See Taylor v. United States, 54 Fed. Cl. 423, 423 (2002); Mitchell v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 437, 438 (1999). The Federal Circuit appears to agree with the Court of Federal Claims' precedent that "the Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction `over actions for breach of settlement agreements when the agreements ar[i]se from disputes which would have been litigated in other fora.'" Massie v. United States, 166 F.3d 1184, 1188 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (alteration in original); cf. St. Vincent's Med. Ctr. v. United States, 32 F.3d 548, 550 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Medicare Act); Chin v. United States, 890 F.2d 1143, 1146 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (Postal Reform Act). It also appears to agree with this court's precedent that the Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction under the Tucker Act only if "disposition of the contract claim would require review of subject matter reserved to another body," Massie, 166 F.3d at 1189; cf. Bobula v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 970 F.2d 854, 858 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (Civil Service Reform Act). In holding that the Court of Federal Claims had jurisdiction over a claim for an annuity under the comprehensive remedial scheme of the Military Claims Act ("MCA"), the Federal Circuit distinguished between "review of the substantive issues of the MCA claim — the existence and extent of the government's liability" — and the enforcement of "an express contract embodying" the claimant's entitlement to the annuity under the MCA. Massie, 166 F.3d at 1189.

Ironically, the exclusive grievance procedures of the CBA preclude any party from challenging the CBA in the Court of Federal Claims, thereby providing an additional reason that the Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction. See, e.g., Chin v. United States, 890 F.2d 1143, 1144-47 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Harris v. United States, 841 F.2d 1097, 1098-1100 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Rinner v. United States, 50 Fed. Cl. 333, 335-36 (2001); Hayes v. United States, 20 Cl.Ct. 150, 151, 156 (1990) (interpreting Chin and Harris). Even assuming that a third party beneficiary could enforce the CBA and MOU in the Court of Federal Claims, appellants cannot establish jurisdiction under the Tucker Act for a claim for money damages against the United States. Appellants essentially seek to use the CBA or the MOU as leverage to obtain a reclassification of the Albuquerque Center to an ATC-11 facility. Absent a prior reclassification, however, appellants have no claim for back pay.

In turn, courts have consistently read the phrase "in the performance of his [or her] duty" to mean, "arising out of or in the course of employment." Chin v. United States, 890 F.2d 1143, 1145 (Fed. Cir. 1989); see also Tarver v. United States, 25 F.3d 900, 902 (10th Cir. 1994). Under this construction, FECA extends compensation coverage to cases where "the obligations or conditions of [federal] employment created `a special zone of danger' that resulted in injury."

To have occurred "in the performance of duty," the injury or death must have "aris[en] out of and in the course of employment." Chin v. United States, 890 F.2d 1143, 1145 (Fed. Cir. 1989). The United States shall pay compensation ... for the disability or death of an employee resulting from personal injury sustained while in the performance of his duty unless the injury or death is —

Even though his reinstatement would ultimately require the government to expend money to pay his salary, the thrust of his complaint does not center on money owed to him by the government. See Doe v. United States, 372 F.3d 1308, 1312-13 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that the Little Tucker Act provides the district court with jurisdiction to grant equitable relief only where such relief "would give the plaintiff nothing more than an award of damages"); see also Chin v. United States, 890 F.2d 1143, 1145-46 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (finding a claim for a violation of a collective bargaining contract is cognizable only under the Postal Reorganization Act, 39 U.S.C. §§ 101-5605, not the Tucker Act). --------

Plaintiff cites numerous Claims Court cases affirming that third-party beneficiaries of government contracts have standing in that court to sue the United States under such contracts. E.g., Chin v. United States, 16 Cl.Ct. 274, 276 n. 2 (1989); Hebah v. United States, 192 Ct.Cl. 785, 792, 428 F.2d 1334 (1970). Those cases, however, involve interpretations of the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491, the primary jurisdictional statute for that court, not of the Contract Disputes Act, which alone can bestow jurisdiction on this Court in this case.