Opinion
B225961
01-24-2012
In re Marriage of HELEN and SAMUEL OKE CHIMA. HELEN CHIMA, Respondent, v. SAMUEL OKE CHIMA, Appellant.
Thomasina M. Reed for Appellant. Lola M. McAlpin-Grant for Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BD448029)
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Hank M. Goldberg, Judge. Reversed with directions.
Thomasina M. Reed for Appellant.
Lola M. McAlpin-Grant for Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Samuel Oke Chima (Husband) appeals from a judgment of dissolution of his marriage to Helen Chima (Wife). We reverse.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Husband and Wife were married on September 24, 1979 in Nigeria. Their daughter was born in 1991. They separated on October 20, 2005, and Wife filed a petition for dissolution of marriage on June 20, 2006.
The matter was initially heard before Commissioner Gretchen W. Taylor on September 23, 2008. At the hearing, the court explained that the marriage could not be dissolved until a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) was prepared to protect Husband's right to a portion of Wife's pension. Wife's counsel agreed to prepare the QDRO.
The court confirmed the parties' cars as their separate property. It asked the parties to find out whether their life insurance policies had cash value; whether Husband had a claim to Wife's properties in Arkansas.
Wife claimed an interest in two properties outside of Lagos, Nigeria. Husband stated, "I don't own them. I never owned them. We don't own them because of this marriage, and whatever I own she can have." The court awarded them to Wife at zero value, so she did not have to pay Husband for them.
The court also ordered the parties to agree as to a fair market value for the family residence on Rimpau Boulevard in Los Angeles, and it set a mandatory settlement conference for October 24.
On October 24, the parties entered into a settlement agreement. Pursuant to the settlement agreement, Wife was awarded the family residence and ordered to make an equalizing payment to Husband of $68,750. The settlement agreement provided that if Wife was unable to make the equalizing payment, the property would be sold and the proceeds divided equally. Wife was also awarded the real property in Nigeria having no assigned value. The settlement agreement also awarded Husband and Wife interests in one another's retirement plans, and their automobiles. The court awarded child support but reserved jurisdiction to award spousal support until the time of trial. The court reserved for trial the characterization of the Arkansas property as separate or community property.
Husband filed a trial brief regarding Wife's failure to comply with the settlement agreement as to the residence on Rimpau Boulevard. Trial took place on January 28, 2010. When the trial court asked what the remaining issue was, Wife's counsel stated, "The issue, according to our position, is that we resolved everything except the property in Nigeria that was awarded to my client is not property that she can own in Nigeria. . . . [¶] So what we're asking is that the real property in Los Angeles be assigned as to my client and that an equalizing award of the property in Nigeria to [Husband]. The property in Los Angeles is upside down. My client is paying the mortgage and attempting to do everything she can [to] keep it from going into foreclosure. She at this point has . . . made an attempt to try to sell the property. But . . . the property is just not worth what they wanted to list it for, namely $300,000. And unless it is $300,000 or more there is no equity."
Husband, who was representing himself, stated that the issue was that Wife had not complied with the settlement agreement by making an equalizing payment for the Rimpau Boulevard property. The trial court responded, "Well, why don't we just get started then and see what happens." Husband asked, "And, your honor?" The trial court stated, "That is the only issue, is regarding the two homes, the property . . . in Nigeria and the property here in Los Angeles." Wife's counsel agreed.
Wife's expert then testified that under Nigerian law, Wife would be unable to own the property in Nigeria, even if it was awarded to her by a California court. Wife testified as to the work she and Husband put into the house on the property. She also claimed that Husband "was not forthcoming to the court" at the prior hearing when he said that Wife could have the property in Nigeria, because he knew that she would never get it.
Husband testified that his father had owned the property in Nigeria. His oldest brother was entitled to the property and lived in the house on the property. While Husband contributed some money toward the house, it was his brother who built the house, not he and Wife. Husband added that he and Wife contributed money to help her family in Nigeria as well.
The court gave its indicated judgment, which was to award the equity in the Rimpau Boulevard residence to Wife. The court believed the house in Africa was quasi-community property, which it awarded to Husband. Because the value of the Africa property was greater, Husband would owe Wife an equalizing payment. Husband argued the unfairness of this ruling, but the trial court believed that the house in Africa was built by Husband and Wife with community assets.
Husband filed a motion for new trial or to set aside the judgment on February 16. The basis of his motion was the trial court's failure to enforce the settlement agreement.
Judgment was entered on March 2. The judgment awarded the Rimpau Boulevard residence to Wife and the quasi-community property in Nigeria to Husband, with Husband to make an equalizing payment.
At the June 14 hearing on the new trial motion, Husband was represented by new counsel, who reviewed the proceedings before Commissioner Taylor with respect to the property in Nigeria. She noted that the settlement agreement awarded the property in Nigeria to Wife and did not reserve for trial the question whether it was community property or quasi-community property. She also pointed out that no value was assessed to the property at that time.
Husband's counsel also pointed out that Commissioner Taylor had reserved a determination as to ownership of the Arkansas properties, and the court never made that determination. The same was true of Wife's pension. So Husband, "instead of receiving money for the purchase of his interest in the [Rimpau Boulevard] house, now has to pay [Wife] for the interest of the house that he does not own in terms of Nigerian property [law]."
Wife's counsel told the court that Husband had withdrawn his claim to the Arkansas properties, and the issue of Wife's pension also had been resolved. The trial court denied Husband's new trial motion.
DISCUSSION
It is Husband's contention that once the parties entered into the settlement agreement, the trial court had no authority to divide the parties' property in a manner other than that specified in the agreement. We agree.
Family Code section 2550 provides for the equal division of community property, "[e]xcept upon the written agreement of the parties, or on oral stipulation of the parties in open court." Thus, where "the parties agree upon the property division, no law requires them to divide the property equally, and the court does not scrutinize the [settlement agreement] to ensure that it sets out an equal division. [Citation.]" (Mejia v. Reed (2003) 31 Cal.4th 657, 666.) Rather, "the court must accept the parties' written agreement or in-court stipulation regarding the disposition of their property. [Citation.] The court's 'only role with regard to a proper stipulated disposition of marital property is to accept the stipulation and, if requested, to incorporate the disposition into the judgment.' [Citation.]" (In re Marriage of Dellaria & Blickman-Dellaria (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 196, 201.)
Here, the parties entered into a written settlement agreement that awarded the Rimpau Boulevard residence to Wife and required either that she make an equalizing payment to Husband or that the property be sold and the proceeds divided equally. The property in Nigeria, which Husband claimed he had no interest in, was awarded to Wife at zero value, so that Wife would not have to make an equalizing payment to Husband should she be able to obtain an ownership interest in the property.
The court was required to accept the settlement agreement and enter judgment accordingly. (In re Marriage of Dellaria & Blickman-Dellaria, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 201.) Clearly, what happened here was that the value of the Rimpau Boulevard residence decreased and Wife was unable to make the equalizing payment or sell the property for more than the amount she owed on it. While this was an unfortunate situation, she was not entitled to renege on her agreement (Boeseke v. Boeseke (1974) 10 Cal.3d 844, 849-850), and the trial court was not permitted to remake the agreement to ensure an equal division of the parties' property (Mejia v. Reed, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 666; Matassa v. Matassa (1948) 87 Cal.App.2d 206, 214).
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. The matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Husband is to recover his costs on appeal.
JACKSON, J. We concur:
PERLUSS, P. J.
WOODS, J.