. It appears that Chinn's arm was broken when Wilson pulled Chinn's arm out from underneath him so that he could be placed in handcuffs.
All of the corrections officers were familiar with Chinn and his prior assaults on other inmates. They were familiar with certain behavior, walking backward and in circles, which they have seen to occur when Chinn is having a psychotic episode at which time he is inclined to act violently. Chinn was walking backward immediately prior to striking Lewis. Chinn has admitted to having launched an unprovoked attack on Lewis. He stated in his amended complaint, however, that he only struck Lewis once. He contends that he would not have struck Lewis again, therefore it was unnecessary and excessive for Taylor, Wilson and Crowe to take steps to restrain him. Chinn has not responded to the motion for summary judgment, and has not refuted the affidavits which establish that a violent struggle ensued in bringing the situation under control. While Chinn does not admit to acting violently toward Taylor and Wilson as they attempted to restrain him, he has admitted that he "tried to avoid" them, and that at some point, he did grab onto Wilson's shirt. (See Chinn's Response to Motion to Dismiss of Greg Taylor).
Under the facts before us, the court finds that there is no evidence of obdurate or wanton conduct on the part of Taylor, Wilson or Crowe. Clearly a need existed at the time of Chinn's assault on Lewis for the application of force to restrain Chinn from further violent conduct. This is true despite Chinn's retrospective assertion that he had no intention of doing Lewis any further harm. The amount of force employed under the circumstances does not appear excessive in light of the uncontroverted statements that Chinn was abusive and violent, and attempting to strike and kick the officers. Chinn's arm was broken in an attempt to place him in handcuffs, a restraint made necessary by his violent resistence and continuing violent behavior.
The court concludes that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. A separate order will be entered herein this date in accordance with this opinion.